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Abstract 
This dissertation is concerned with the distribution of power within the Conservative 
Party, but specifically how power manifests itself. Following the devastating 1997 defeat, 
the party embarked on a programme of organisational change, which brought together the 
individual components of the party, underpinned by a written constitution. A more formal 
approach to organisation ensued. It was deemed the route to party renewal, in line with 
the Labour Party's central command model. As such, it was a direct challenge to the 
traditional autonomy enjoyed by the constituency parties. The research thus examines 
how the party responded organisationally to defeat and the attendant impact on local 
autonomy. The methodology employed is qualitative in nature and takes the bottom-up 
perspective. Interviews were conducted with local constituency officers, area officers, 
agents and regional officials. These were supported by statistical and documentary data. 
Three centrally-orientated themes emerged: the right of political determination, the 
development of political capability and the approach to party management. These were 
synthesised into a new framework to explain the evolution of the Conservative Party 
organisation: the managerial-network model. This recognises the move to greater central 
administration and control, but equally to local rights of self-organisation, as local 
autonomy is now conceived. Moreover, it incorporates the increasing engagement of 
outside supporter networks and expertise at the local level; this is an extension of the 
national practice. The model is appraised against the `oligarchy' and `party evolution' 
literature. Oligarchy has been strengthened by managerialism, thereby re-enforcing 
McKenzie's (1963) argument, but in a wider organisational context. The party evolution 
literature was found to be too narrowly focused, as it did not satisfactorily address 
organisation. Hence, the managerial-network model builds upon the electoral- 
professional model of Panebianco (1988), but is more comprehensive and flexible. It also 
suggests that the notion of `membership party' is no longer applicable as there is a 
noticeable political deficit locally. It has been replaced by a local network in which the 
local association is the foundation. This has resulted in the blurring of its boundaries. The 
new organisational settlement is a logical and sustainable response to the changing 
political environment that the Conservative Party leadership was confronted with, but one 
that offers room for further development. 
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" Introduction 
This dissertation takes an organisational perspective to the distribution of power within 
the Conservative Party. It is concerned with how power manifests itself. The dissertation 
does not seek to contribute to an understanding of the concept or nature of power. 
However, the essence of power warrants consideration. Power relates to social 
relationships between individuals and their status within the organisation (Mullins 2005). 
It provides the ability to overcome resistance, to exert influence and to generate results 
consistent with objectives and interests (Huczynski and Buchanan 2006). From the 
political viewpoint, the works of Lukes (1974) and Dowding (1996) are apposite. Lukes 
conceived three dimensions of power. The one-dimensional view reflects the pluralist 
approach in which power is behavioural, associated with decision-making situations 
where there is 'observable conflict of (subjective) interests. ' The two-dimensional view 
improved upon this by expanding the boundaries of power to include potential issues 
where decision-making is prevented, thereby avoiding conflict. Hence, control is 
achieved over the political agenda so that certain issues are omitted from the political 
process. Lukes argued this was still conceptually incomplete and therefore advanced a 
three-dimension view, which further incorporated institutionalised power. Here, elites 
define or shape the setting in which organisational members participate, so that the 
latter's real interests and potential grievances may be distorted. Power is thus employed to 
prevent conflict by encouraging them to accept existing organisational modes. 
Dowding (1996) distinguished between 'power to' and 'power over'. The former relates to 
'outcome power', the ability to bring about results, but where the impact on other actors is 
secondary or irrelevant. 'Power over' however, reflects 'social power' because it concerns 
a relationship in 'the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of 
another actor' to realise outcomes. It is the capacity to manipulate others' incentive 
structure which is critical: the ability to change the choice menu, which may or may not 
be in their interests. In this way, it represents the capacity of party elites to alter the 
internal balance of power. The means of facilitation range from coercive to subtle in 
nature. However, Dowding also acknowledged co-operation, which permits power 
accumulation if there is mutual recognition; although conflict may still lie below the 
surface. Pinto-Duschinsky argued that in the Conservative Party, the concept of power 
was misleading because it implied pressure, imposition and control. It thus ignored 
voluntarism, which formed the essential relationship between the parliamentary party and 
the constituencies (1972: 12). Far from trying to compel members therefore, power could 
also emanate from consensus. This was appropriately expressed by Medding: 
Consensual power, originating in the ability and the need of the leadership to gain 
the co-operation of the rest of the party, is power based upon agreement. As such, 
it has both positive and negative aspects. To the extent that leaders demonstrate 
their ability to achieve the co-operation of their followers, their power will be 
greatly increased. Conversely, to the extent that a leadership fails to gain the 
agreement and co-operation of its followers, its power has been limited (1970: 
10). 
Party unity for electoral success would underpin leadership drives for consensus. 
Activists would co-operate more fully and acquiesce to leadership positions if they came 
to the conclusion that such a move would bring the desired outcome. Layton-Henry 
pointed to an intra-party consensus reflecting the party's aims, values and beliefs, and 
organisational management, so that the notion of power was relatively unimportant. 
However, pointing particularly at candidate selection, he added that if this fundamental 
consensus were to break down, the 'development of formal procedures which would be 
more strictly enforced', would be a likely outcome (1976: 400-402). Leaders could take 
action, but negative power might be exercised in the sense of reduced activity, short of 
actual exit. Here, Dowding noted trustworthiness and reliability, manifested in repeated 
interaction, as crucial to co-operation (1996: 15). 
The critical issue is the extent to which leaders require intra-party consensus. If they were 
strengthened centrally by for example, wealthy external donors, their judgement might be 
skewed accordingly. This reflects the literature which underpins this dissertation. Many 
scholars (e. g. Webb 1994), have acknowledged a trend towards the greater centralisation 
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of party organisations; local activists and members being deemed increasingly 
unimportant. This conclusion has its origins in the 'oligarchy' and 'party evolution' 
traditions. Foremost in the former is McKenzie (1963). His study of British political 
parties examined the distribution of power at the national level and in this regard afforded 
little prominence to the local parties. The critical political activities of policy, finance and 
candidates were firmly under the control of the party leadership. The views of the party 
members must be accommodated because of their role in selecting candidates, raising 
funds and campaigning, but final authority remained with the leadership. However, in 
restricting his analysis to the national level, he was making an implicit assumption that 
only political activity in this arena mattered. Yet, numerous contemporary scholars have 
shown that the local contribution can have a decisive impact on electoral outcomes (e. g. 
Johnston and Pattie 1995,1998; Whiteley et al 1994). It could thus be construed that it 
was not just teams of leaders that win elections, but a more holistic party-wide effort. 
McKenzie did not give any weight to single member individual constituencies in the first- 
past-the-post electoral system. For his thesis to be sustainable, the leadership must be 
able to utilise central power to exercise control over politically sensitive local activities. 
Panebianco (1988) made important assertions concerning the evolution of party 
organisation. His electoral-professional model extended McKenzie through its emphasis 
on centralisation. Social and technological changes both required and enabled central 
professionals (experts with specialist knowledge) to assimilate tasks performed by party 
bureaucrats, so that activists were downgraded. Professionals were deemed more adept at 
engaging voters, by contrast to the amateurish membership. Campaign emphasis was 
placed upon the personalities of leaders, particularly through the medium of television. 
Hence, power and resources were necessarily located at the centre, thereby permitting the 
leadership to direct the party organisation accordingly. However, his model was 
inherently product-based, reinforced for example, by the need for instant national-level 
responses to emerging issues. He ignored the geographical dimension in the British 
polity, the important battles fought in individual constituencies. The salient characteristic 
of these constituencies is diversity. Whilst national issues dominated a general election 
campaign, they had to be framed within a local context. Candidates required an 
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understanding of local issues in order to present themselves as appropriate to tackle them. 
Failure to engage locally would convey some advantage to more locally-orientated 
competitors. Hence, they required the support of local parties, who occupied a unique 
position in British politics. The Conservative Party provided a good illustration of the 
diversity and complexity implied by this argument. 
The Conservative Party 
For a long time, the Conservative Party was the dominant party in British politics, but 
was reduced to disarray by the devastating electoral setback of 1997; in terms of votes its 
worst performance since 1832 and in seats won since 1906 (Collings and Seldon 2001: 
624). It subsequently embarked upon a series of organisational reforms, which challenged 
the traditional autonomy of local parties. They render the Conservatives as an interesting 
case for analysis. 
Defeat had both political and organisational dimensions. Politically, the internal divisions 
over Europe were described as 'intractable and unsettling' (Peele 1997: 100). This led 
Buller to question how 'one of the most disciplined and electorally successful parties in 
Western Europe' could implode in the manner it did (2000: 319). The ideological legacy 
of Margaret Thatcher was especially apposite; her stance over Europe particularly, caused 
turmoil. Thus, the issue deprived the party of the unity for which it was renowned, with 
profound implications for party management and public image (Bale 2006a: 385). 
Moreover, the party became associated more with England than Britain as a whole, but 
importantly here, her position over local government and local Conservative parties 
fuelled a weakening of the party organisation (Seldon and Snowdon 2005a: 245-6). 
Nevertheless, it was instinctive that some blame for defeat was apportioned to the 
organisation; this was a typical Conservative reaction (Scarrow 1996; Ball 2005). Ball 
added that complacency towards organisation was a feature of mature governments, but 
equally once in opposition could divert attention from more pressing political problems 
(2005: 12-13). Kelly though, stressed that organisational renewal was essential, since it 
would have reduced the size of defeat; the re-adoption of the politically discredited Neil 
Hamilton, for example, could have been avoided (2003b: 83). It was clear that the party's 
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organisational ascendancy had been severely eroded. During the Major administration 
1990-1997, the professional centre faltered, particularly in communications capability 
(Peele 1997: 107). This was accompanied by growing malaise locally. Party membership 
and levels of activism declined markedly, on the back of a substantial reduction in local 
councillors (Seldon and Snowdon 2005a: 248). Indeed, there was a marked de- 
energisation happening locally (Whiteley et al 1994). Politically and organisationally, the 
Conservative Party was not prepared for opposition. 
The Conservative Party hierarchy did not view their problems to be deep-seated, 
opposition being a 'temporary aberration', the result of policy divisions, 'sleaze' and 
government exhaustion (Garnett and Lynch 2002: 31). Its self-assessment as the 'natural' 
party of government meant that the fundamental shift in outlook of Tony Blair's New 
Labour Party, together with societal changes generally, were not fully understood (Seldon 
and Snowdon 2005a: 248). Organisationally however, the party leadership and central 
professionals had watched Labour roll out its strategy with debilitating consequences. 
They were determined to learn lessons from its Millbank operation; in particular, the use 
of technology, the management of the media and the ability to deploy local campaign 
personnel where they were needed (Butler and Kavanagh 1997: 243; 2002: 41). The key 
to its success was believed to be a central command structure, which directed the 
resources of the party and hence provided campaign flexibility (Gould 1998: 240). This 
had implications for local Conservative associations, whose autonomy was deemed 
inconsistent with the demands of the modern competitive political environment. A reform 
agenda was the natural outcome. Denunciations by numerous party members of MPs' 
conduct during the party conference following the 1997 defeat (Cowley and Stuart 2005: 
1), may have given the leadership added impetus. The party was renowned for its 
'adaptability, resilience and desire for power, ' characteristics that manifested themselves 
especially when confronted by opposition (Ball 2005: 1). As will be shown in this study, 
it now included a quest to dismantle the rudiments of local autonomy. This first needs to 
be viewed in a historical context. 
Historical Perspective 
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Organisation was a cornerstone of the party's relentless and ruthless pursuit of power. 
Constituency associations emerged as a response to the 1832 Reform Act, initially to 
organise the registration of voters, then a complicated process, and to attract finance. 
They had no input into policy, nor at that stage did they select candidates, but equally, 
they were not administered from the centre (Hurd 2007: 179). Essentially, they were 
'oligarchic groupings of notables without an extended membership or internal 
representative arrangements' (Tether 1996a: 98). However, it was following the second 
Reform Act of 1867 that serious attention to organisation emanated. Designated by Lord 
Derby as a'leap in the dark', the resultant doubling of the electorate to two million meant 
new votes that had to be competed for (Ramsden 1998: 98). This led to the formation of 
the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations in 1867 and Conservative 
Central Office in 1870. The National Union's purpose was to co-ordinate the activities of 
local associations, to encourage new ones, and to disseminate campaign propaganda; in 
other words 'to support, not to question or control, the party in parliament' (Norton and 
Aughey 1981: 203). The term 'handmaiden' to the leadership was coined. After the 1880 
election defeat, steps were taken to develop associations into less oligarchic competitive 
entities that, with the support of Central Office, lasted until the contemporary era (Tether 
1996a: 102). Whilst giving the benefit of continuity though, this structure was hampered 
by resistance to change (Ball 1994b: 297). Associations were augmented by the rise of 
the Primrose League, founded in 1984 as a supporters club for the party, which engaged 
in mostly social activities and the attraction of a mass membership. Importantly, it 
provided a vehicle for the participation of women until they were able to fully join 
associations after 1918, and for mobilising an army of canvassers at election time 
(Ramsden 1998: 143-4). Central Office was established by Disraeli to provide 
professional support, quickly involving itself in forming new associations, finding 
candidates, and all aspects of early campaigning, including literature, statistical analysis, 
press relations and electoral procedure. Its leadership has always been appointed by, and 
accountable to, the party leader (Norton and Aughey 1981: 223). 
Structurally, the organisational initiative following the 1867 Reform Act resulted in a 
disparate party comprising three separate bodies - the parliamentary party, Central Office 
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and the constituency associations - linked only by common purpose. The relationship was 
articulated by the Maxwell Fyfe Committee (1949): 'we have recognised the need not so 
much for a constitution ... as for an organisation which is an educative political force and 
a machine for winning elections'. It meant a focus on fundraising and campaign activities, 
and 'the avoidance of political discussion and controversy' (Layton-Henry 1976: 401). To 
this, Maxwell Fyfe added that the task of Central Office was 'to guide, inspire and co- 
ordinate the work of the party throughout the country, to advise and assist constituency 
associations and area councils and to provide such services as can best be organised 
centrally: For Pinto-Duschinsky, its role was thus advisory and supportive, and not 
control-based (1972: 9) However, that would depend upon how'guide' and 'co-ordinate' 
were interpreted; the modern era would suggest a more assertive stance to try to reconcile 
the different aims and interests of the party components, particularly the localities. 
Associations jealousy guarded their autonomy; it was 'widely accepted as a canon of 
Conservative Party organisation' (Layton-Henry 1976: 396). This was strongly indicated 
by their attitudes to membership, finance and candidate selection. Mindful of their 
contribution to the party's electoral effort, any direct attempts to get centrally preferred 
candidates selected were strongly rebuffed (Ingle 1987: 62). In return, they sought no 
active policy influence and there was no attempt to control the leadership; they simply 
expected acknowledgement of their efforts in their own vicinity (Tether 1996a: 103). 
Political debate was shunted into separate Conservative Political Centres (CPC), which in 
terms of input into national policy, were innocuous (Byrd 1987: 218-9). Essentially, it 
was a local competitive advantage in membership numbers and activity rates which 
reduced the centre's ability to direct the associations (Rose 1974: 153,157). This was 
supplemented by the strength of local finance, but also by the reality that activists were 
not beholden to the patronage of the centre for jobs and other benefits (Pinto-Duschinsky 
1972: 7-9). 
Central initiatives were commonly viewed with suspicion. Whilst Maxwell Fyfe was 
careful to work with the grain of local autonomy, other reformers elicited much rancour. 
For example, Lord Carrington's proposals for the central employment of agents in the 
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1970s and the 1993 Fowler Review into party organisation, which would have 
undermined local associations in the sensitive area of finance. Limited representation on 
the proposed Board of Management together with changes to the model rules, a code of 
practice and an annual audit brought fears of the centre acquiring information and power 
to annex local resources (Ball 1994b: 303). Despite this, Ball asserted that in practice, 
local associations were generally co-operative and worked with the professionals. The 
problem though, was an inability of the centre to correct weak performance; ultimately, it 
lacked effective sanctions (1994b: 262-3). 
The electoral onus attached to associations meant that intra-party democracy was 
'inappropriate' and largely shunned by the hierarchy (Byrd 1987: 218). Ingle speculated 
that there was a lack of demand for policy input (1987: 61). However, Whiteley et al 
noted the desire to attract members willing to contribute financially and campaign, but 
who wished no active policy-making involvement. They argued that the structure and 
culture of the party provided no real outlets for this (1994: 28). Nevertheless, there were 
numerous attempts to make the party more democratic, but these were destined for 
failure. In 1969, Greater London Young Conservatives produced a pamphlet Set the Party 
Free, which described the Conservative Party as 'one of the least democratic 
organisations in Britain outside the Freemasons' (1969: 20). It sought greater powers for 
the National Union to curb those of Central Office, a less stage-managed conference and 
more focus on political activities and issues throughout the voluntary party (Tether 
1996a: 108). Whilst inevitably no action was forthcoming, it did lead to the Chelmer 
Committee inquiry, which reported in 1972. This recommended enhanced policy 
discussion, but mechanisms needed to achieve it were quietly ignored (Ingle 1987: 61). 
This led Seyd to conclude that the party leadership and professionals were only prepared 
for reform and greater democracy in order to improve electoral efficiency; any challenge 
to the balance of power was refused (1975: 235). Despite this setback, the Charter 
Movement pressed on with regular newsletters and demands for more elected party 
officials. It established a Party Reform Steering Committee in 1992 to campaign for one 
half of the personnel on the National Union Executive Committee to be directly elected 
by members and for the National Union to take responsibility for central finances, but 
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these again were ignored (Whiteley et al 1994: 33). In the modern era, the quest was 
perpetuated by the Campaign for Conservative Party Democracy and ConservativeHome, 
but seemingly with the same outcome. 
In the Conservative Party, democracy was deemed subordinate to the indispensability of 
leadership: 'hierarchy, respect for, and deference to leaders have been the prevailing 
values of Conservatism' (Whiteley et al 1994: 36). This was conditioned by electoral 
success and respect for the views of the voluntary party, leading Tether to talk of 
conditional trust, rather than deference (1996a: 104-8). Nevertheless, to Ingle the pre- 
eminence of the party leader remained 'the defining characteristic of the Conservative 
Party'; reflected by 'an ingrained loyalty' in the localities, which was not present within 
the Labour Party (1987: 67,83). To this was added the importance of party unity, nobody 
wanting to be accused of splitting the party (Layton-Henry 1976: 400). Hence, Pinto- 
Duschinsky concluded that Conservative politics was 'best seen as a continuing series of 
feints and manoeuvres between various sections of the party, each seeking to push 
forward opinions, each realising however, the immense costs of disunity' (1972: 12). 
Organisational change would be a test of this. 
Organisational Reform 
The Fresh Future reform programme was the organisational response to the 1997 
election defeat, driven through by new party leader, William Hague. He was enamoured 
of New Labour's centralised command model, which was viewed as the cornerstone of its 
landslide victory. Change was masterminded by Archie Norman, former chairman and 
reviver of Asda supermarkets and a colleague at McKinsey consultants. His approach 
reflected business management principles consistent with Hague's vision. Concern was 
expressed at senior levels in the party at both the cost and the likely damage to relations 
with the voluntary party; Norman though, was more aghast at the resistance to change 
from vested interests (Butler and Kavanagh 2002: 42). However, in the membership 
consultation exercise, Kelly observed that the leadership was not interested in any 
counter-proposals; only those of the centre were for discussion and it would decide the 
final version (2003b: 88). 
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The provisions of Fresh Future would have profound implications for the local parties. 
For the first time the party components were united in a single structure with a detailed 
formal constitution, a repudiation of the flexible approach of Maxwell Fyfe and 
inevitably a future source of organisational rigidity. Importantly, the party leader now 
presided over the whole party, rather than just the parliamentary enclave. At the heart of 
the reforms was the creation of a governing Party Board, which would act as 'the supreme 
decision-making body on all matters relating to party organisation and management', and 
which would have strong membership representation (Conservative Party 1998a: 5-6). 
However, in its first incarnation, there were only five of seventeen, and in nön-executive 
positions. The National Union was abolished, but regional offices were also rationalised. 
Kelly's appraisal was stark. The board would 'take ultimate control of all party matters 
outside Westminster and in essence, centralise power within the extra-parliamentary 
party: As a result, central professionals reinterpreted local activities, 'hijacking' many of 
them (2002: 40-41). There were permanent sub-committees for candidate selection, 
conference and membership, but generally, the list of activities for oversight was so " 
comprehensive that it was-difficult to see any room for local initiative. 
Emphasis was placed upon reduced 'layers of communication' between members and the 
leadership in a flatter structure. The local associations were the 'building blocks of the 
renewed and decentralised party' and there was an enhanced role for the constituency 
chairman (Conservative Party 1998a: 10). Critically however, the legal autonomy of the 
associations was removed, so that they became formally accountable to the centre (Webb 
2000a: 196). They were provided with a new set of mostly mandatory rules. In addition, 
minimum performance criteria were established under the guise of producing a modem 
campaigning force. Failure to achieve the required standards across a range of political 
activities laid an association open to direct intervention under the mechanism of 
'Supported Associations. ' This would bring improvement under the centre's terms; it 
would appoint its own representative to manage the association (Conservative Party 
1998a: 11). Hence, the centre held sanctions over the localities for the first time, a change 
which Whiteley and. Seyd forecasted would transform intra-party relations (2002: 28). 
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Decentralisation was further undermined in more subtle, but equally significant ways. 
The centre would take greater responsibility for the recruitment, training and 
development of agents, though employment would likely remain local. Although 
candidate selection regulations superficially indicated continuing local autonomy, they 
were couched in sufficiently vague terms to permit the centre to implement future 
changes at will (Conservative Party 1998a: 17-20). Indeed, candidate conduct 
underpinned the establishment of an Ethics and Integrity Committee, which was charged 
with investigating individuals who brought the party into disrepute. (Conservative Party 
1998a: 30). Whilst, the party needed to be able to deal with recalcitrant people, the 
manner of the committee's establishment represented another centralising tendency. 
Fresh Future proudly displayed 'democracy: giving power to the members', suggesting 
ownership by them (Conservative Party 1998a: 21). The route was the power to elect the 
party leader and representatives to the central board. The latter as noted, was ineffectual. 
For the party leader, members were asked to choose from the two remaining candidates 
from the parliamentary party's prior process; they had no power of nomination. Kelly was 
again scathing, suggesting that this concession had seduced members into surrendering 
their autonomy to the party board (2003b: 89). Greater involvement was promised in 
policy development, manifested in the new Conservative Policy Forum (CPF), which 
replaced the CPC. Despite some member participation, Cowley and Quayle noted there 
was scarcely any 'direct and measurable impact' (2002: 52). Furthermore, membership 
ballots were introduced, but this was a cynical manipulation of the perceived more 
deferential passive members; they were, though, rarely used and the response rate was 
relatively poor. 2 Kelly observed that all five candidates in the 1997 leadership election 
stressed party unity and intra-party democracy, but critically, with the former taking 
precedence in order to ensure electoral viability. Power was thus to be skewed towards 
the leadership to enhance its strategic autonomy; democracy was a means to an end 
(2003b: 84-5). This was reinforced by Lees-Marshment and Quayle, who concluded that 
the democratic component was constrained by the move towards greater centralisation of 
power and was simply part of a quest to make the party appear more market-orientated 
and electorally attractive (2001: 211). 
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Fresh Future was a clear break with past organisational practice. Hague's stated intention 
was 'to revive the greatest political party of this century so that it is equipped to provide 
our nation withleadership and good government in the new millennium' (Conservative 
Party 1998a: 4). Hitherto, Ball had noted that' the party chairman was charged with 
organising election victory without any control over the efforts of the local parties 
(1994a: 176). Fresh Future was therefore an attempt to more closely align national and 
local aims and interests. However, it was questionable whether it was the solution to 
organisational renewal or was simply a leadership ruse to enhance its power. In trying to 
emulate Labour, a confused command structure emerged at Central Office (Seldon and 
Snowdon 2005a: 252). Furthermore, by reducing local morale, the reforms may have 
contributed to the party's dismal performance at the 2001 general election; area campaign 
directors were over-stretched, area researchers redundant and in many northern cities, the 
organisation was vapid (Kelly 2002: 38). 
A further tailing off of members and activity led after the 2005 election to the A 213' 
Century Party 'consultation' paper, proposing further organisational change. This marked 
a move towards even greater centralisation, showing that the leadership had not learned 
any lessons. Hence, local antipathy towards the proposals did not prevent the centre from 
taking steps to implement some of them. Aside from the attempt to recover the 
parliamentary party's sole right to select the party leader, the document proposed a radical 
change to the position of local associations through their re-conception as franchises. 3 
Their role would be defined in terms of contractual rights and responsibilities in a similar 
manner to business practices seen in fast-food and rent-a-car chains. Part of the package 
was the grouping of constituencies to form larger entities covering more than one 
constituency and the abolition of the historic 'association' title in favour of, for example, 
the 'Leicester Conservative Party'. The notion of supported status was also strengthened 
to make it easier for the board to find reason for intervention and to do so (Conservative 
Party 2005a: 6-11). The paper exuded central managerial control and was the antithesis of 
voluntarism. Franchising has not been implemented in name, but grouping has been 
aggressively pursued to reap campaign efficiencies; the propensity to group had been 
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vaguely set in voluntary terms in the 1998 constitution (Conservative Party 1998b: 10). It 
is clear that the centre has been doggedly pursuing business practices within the party 
organisation, with the potential for tension with local activists. Under David Cameron's 
leadership, there have been no further proposals for structural change, but strategically he 
has sought to professionalise the local procedures regarding candidate selection to 
address the under-representation of women, black and ethnic minority people in the 
parliamentary ranks. Again, consultation with the membership was ignored so that upset 
emanated. 
Research Objectives 
Central to this study is organisational reform within the Conservative Party. It is 
acknowledged that its developments were largely a competitive response to those that had 
taken place within the Labour Party. However, whilst a comparative study reflecting this 
would be of high academic value, the approach taken in this dissertation is to examine 
internal relationships within the Conservative Party. 
Ontologically, parties retain their position as a key pillar of liberal democracy, so that 
their organisations require careful examination. This need is enhanced as a result of the 
clear trend of membership decline at a time when there has been a resurgence of interest 
in the importance of local constituencies as key electoral battlegrounds. However, the 
traditional academic approach to assessing organisation is narrow, as it tends to 
emphasise local structures and people numbers. Such a stance is also inherently top- 
down; activists are invariably seen as actors to be accommodated by the leadership in its 
desire to maximise strategic autonomy. Hence, it was deemed important to delve more 
deeply into the party organisation to analyse its facets more broadly. The actual impact of 
central initiatives on party activists has largely been ignored. In the Conservative Party, 
organisational reform presented a direct challenge to the capacity of the local parties to 
sustain autonomy, here defined as the right of self-government or self-determination. The 
three research questions, detailed below, will thus be addressed from the local 
perspective, with a focus on the views and behaviour of local activists; they are an under- 
researched aspect of British politics. Whilst they will be augmented by the views of 
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regional professionals, the potential for bias is acknowledged as professionals operating 
out of Central Office do not form a part of this study. 
It needs to be further acknowledged that the period under consideration is from the 1997 
defeat until 2007, a time when the Conservative Party was in the political doldrums. The 
empirical work inevitably reflects this. Underlying each research question are issues 
concerning the purpose of party organisation and how it should be organised. 
1. How has the Conservative Party responded organisationally to the crushing electoral 
reversal of 1997? 
This study will confine itself to the Westminster electoral context. The basic assumption 
is that dominance of the national legislature remains the party's primary aim. Whilst 
minor parties have undergone solid development, the single member plurality electoral 
system imposes a high threshold, to a large extent protecting the position of the two 
major parties (Mitchell 2005: 167). Nevertheless, the Conservative Party has had to come 
to terms with political change. Fresh Future was the organisational response, but the 
document evinced restructuring; it seemingly neglected rejuvenation of people-related 
issues. Hence, the changing role and effectiveness of the local parties will be addressed. 
2. To what extent has the power afforded to the leadership by the 1998 party 
constitution impacted upon the traditional autonomy of the local Conservative 
constituency associations? 
Fresh Future provided the centre with the right of intervention into the constituency 
associations, particularly where they were deemed to be under-performing. The study 
will identify the extent to which encroachment has taken place and hence will provide an 
assessment of central attempts at co-ordination. As such, it raises the issue of the 
alignment of national and local aims and interests. Fresh Future, and more recently 
David Cameron's candidate changes, sought this outcome. The contemporary role and 
power of local activists will therefore be addressed. 
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3. What are the implications of the Conservative Party's revised organisational 
settlement for the academic models of party evolution? 
The electoral-professional model (Panebianco 1988), could be construed as a foundation 
of modern thinking on party organisation, at least from the top-down perspective. The 
model though, represents one rung on the ladder of party evolution from Duverger (1959) 
through to contemporary authors such as Carty (2004). Most emphasise the importance of 
leadership and largely dismiss politically, the party membership. However, a growing 
body of work has attempted to alter the way it is perceived (e. g. Seyd and Whiteley 1992; 
Whiteley et al 1994; Denver and Hands 1997). This dissertation seeks to augment this, 
through an organisational examination of the Conservative Party. In this vein, the study 
commenced by taking a hypothetico-deductive stance consistent with Popper's (1959) 
thesis, thereby with a view to the falsification of the electoral-professional model within 
the British context. However, it became apparent that, notwithstanding Panebianco's 
assertion that `no party completely fits the electoral-professional type' (1988: 265), both 
it and Carty's (2004) franchise concept, with its fixed contract, were too rigid and 
impractical. The models did not grasp adequately either the evidence that was 
materialising from talking to people on the ground or the apparent complex reality that is 
the Conservative Party. Hence, this was deemed to require an inductive-type study to 
unravel. The resultant model proposed in this dissertation reflects this, as it emerged from 
the empirical data to provide an interpretation of the new Conservative organisational 
settlement following the reform programme. 
By adopting an organisational perspective, the three research questions are addressed 
from a different, bottom-up angle. The research is confined to the salient organisational 
activities and hence does not explicitly address policy development. Following this 
organisational direction, use is made of management models as organising narratives. 
These permit an understanding of the softer, nuanced dimensions of power and hence 
how it manifests itself within the modern Conservative Party. The primary model in this 
respect is the McKinsey 7-S Framework (Peters and Waterman 1982), which addresses 
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organisational effectiveness, but beyond the traditional strategy and structure variables. In 
addition, Porter's (1980) `Five Forces' model of industry structure is employed in the 
literature chapter as an expedient way of collating the micro-environmental criticisms of 
the influential party evolution models, particularly those of Kirchheimer (1966) and 
Panebianco (1988). 
Methodology 
The research design for addressing the research questions is qualitative. This reflects an 
epistemological position that the approach to understanding parties as grassroots 
organisations, and to delving into their many facets, requires a design that permits a 
dialogue with the relevant actors locally. A qualitative stance allows an examination of 
the perspectives of those people who run the local parties and their interpretations of the 
political world as they see it. There have been relatively few qualitative studies of 
Conservative constituency associations, and even then they tend to be of specific 
associations (e. g. Bealey et at 1965; Holt and Turner 1968; Tether 1980). Much of the 
research has instead employed aggregate survey data (e. g. Whiteley et at 1994; Denver 
and Hands 1997). This has generated analysis of the socio-economic characteristics, 
motivations and attitudes of members. However, the unit of analysis was typically the 
individual member, rather than any structural element of the party. Furthermore, in 
asking participants to respond to preordained questions, this strategy does not permit an 
examination of how the organisation actually works. The identification of nuances in 
power structures and relationships was deemed to require a more flexible approach, 
where themes could be explored and developed. A more qualitative design was thus 
appropriate. 
The primary data collection was semi-structured interviews with eight local officers in 
each of four constituency associations, together with agents where present, and area 
chairmen. Regional professionals were also interviewed, in order to acquire the counter 
perspective. The interviews were scheduled for approximately one hour per respondent; 
although some were more expansive. Secondly, to the constituency interviewees, a short 
self-completed questionnaire was administered to discover their skills and level of 
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political activity. Thirdly, a request was made to each constituency chairman for access to 
the executive council minutes for a twelve-month period to gauge the types of activity 
that associations focused upon. Three acquiesced; High Peak declined. Somerton and 
Frome provided much extra material. Fourthly, financial analysis required the acquisition 
of annual reports and accounts. This was undertaken through a stratified sample 
conducted nationally, the constituencies being selected in a quasi-random, systematic 
manner. Stratification was by type of constituency (safe, close, marginal) and by party 
incumbency (Conservative, opposition). The data used was for the years 2004-5, 
reflecting the period prior to the 2005 general election, when fundraising and campaign 
expenditure reached a peak. Finally, additional material was provided by the secretary of 
the local association in the author's constituency. He was also able to attend a number of 
party events and meetings, which enabled some participant observation data to be 
obtained. A broad array of research tools was therefore utilised for triangulation 
purposes. 
The selection of appropriate constituency associations was the critical component of the 
qualitative research design. It was decided to focus on marginal seats that the 
Conservative Party needed to win at the next general election; it was upon these that the 
centre was likely to exert the most pressure in order to achieve its strategic aims. Power 
relationships would be more strongly indicated in these constituencies. As noted above, 
historically the centre had continued to chip away at local autonomy to enhance its 
control; the erosion of the local competitive advantage in member numbers and finance 
pointed to a potential to expedite this process. Moreover, organisational reform reflected 
a central desire to emulate the Labour Party's central command model. Local 
performance criteria, greater control of agents and the assumption of central 
responsibility over a wide range of local activities were hallmarks of this approach. In 
addition, there was some evidence of greater central co-ordination of local campaigns, 
although within the Conservative Party it had thus far had limited electoral impact 
(Denver et al 2003b; Fisher et at 2006). These initiatives pointed to a strong desire for 
organisational renewal, but as determined by the centre. Hence, in the marginal 
constituencies, there was likely to be scope for numerous organisational and political 
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nuances occurring. Activists would inevitably have different interpretations of the 
dynamics of organisational change to professionals. In focusing on marginal 
constituencies however, it needs to be acknowledged that politically, activists in safe 
Conservative seats, being in a stronger position, may have adopted a harder stance over 
issues such as candidate selection. 
The core issue in the decision concerning constituency association choice was the need to 
enhance data validity. Validity refers to the capacity of the research instrument to 
produce convincing results that reflect the true position (Sarantakos 1998: 78) of the 
Conservative Party, and thereby thoroughly address the research questions. There are, 
inevitably, practical constraints in a qualitative design, a primary purpose of which is 
focus on the subjective accounts of individuals: interviews are necessarily lengthy and 
time-consuming, so that it would not be feasible to interview a large number of people 
(Devine 1995: 142). The narrowness of the sample of qualitative interview respondents, 
when compared to, for example, survey data, would additionally have implications for 
the external validity notion of the generalisability of the results. This problem is 
magnified by the issue of sample representativeness, which cannot be fully achieved 
through a small number of respondents from a non-probability based sampling frame. 
Thus, Miles and Huberman (1994) refer instead, in qualitative studies, to credibility, 
trustworthiness and authenticity of the data. Credibility can be improved by a quest to 
achieve diversity in case selection, thereby enabling the researcher to tap into a network 
of local people from various backgrounds, with varying levels of responsibility and 
interest (Devine 1995: 142). 
Derived from the above discussion, constituency selection embraced three primary 
criteria. Firstly, constituency marginality: seats currently held by opposition parties 
would indicate power relationships through the key issues of candidate selection, finance 
and campaign strategy. Marginality was defined as the majority over the nearest 
challenger being less than 10%. Secondly, diversity: this would be achieved through a 
mix of Labour- and Liberal Democrat-held, northern and southern, and urban and rural 
seats; the latter were also distinguished by type, reflecting city/town and 
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agriculture/tourism respectively. The presence of different types of local council would 
also add to diversity. Thirdly, they needed to be accessible in practical terms. In addition 
to these basic needs, a number of desirable characteristics were sought, including: 
resource strength (people and money), property ownership, branch activity, Patrons Club, 
grouping possibilities, and boundary review activity. This resulted in four constituencies 
providing access for the study: Derby North and High Peak in the East Midlands, and 
Cheltenham, and Somerton and Frome in the South West. As will be shown below, these 
constituencies possess very distinctive characteristics and hence provided a good basis 
for exploring the research questions. 
Derby North is a city constituency with an industrial outlook: Rolls Royce (engines), 
Toyota (motor cars) and Alstrom (heating) are large employers in the city, but it also 
retains a strong railway heritage. Labour prevailed in 1997 for the first time since 1983. 
Boundary changes have deprived the constituency of good Conservative wards, with the 
result that it is now considered a three-way marginal. It forms part of a merged local 
association, firstly with the Labour stronghold Derby South, and more recently with the 
new Mid Derbyshire, deemed to be a potentially safe Conservative seat. There was a 
constituency office and part-time secretary, but no agent. In the general election year of 
2005, the association had 458 members and a financial turnover of £36,930. Its net assets 
were £45,100, but this included a substantial legacy, without which it would have 
struggled; there was no property ownership. The association had 16 branches, plus a 
Patrons' Club. Finally, it was structured in an unusual way, which reflected its merged 
status. The overall entity had the designated three senior officers of chairman, deputy 
political and campaigning, and deputy membership and fundraising, but the officer team 
also included three deputy chairmen campaigning. These people acted as chairmen of the 
individual constituencies for general election and candidate selection purposes; they were 
augmented by deputy chairmen. 
High Peak is located in North-West Derbyshire. Its Labour MP has been in place since 
1997. Prior to that, with the exception of one parliament (1966-70), the seat had been 
Conservative since 1910. Boundary changes were adverse, but the party still expected to 
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win at the next general election. The constituency is largely agricultural, but also 
encompasses the Peak District National Park, thereby attracting much tourist and leisure 
trade. The main town is Buxton, famous for its mineral water, but there are several 
smaller prime settlements. Structurally, the association remained a stand-alone one. This 
can be partly explained by its position as an East Midlands constituency, but with closer 
links to Manchester and the North West. It possessed a long-standing constituency office, 
which it owned, and which occupied a prominent position. There was a secretary, but no 
agent; the PPC was undertaking the agent duties. In 2005, it had 555 members across 
seven branches. Its Patrons' Club had been recently relaunched. Turnover was £57,817, 
with non-property net assets of £7,764. 
Cheltenham is a fairly affluent urban constituency located in the Cotswolds. It has been 
held by the Liberal Democrats since 1992, when the black candidate John Taylor was 
controversially beaten, after racist remarks by a local member. Apart from an 
Independent Conservative who sat from 1937-1950, it had been Conservative since 1911. 
The Government Communications establishment is the major employer. In addition, there 
are high-profile service sector companies, notably building societies and insurance, and 
large aerospace and electronics concerns. The association forms part of the loose 
Gloucestershire group of six constituencies, which retain their individual identities. 
Consequently, it helped to fund a modern, well-equipped group office containing three 
agents and other staff. As an independent association, the officer structure followed the 
constitutional model, though the group as a whole had an overseeing committee. In 2005, 
the association had 789 members, eight branches and a Patrons' Club. It had a turnover of 
£43,974 and net assets of £2,843, but no property ownership. 
Somerton and Frome is an unusual constituency. It was created in 1983 as a concoction 
of large parts of two former constituencies and geographically, at almost 900 square 
miles, is one of the largest in England. Because of its origin, local councillors are fairly 
evenly split between Mendip and South Somerset councils. North-south rivalry is hence a 
problem to constituency management. There has been a Liberal Democrat MP since 
1997, an event that was looked upon with disbelief by the largely elderly membership. 
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Indeed, the constituency generally, is relatively densely populated with retired people. 
Agriculture, particularly dairy, forms a primary source of employment. The main 
settlement of Frome in the north has a more diverse base, but equally is regarded as a 
commuter town for Bath, Bristol and organisations in adjacent constituencies. Essentially 
though, the constituency is rural with a scattering of small towns and villages so that 
countryside issues are prominent. Structurally, the association had controversially entered 
into a joint-working relationship with neighbouring Wells. It shared the Wells agent and 
office, leaving open the question of whether its former constituency office in Wincanton 
would be disposed. In 2005, its 1149 members meant that it was one of the Conservative 
Party's leading associations. It had 29 branches, a turnover of £103,636 and non-property 
net assets of £12,389. It also had a Patrons' Club. 
Chapter Outline 
The dissertation commences with a literature review, which addresses the distribution of 
power within political parties. This incorporates both the oligarchy and evolution strands, 
but is further supplemented by issues concerning party membership. Four chapters of 
empirical data are then presented. Chapter two undertakes an analysis of the Conservative 
Party organisation using the McKinsey 7-S Framework. This permits an exploration of 
softer people issues as well as structural concerns. Chapter three examines the impact of 
reform on Conservative Party finance. It explores local financial capability and sources of 
central encroachment. Chapter four extends the capability dimension to local 
campaigning. Critically, in light of this, it addresses the propensity of the centre to direct 
local campaigns. Chapter five continues this theme, by discussing the impact of changes 
to the candidate selection process, a jealously guarded local activity. This empirical 
material is synthesised in chapter six to provide an interpretation of how the Conservative 
Party responded organisationally to defeat and the impact on local autonomy. From the 
analysis, a new model of party evolution is proposed. This is evaluated politically and 
with respect to the academic literature. An agenda for further research follows from this 
discussion. 
Conclusion to Study 
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From the empirical data, three centrally-influenced organisational themes emerged: the 
right of political determination, the development of political capability and the approach 
to party management. These formed the basis for the `managerial-network model', which 
explained the Conservative Party's response to defeat, including the dismantling of local 
autonomy. It is also put forward as a new organisational settlement for a sustainable 
future. It builds upon Panebianco's electoral-professional stance, but recognises the non- 
substitutability of certain local activities, and hence the importance of local parties. It 
offers a more flexible approach to party organisation development than the present 
models discussed in the academic literature. 
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1 This was also strongly indicated in the leadership election following John Major's resignation in 1997. See 
next section. 
2 Hague employed the ballot mechanism on four occasions to decide upon his leadership, Fresh Future, 
Euro policy and the draft manifesto. However, all were presented in yes-no format with no options. Turnout 
was 44%, 33%, 60% and 16% respectively (Kelly 2002: 40). Aside from leadership selection ballots, the 
only other time the mechanism was employed was for David Cameron's mission statement Built to Last 
when the turnout was 27% ('A good day to bury Built to Last', ConservativeHome 19 September 2006). In 
all cases the membership have endorsed the leadership's position. 3 The political pressure that emanated from the A 21" Century Party proposals eventually led to the 
Constitutional College, comprising MPs/MEPs, peers, members of the party board, association chairmen, 
area and regional officers, and other senior voluntary officers, voting upon, and rejecting, the changes to 
the leadership rules only; the organisational reforms were decoupled from it (Bale 2010: 266-7). 
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Chapter One 
Literature Review: The Distribution of Power within Political Parties 
This chapter examines the salient literature concerning the distribution of, power within 
political parties. It concentrates on the two leading British parties, recognising that those 
with expectations of electoral success typically encounter different tensions and 
constraints from those without such aspirations (Schlesinger 1984: 374). Underlying the 
debate are questions concerning the purpose of party organisation and how it is, and 
indeed should be, organised. The relative position of the local parties is inherent to this. 
Rose identified two approaches. The 'top-down' model stressed the electoral dimension 
through the services they undertake for the central party. Alternatively, the 'bottom-up' 
model considers local political activity to be the foundation of party politics. Hence, 
'party headquarters is an institution to co-ordinate their actions, but not direct them. ' He 
saw British parties adopting the former approach, pinpointing the constituency 
association as the basic unit; the latter would give greater prominence to the local 
community or constituency ward (1974: 148). 
In the Conservative Party, local autonomy was an important condition. It reflected the 
critical organisational tension, articulated by Maor as 'the trade-off between the freedom 
of action enjoyed by the party leadership and the constraints which derive from 
maintaining a strong and active party organisation' (1997: 92). This will be addressed in 
the first part of the chapter through a consideration of the 'oligarchy' strand. Both Michels 
(1915) and McKenzie (1963) concluded strongly in favour of leadership ascendancy, 
vehemently downplaying the importance of the local parties. The 'evolutionary' literature 
largely concurred. It purported to explain the movement of parties from one type of 
organisation to another in order to adapt to changing political conditions. The models of 
Duverger (1959), Kirchheimer (1966), Epstein (1967), Panebianco (1988), Katz and Mair 
(1995) and Carty (2004) are especially relevant and will be appraised. Most studied 
parties from a top-down, political viewpoint, with the organisational dimension 
underplayed. Membership issues though cannot be neglected; these will be examined in 
the final section. 
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The Dominance of Oligarchy 
The focus of this section will be the work of McKenzie (1963) whose British Political 
Parties has framed academic thinking on power relations. 
1. McKenzie's Thesis 
McKenzie conducted a detailed assessment of power relations at the national level in 
Britain's main political parties and concluded that 'in practice final authority rests in both 
parties with the parliamentary party and its leadership. In this fundamental respect the 
distribution of power within the two major parties is the same' (1963: 635). Little 
prominence was afforded to local activists and members. In arriving at this judgement, he 
acknowledged primarily Michels (1915). 
Drawing upon evidence particularly from the German Social Democratic Party, Michels 
questioned the association between democracy and organisation. Importantly, he 
discounted the fear of Ostrogorski (1902) that party leaders would effectively become 
servants of the extra-parliamentary party. Political parties were large and complex 
organisations that required hierarchically organised bureaucratic systems to cope with the 
scale of administration. This in turn necessitated a concentration of power at the top of 
the organisation, thereby weakening that of the grass roots membership (Lipset 1962: 16). 
To Michels, 'it is organisation which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the 
electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who 
says organisation, says oligarchy' (1915/1962: 365). 
Oligarchy was intrinsic to politics. LaPalombara asserted that'a political party is a formal 
organisation whose self-conscious, primary purpose is to place and maintain in public 
office persons who will control, alone or in coalition, the machinery of government' 
(1974: 509). For this, Max Weber pointed out that the essence of politics was struggle, 
whereby the party was attuned to the acquisition of social power. Therefore, 'since a party 
always struggles for political control, its organisation too is frequently strict and 
authoritarian' (1968: 938-9). This posed a challenge to the notion of intra-party 
democracy. Michels's 'iron law of oligarchy' portrayed this as a 'mere chimera' (Teorell 
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1999: 363). This followed Ostrogorski's (1902) view that democracy in this sense was 
destructive and led to mediocrity. If parties were accountable to their members, then 
inevitably their accountability to voters was diluted. Schattschneider indeed, concluded 
that 'democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties' (1942: 60). 
This perspective underpinned McKenzie's thesis. The core of parliamentary government 
was a 'vertical chain of responsibility' from the cabinet to the electorate. Accountability 
was to the latter, rather than to any extra-parliamentary body. In the Conservative Party, 
policy concessions were made to backbench supporters, member influence being merely 
indirect in nature (1963: 645,642). As a result, the parliamentary party enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy. This was reinforced by its historically successful record in office 
and also by the fact that the establishment of the party organisation was itself a direct 
response to a political development: the extension of the electoral franchise (1963: 638). 
McKenzie's stance was consistent with the elite model of democracy. He accepted 
Schumpeter's (1952) critique of the classical concept, which argued that the notion of 
members of parliament reflecting and articulating the will of the people was unrealistic. 
To McKenzie, this ignored the importance of political leadership. The electorate's task 
was to judge the competence of party elites; its role was 'not to reach decisions on 
specific issues of policy, but to decide which of two or more competing teams of political 
leaders shall make the decisions'. The membership organisation's responsibility was to 
provide support, by developing and maintaining the candidates for the leadership, from 
which the electorate would periodically choose (1963: 645-7). Intra-party democracy 
could undermine this process. For democracy to function effectively, oligarchy within 
party organisations was a pre-requisite. 
However, oligarchic tendencies would not negate democracy, but would be located as a 
'condition occupying the ground between pure democracy and pure autocracy' (May 
1965: 419). This was supported by Barnes, who argued that leaders had to operate with 
local officials they had not appointed or chosen and contend with events over which they 
had little control. In addition, he noted that parties were essentially voluntary 
organisations, members always having the ultimate sanction of becoming inactive, or 
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leaving the party altogether. (1967: 6-7). This inferred a dependency relationship between 
leaders and members, the strength of which was underpinned by electoral resource needs. 
Hirschman (1970) though, suggested that 'exit' would not necessarily occur, as the 
decision to do so must be credible; for example, through the availability of an alternative 
party or other political vehicle. Instead, 'loyalty' could encourage individuals to remain 
inside and fight through efforts to enhance 'voice. ' Far from strict oligarchy, there was the 
suggestion of a more dynamic set of intra-party relationships. Nevertheless, oligarchic 
tendencies would prevail, as irritating proposals from below would be repelled. Party 
officials and members of parliament, elevated to the 'power elite', would acquire their 
own political outlooks and would seek to protect both their own position and the stability 
of the organisation as a whole (Lipset 1962: 17-18). 
Oligarchy to Michels was the product of technical and psychological factors. Technically, 
it was underpinned by the 'indispensability of leadership' (1915/1962: 364). Leaders were 
formally positioned to assess the organisation's resource and co-ordination requirements. 
They were also able to strengthen their own grip through the acquisition of resources 
typically not available to occupationally time and energy constrained members. These 
included superior knowledge, control over the formal means of internal communication 
and skills in the art of politics (Lipset 1962: 16-17). Leaders could thus aspire to greater 
professionalism, which psychologically led members to defer to them for direction and 
guidance (Michels 1915/1962: 365). McKenzie employed both types in support of his 
assertion that for the Conservative Party, 'it would be difficult to envisage a more tight- 
knit system of oligarchical control of the affairs of a political party' (1963: 291). This 
caused barely a ripple in the party, as it largely concurred with the prevailing view, but 
the inevitability of leadership dominance aroused controversy in the Labour Party, 
through its policy-orientated conference process (Kavanagh 1985: 6-7). 
McKenzie maintained that in the Conservative Party, the legitimate authority of the 
leader was paramount, the key to its understanding, as he retained 'sole ultimate 
responsibility for the formulation of the policy and electoral programme of his party' 
(1963: 21-2). Monarchical and baronial models have been advanced to explain this 
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position. In the former, the components of the organisation fell under the authority of the 
party leader, or in a modified form, a small leadership group. The latter was more diverse. 
Whilst there was inherent loyalty to the leadership, 'bargaining and occasional conflict' 
occurred instead of total direction from the top. Rose argued that the baronial model was 
more appropriate to British parties, suggesting that 'each part of the party is supreme 
within a given area of competence' (1974: 158-65). Lagroye pointed to a hard core of 
experienced and knowledgeable activists who developed close contacts with leadership 
groups to the extent that they had 'a key role in the life of the party at crucial moments' 
(1989: 368). Nevertheless, the leader role was often more important than organisation or 
ideology, so that it became a major source of party vitality (Blondel 1978: 160). Hence, 
although operating under constraints, Ingle concluded that the Conservative leader 
retained a fundamental strength and enjoyed 'considerable personal prestige' throughout 
the party. He thus concurred with McKenzie that 'this pre-eminence remains the defining 
characteristic' of the party (1987: 67). 
McKenzie recognised that oligarchy was not an iron law as leaders could not ignore the 
'moods and aspirations' of the membership. In the Conservative Party, policy formulation 
was never intended as a membership priority, but on account of their efforts locally, the 
leadership was obliged to take account of their views, albeit in an advisory capacity 
(1963: 226). Instances where the voluntary party achieved significant influence were rare, 
as the twin notions of leadership and discipline tended to dissuade such practice (1963: 
638). 1 In essence, McKenzie regarded local parties as electoral machines, whose main 
function was 'to conduct propaganda and to raise funds with a view to securing the 
election of Conservatives to public bodies' (1963: 244). Their impotence was consistently 
reinforced by his finding that the three critical party functions, policy, finance and 
candidates, were under the control of the leader or his appointees (1963: 290). Overall, he 
confidently concluded that members were 'content to be the voluntary servants of the 
parliamentary party' and that 'in an analysis of the distribution of power within the party, 
they are of little importance' (1963: 258). 
2. Critique of McKenzie 
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Policy development rather than organisation is the common focus of criticism of 
McKenzie. For Labour, Beer (1965) contended that policies such as nationalisation were 
largely influenced by conference. Moreover, in his study of the Wilson governments, 
Minkin acknowledged leadership dominance in policy formulation and implementation, 
but argued that trade union input and the complexity of party procedures were under- 
emphasised. Hence, 'there is no simple categorisation of the distribution of power within 
the conference policy process which does justice to its subtlety and variability' (1978: 
317). Indeed, conference power was magnified when the party was in opposition, as 
leaders then lacked 'authority and patronage' (Kavanagh 1985: 16). Contemporary authors 
offered further support, despite the Blair reforms, which were designed to weaken the 
power of trade unions and activists through the empowerment of the ordinary members 
by one-member-one-vote and through innovations such as the National Policy Forum and 
the Joint Policy Committee. 2 Shaw (2002) showed that once in government, as long as 
the trade unions remained affiliated, the leadership would be unable to achieve any 
monopoly over policy. Moreover, Russell found that whilst their formal power had been 
diluted, it was still 'exercised formally and informally at many different levels' (2005: 
262). She further argued that power became more widely distributed, as the reform 
process itself involved compromise and negotiation, and was not wholly controlled by the 
leadership. It was the perception of change that was important, as it strove to make the 
party electorally competitive (2005: 282,256). Conferences therefore, became 'media 
events, stage-managed for television and part of a permanent election campaign ... a 
good conference is defined by managers as one which does not have unseemly divisions 
or, if they do occur, results in an overwhelming victory for the leadership' (Kavanagh 
1996a: 28-9). 
Historically, the Conservative conference was relatively uncontroversial, labelled as a 
'public relations exercise' (Ingle 1987: 58), and a 'party rally' (Maor 1997: 131). Emphasis 
was placed upon 'party unity, morale and publicity' rather than policy-making (Webb 
2000a: 194). Attendees acted as representatives rather than mandated delegates (Byrd 
1987: 218-9). However, Kelly contested this outlook, suggesting that the stage-managed 
rally was a centre-left comparison with Labour. He identified a 'conference system' 
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involving secondary gatherings, such as those of Conservative women and local 
councillors, which permitted members 'hidden' policy influence. Senior politicians 
attended to listen as well as to speak at these events. Differences of opinion were thus 
ironed out prior to the main conference or else were transmitted subtly during it. Party 
unity considerations served to translate concerns into a collective expression of 'mood', 
which recognised mutual trust between the membership and the leadership (1989: 184- 
88; 1997: 241). Dissent occurred when activist anxieties were ignored; the bitter fallout 
from the Europe debate in 1992 being a prime example (Kavanagh 1998: 32). Kelly 
acknowledged this by partially attributing it to a sharp fall in secondary conference 
attendance (2001: 332), but also citing it as evidence of the waning of 'loyalty' as the 
party's secret competitive weapon (1997: 243). Whiteley et al though, argued that Kelly 
was overgenerous regarding membership influence. They questioned the measurability of 
'mood' and 'atmosphere' and hence their impact (1994: 35). These concepts were abstract 
and thus open to misinterpretation. Nevertheless, their importance could be associated 
with the leader's speech. Here, Thatcher's position was usually strengthened through 
articulating her popular brand of Conservatism, whereas for Heath and Major, it was seen 
as a barometer for their continuing leadership (Kavanagh 1996a: 31). 
With respect to organisation, McKenzie could be accused of over-simplification by 
delineating the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties as unitary bodies. Instead, 
Medding stressed that a party's complexity and diversity was central to understanding 
'many of the nuances and subtle forms of power and influence. ' Parties, he argued, 
contained an array of groups defined by religion, ethnicity, region, ideology, commercial 
sector and so forth, and made decisions on varied activities such as campaign planning, 
finance, candidates and policy, typically involving different personnel (1970: 15). 
Kavanagh added that often, power struggles involved alliances across such groups (1985: 
12). Brand though, countered that McKenzie's acknowledgement of members 
incorporated this; for him, it was merely a degree of emphasis (1989: 117). Moreover, 
McKenzie was writing in the 1950s and 1960s, when Britain was a classic two-party 
polity. It was probably why he also omitted any consideration of the electoral system 
from his thesis; it 'allows voters to choose between two alternative governing teams and 
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then subsequently hold them accountable' (Mitchell 2005: 161). Here, one-party 
domination of government often arises; oligarchic tendencies within party organisations 
could become stronger in such circumstances as leaderships were not engaged in 
coalition building (von Beyme 1985: 239). Ultimately for McKenzie, membership 
organisation was a support. This conclusion surfaces strongly in the'evolution' literature. 
The Early 'Evolutionary' Theorists 
Writers from the 'evolutionary' strand were interested in party adaptation to electoral 
needs and the ability of the leadership to accommodate the party organisation accordingly 
(Maor 1997: 93); oligarchy was seen in this light. The foundation for analysis was 
Duverger. He distinguished structurally between cadre and mass parties. The cadre 
consisted of groups of political elites who employed their status, campaign skills and 
access to financial resources in order to secure election victory. Quality was deemed 
more important than numbers and operations were conducted in a top-down manner. 
Parties of the right, often originating before the concession of universal suffrage, usually 
assumed this form. This was in contrast to the mass party concept, later adopted by 
Socialist parties. Here, members were actively sought for the political education of the 
working class and for obtaining subscriptions to provide campaign funds, thereby 
replacing 'the capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing. ' Leaders 
were elected by the membership and hence were answerable to them, but such influence 
did not mean that complete democracy was implied. Indeed paradoxically, such parties 
tended to be more centralised and closely-knit than their more autonomous cadre type. 
Duverger contended that over time the mass concept would come to dominate as elitist 
parties would seek members to discharge campaign activities and form a political and 
financial support network (1959: 63-7). 
However, Epstein challenged this position, maintaining that future party development 
would imitate the elite model. Duverger largely confined his analysis to West European 
parties, thereby understating their American counterparts (1967: 6-7). Epstein rectified 
this. Instead of 'contagion from the left', where parties adopted the mass approach for 
electoral success, he argued for 'contagion from the right', by suggesting there were 
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'strong counter-organisational tendencies represented by the increased use of new 
campaign techniques involving mass media, professional skills and large financial 
contributions' (1967: 260). Voter reach was prominent in his thesis. Specialists in 
advertising, opinion polling, speech writing and organisational management were better 
equipped to accomplish this than amateur activists (1967: 234-8). Hence, a loose and 
flexible organisation capable of responding to electoral 'peaks' and which deferred 
politically to the parliamentary party was preferable (Maor 1997: 106). Epstein suggested 
the 'most efficient arrangement' for a British constituency would perhaps be 50-100 active 
members, in essence a local cadre (1967: 117). Duverger was writing in an era when 
election campaigns were more labour intensive, so that if Epstein were correct, his mass 
party would be merely a stage in the evolution of party competition. In Britain, the 
Conservative mass membership strategy would be a competitive adaptation to the 
increasingly strong Labour Party (1967: 100). Moreover, the contemporary strengthening 
of the centre by Britain's parties, in order to improve electioneering, enhanced Epstein's 
credibility. 
Epstein has been criticised for his virtual dismissal of the local element. Ware argued that 
strong local government provided an incentive to maintain active local parties. Secondly, 
new electoral technologies and the personalities of leaders were insufficient for 
competitiveness, as without strong local parties, important political intelligence and 
electoral support could be lost. Finally, in his American slant, Epstein missed the notion 
that parties could be derived from a broader social movement, the Labour Party being a 
prominent example (1987: 10-11). To this could be added renewed attempts to increase 
party membership in Britain. In comparing Duverger and Epstein, Meny argued that 
electoral needs virtually compelled parties to assume 'characteristics and practices which 
are in principle alien to them'. Elite parties produced programmes and recruited members 
in line with the strategy and structure of mass parties, who in turn adjusted their 
behaviour to a more elite style (1993: 97). Consequently, Ware concluded that the 
Conservative Party was a good example of a hybrid party (1996: 66). Webb agreed. 
Whilst Fresh Future brought increased membership rights over leadership selection, this 
did not extend to policy development (2000a: 198-9). Nevertheless, the adjustments made 
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were consistent with Kirchheimer's influential 'catch-all' thesis in terms of perceptions 
with voters. 
Kirchheimer was attuned to environmental change, where he pointed to 'conditions of 
spreading secular and mass consumer goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive 
class lines' bringing about a change in political attitudes (1966: 58). Class-based, 
ideological parties risked loss of support to opponents with broader political strategies. 
Conceptually, this meant a transformation to a 'catch-all people's' party, which 
encapsulated a number of developments. Electorally, a slackening of ideological 
commitment and a de-emphasising of social class were required to provide greater policy 
flexibility, though inevitably at the potential loss of some members. In addition, this 
necessitated a further strengthening of the leadership, which at the same time 
corresponded with a 'downgrading' of the role of party members, who Kirchheimer 
regarded as a'historical relic' with a capacity to undermine the catch-all image. This was 
further aligned to the courting of interest groups both for campaign assistance and to 
secure the necessary finance (1966: 58-9). However, he accepted that catch-all was not 
wholly realisable in practice, as parties would seek to retain their traditional clientele 
base, whilst simultaneously reaching out to `all those categories (of voters) whose 
interests do not adamantly conflict' (1966: 53). 
Kirchheimer has been dismissed on the basis of over-simplification. For Wolinetz, catch- 
all should reduce party system fragmentation, but the evidence suggested otherwise. 
Unpopular government policies and the emergence of new issue cleavages resulted in 
traditional parties being outflanked by smaller ones occupying policy space, through the 
articulation of political issues, but without the historical burden of decisions made whilst 
in office (1979: 8-9,20-1). The revitalised Liberal Democrats and new entrants such as 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) served as a testament to this. Moreover later, he 
suggested that the notion of mass parties becoming 'ideologically bland' catch-all to 
maintain competitiveness was located in the 'end of ideology' literature, and did not 
account for subsequent political trends (1991: 113). Parties responded in different ways 
subject to their specific political market and the internal pressures they had to bear (1991: 
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125). Scarrow thus argued that Kirchheimer, along with Duverger and Epstein, did not 
address how party organisations would adapt, particularly how they would manage the 
remaining membership base. She concluded that falling member numbers did not 
necessarily negate their contribution to electoral success, suggesting instead that those 
remaining might become even more important, as leaders valued their continuing support 
(2000: 100-1). This debate has perpetuated through the professional outlook. 
The Professional Outlook 
Parties increasingly engaged outside professional expertise. To Panebianco, this was of 
much greater political value than the contribution of party bureaucrats. Building upon 
Kirchheimer, he argued that Duverger's notion of parties as membership organisations 
was redundant, being superseded by his electoral-professional model. This put even 
greater emphasis on political issues and 'personalised leadership, ' which required career- 
minded professionals to manage effectively. It was further reinforced by the approach to 
funding, which would be through interest groups and importantly, state provision. Power 
relationships would thus become further skewed in favour of the leadership and the 
parliamentary party. The evolution of parties towards an electoral-professional state was 
underpinned by two significant trends. Socio-cultural changes, primarily educational and 
occupational, transformed political attitudes to leave a more heterogeneous electorate. 
These occurred alongside momentous technological developments, manifested in 
meaningful improvements in mass communications. Environmental change therefore 
drove organisational adjustment, but to Panebianco this meant increasing importance 
imputed to professionalisation, a development that Kirchheimer understated. 
However, along with Kirchheimer, Panebianco conceded that parties would be unlikely to 
assume a pure electoral-professional form, as they possessed different legacies which 
would lead to differences in individual organisational settlements. Modern innovations 
would exist alongside traditional features. Hence, regarding the models of party evolution 
he argued that `they are ideal types. No party ever completely fits the "mass bureaucratic" 
type and no party completely fits the "electoral-professional" type' (1988: 263-7). This 
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reflected his analysis of power, which pointed to nuances based upon membership 
incentive structures, so that: 
It was 'possible to imagine the unbalanced leader-follower negotiations within a 
party as being situated on a continuum where at one pole we have an exchange 
relationship strongly in favour of the leaders, thus resembling Michels's power- 
domination; and at the other pole a type of exchange which more closely 
resembles a relation of reciprocal influence. We never find pure cases of either of 
these' (1988: 32) 
Position on the continuum was a function of the ability of members to find the equivalent 
political benefits elsewhere and the degree of control over what he termed `zones of 
uncertainty'. Panebianco identified six such zones: competency, in the sense of specialist 
knowledge that emanates from experience; environmental relations pertaining to political 
issues and alliances; the internal communications network; the formal party rules; the 
channels of party finance; and candidate recruitment and the associated career 
advancement. Control over these zones of uncertainty provided the possessor with crucial 
resources in power relations. These tended to accumulate, so that power converged at the 
top of the party, but again he stressed there would be no monopoly, otherwise there 
would be no mutual bargaining process (1988: 30-36). 
The electoral-professional model is very influential. The inference was that modern 
parties should be controlled from the top, from where all campaign activity would be 
directed. The transformation of Labour following a succession of general election defeats 
was presented as a vindication of his approach (Webb 1992,2000a). Its leaders regarded 
organisational reform as central to their modernisation aim (Russell 2005: 1). Kavanagh 
argued that Blair confronted the party's structure and ethos to galvanise the party into 
extending beyond its traditional support base and into embracing change. Effectively, this 
involved 'the creation of a new party' in electoral-professional terms, the greater 
professionalism and discipline being highly regarded by voters (1997: 534,539). This 
implied a need for greater co-ordination, which was being increasingly realised in that 
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'there's certainly a greater concern now by parties to manage the campaign agenda, 
exploit more professional methods of publicity, use polls to track the moods of voters and 
insist on spokesmen adhering to the strategy, to the plan' (Kavanagh 1995: 228). Greater 
central planning was closely associated with control. Scammell alluded to the 
responsibility of campaign professionals to prevent mistakes, even if visually tedious 
campaigns resulted. This inferred a need for tighter control of the party organisation, and 
hence for the leadership to further strengthen its grip (1995: 276-7). 
The advent of the permanent campaign strengthened Panebianco's argument. Webb 
presented it in marketing terms, stating that it 'has rendered the influence of marketing 
professionals so pervasive that the adaptation of party messages to suit target 
constituencies has reached new heights. Specifically, it can be said that campaigning at 
least for the major parties has evolved into fully-fledged political marketing. ' He talked of 
the 'nationalisation' of the campaign, in which resources and 'co-ordinating power' 
necessarily converged in the centre (2000b: 155). To be effective, political marketing 
required central co-ordination and control. The essence of marketing was a focus on the 
customer, here the voter. Politically, Harrop (1990: 279-82) identified two strands. 
Firstly, attention to image, recognising that trust was more important than detailed 
election manifestos. This was reinforced by the significance of symbols, in national 
politics particularly. Blair's reform of clause four was apposite; the Conservatives were 
deemed by many commentators to require something similar (Bale 2006b: 28). Secondly, 
Harrop pointed to the shared interests of voters, implying that marketing was concerned 
with diagnosing their needs and wants, and responding to them. The design of policies in 
this way to satisfy voters contradicted the traditional persuasion approach of politicians 
(Lees-Marshment 2001: 699). Scammell added that now 'the product is malleable' and 
may be adjusted to voter wants (1995: 9). For Kavanagh, the political product, unlike a 
bar of soap, could change dramatically as a result of leadership upheavals and events 
(1996b: 66). Marketing therefore required a single integrated approach, commanded from 
the centre. It was not the modern techniques themselves, but the discipline by which they 
were integrated together to provide a coherent message that was important (Harrop 1990: 
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286). Effective marketing meant not just a flexible organisation at the centre's disposal, 
but importantly an alignment of national and local interests. 
The marketing synthesis was consistent with the perceived Americanisation of British 
politics. For the 2005 general election, Kavanagh and Butler reported the recruitment of 
professionals from the polling, public relations and media sectors, and a focus on 
message development, discipline and rebuttal. To improve campaign effectiveness, 
sophisticated computer software was employed, which permitted micro data analysis for 
pinpointed voter targeting, specifically engaged in 'cultivating' party waverers who 
intended to vote. This contrasted with traditional local campaigns, which were conducted 
for the purpose of ensuring the turnout of loyal supporters (2005: 194). The reliance on 
national campaign techniques for reaching voters has, in the 'digital age', been set 
alongside more 'focused, localised, targeted communication (Farrell and Webb 2000: 
110). This was strengthened by the notion of the 'political brand', 'the public's instinctive 
feel for a political party', lengthy investment being needed to engender sufficient trust 
that policy initiatives gained acceptance (Philp 2006: 33). 
Growing sophistication in these terms was reinforced by professional contribution to the 
perceived greater 'presidentialisation'. of the campaign. Kellner suggested the 1997 
general election probably saw a realisation that elections were moving in the direction of 
'leadership appeal' rather than the party (1997: 628). 2005 saw its deliberate 
manifestation, the Conservatives favouring a presidential contest between Howard and a 
supposedly vulnerable Blair (Seldon and Snowdon 2005a: 267). Blair himself, was 
surrounded by a network of special advisers loyal to him, rather than to the party, and in 
whom much power was concentrated (Wring 2005: 713). This reflected a trend towards 
further strengthening of party leaders' offices, involving a small campaign elite and a 
greater concentration of resources in this domain. Parties were thus said to have evolved 
from membership organisations into 'campaign machines operating in support of the 
principal candidates', American style (Farrell and Webb 2000: 121). Poguntke and Webb 
crystallised this, asserting that presidentialisation was 'a logical component and 
vindication' of the catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel (see below) explanations, all 
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of which pointed to an enhancement of leadership power over the party membership 
(2005: 353). Kavanagh observed internal conflicts over'turf as a result (1996b: 64), but 
additionally alluded to a reluctant acceptance by politicians and a lack of empathy with 
professionals; indeed, they resented the dependency relationship (1995: 1). 
The Local Response 
The Labour Party came to epitomise the professional orientation. The Conservatives, 
historically the leaders in campaign innovation (Cockett 1994: 576-7), were unusually 
forced into catch-up mode; opinion polling for example, was embarked upon three years 
after Labour (Kavanagh 1997: 538). Fresh Future was conceived to do likewise 
organisationally, through the introduction of the central board to assume 'overall control' 
over both professionals and volunteers (Seldon and Snowdon 2005a: 251), a development 
deemed essential for successful political marketing. Moreover, Webb had concluded that 
for both parties, the drive to 'maximise' leadership strategic autonomy had rendered 
electoral-professional germane (2000a: 209). McKenzie's elite-orientated thesis 
concerning competing teams of leaders was revitalised, but for campaign-related reasons. 
However, for him and Panebianco to be sustainable, by inference party leaderships must 
be able to exercise control over important local decisions, or alternatively as McKenzie 
argued, local parties must be content to acquiesce to such practice. 
Electoral-professional questioned the future role of members. In electioneering, Butler 
and Collins stressed their amateurism, in contrast to the skills of professionals, who had 
been engaged specifically for that purpose. Hence, members would be relegated to low- 
level tasks and implementing instructions handed down from above. Despite this, parties 
still relied on local volunteers. Their political experience and know-how, derived from 
years of activity, could lead to resistance against the imposition of marketing initiatives 
(1994: 24-5). Professionalisation might enhance oligarchy, but as von Beyme argued, the 
iron law remained unconfirmed as long as the amateurs continued to compete (1985: 
238). Far from being redundant, Selle and Svasand suggested the local parties' role was 
more ambiguous. They might be less important for communication, but their mobilisation 
and information gathering functions could become more significant (1991: 473-4). MPs 
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and candidates not only required assistance with understanding local issues and 
community nuances, but also the 'increased local case work that an MP's job entailed 
(Norton 1994; Gay 2005), rendered strong local parties vital. Here, Ware (1989) observed 
that technological improvements potentially allowed activists more time for political 
work by releasing them from onerous administration, but this assumed they were so 
motivated. 
The local position has not been fully clarified in the literature. The models discussed 
above assumed a national slant. Moreover, Kavanagh drew attention to McKenzie's 
methodological approach, which employed memoirs, biographies and reports (1985: 12). 
Minkin achieved deeper knowledge from qualitative interviews, but again with party and 
trade union elites. Similarly, the analyses of both Kavanagh and Scammell derived from 
interviews with national politicians and campaign professionals, who inevitably 
embodied a top-down outlook. The local perspective was largely ignored. This was 
consistent with Britain's political culture, which was centred on Westminster, and which 
was reinforced by the need for a fast response to media covered events and issues. Local 
parties were deemed to play a secondary role in the overall political product. 
In a similar vein, Panebianco's thesis was essentially product- rather than geographically- 
orientated. This was unsurprising since his electoral-professional model, as noted, 
evolved from Kirchheimer's analysis and was a response to the macro environmental 
changes in society and technology. However, neither author addressed explicitly changes 
in the micro or competitive environment. Such changes were often the result of the 
broader environmental ones, but they also retained a capacity for independent influence. 
Porter (1980: 3-4) provided a framework for this analysis, as shown in Diagram 1.1. His 
'five forces model' was developed to analyse the structure of an industry, the ultimate 
profit potential of which was determined by the collective strength of five competitive 
forces: the threat of entry, the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of 
suppliers, the availability of substitute products or services, and rivalry amongst existing 
players. The model has both analytical and prescriptive properties, but it is in the former 
where it has achieved enduring robustness, and hence how it is utilised here. By 
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modifying the model to account for the electoral politics market, a more comprehensive 
analysis of party competition can be conducted than simply assessing the electoral 
strategies of the major parties. In this way, it enables the collation of the micro-level 
shortfalls in the influential party evolution models, that of Panebianco in particular. In the 
analysis below, buyers and suppliers have been adjusted to reflect voters and the 
providers of political resources respectively. 
1. The Threat of Entry 
For the Westminster Parliament, there are considerable entry barriers constructed around 
the single member plurality (SMP) electoral system, commonly depicted as 'first-past- 
the-post. ' In addition to the national effort, general election campaigns consist of 
individual constituency battles; ultimately, it is here that candidates polling the most 
votes prevail. Inherently, this system favours the two major broadly positioned parties 
who have access to substantial resources and the media. It retains no mechanism to 
ensure that seats won are related to votes, so that third and minor parties are under- 
represented (Mitchell 2005: 160). The implication is that capital requirements and an 
organisational capacity to effectively service a broad range of individual constituencies 
provide a very high threshold to potential newcomers. 
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Since 1970 there has been evidence of greater instability in Western electoral systems 
generally. Traditional parties remained dominant, but new entrants attained some success 
campaigning on contemporary issues (Drummond 2006). Policy convergence allowed 
minor parties to achieve differentiation by adopting alternative positions. Partisan 
dealignment in this way brought a more open market (Webb 2000b: 151). As noted 
earlier, the British experience embodied a revitalised Liberal/Liberal Democrat Party and 
the rise of nationalist and single issue parties such as the SNP and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) respectively. Their impact though, manifested itself in terms 
of the proportion of the vote, rather than actual seats. Webb and Fisher hence termed the 
polity a 'suppressed' two-and-a-half party system (1999: 27). For example, in 1951 
Labour and the Conservatives received 96.8% of the vote. This had fallen to 75.1% in 
February 1974 and to 67.5% in 2005. In the latter election though, they still obtained 
85.4% of the seats (Webb and Fisher 1999: 9; Norris and Wlezien 2005: 659). However, 
SMP can also result in bias against the major parties; importantly for the Conservative 
Party, 'electoral deserts' materialised in Scotland, Wales and the northern cities after 1997 
(Mitchell 2005: 161), at least partially caused by the minor parties. Owing to their lack of 
resources, the progress of these parties necessarily entailed a volunteer workforce on the 
ground. The implication for the Conservatives is that in order to recover their electoral 
competitiveness, they would need to match these entrants. Party competition was now 
more broadly conceived than McKenzie, Kirchheimer and Panebianco maintained. 
2. The Bargaining Power of Buyers 
Voter power typically reveals itself at the ballot box every four or five years, although 
intervening contests, such as local and European elections, provide indications. Political 
policies and ideas are essentially intangible products with the capacity to generate 
sensitivity. This is magnified by an increasingly knowledgeable electorate (Electoral 
Commission and Hansard Society 2007: 15-17). Perceived competence to govern thus 
became key in an era of policy proximity by the main parties, Webb concluding that they 
are 'electorally motivated organisations compelled to act within an increasingly 
competitive and uncertain electoral market ... (they) will seek to compete by convincing 
electors they are reputable, competent, cohesive and credible, and have more attractive 
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policies and politicians than their rivals' (2000b: 168). Convincing voters therefore 
required a more holistic, party-wide approach. 
Denver and Hands distinguished between 'persuasive' and 'mobilising' campaigning. The 
former was traditionally the preserve of the national party and the latter the localities. 
However, they noted increasing attempts at persuasion being facilitated locally (1997: 
308). This would provide justification for central involvement in local campaigns, as well 
as initiatives to improve resource distribution. There was also the need to address tactical 
voting: an elector voting for an alternative party to his preferred one in order to reduce 
the likelihood of a disliked party winning the seat (Heath and Evans 1994: 558). Franklin 
et al (1994) distinguished between instrumental and expressive forms, the former to avoid 
a wasted vote and the latter to send a signal to the preferred party, usually at 
parliamentary by-elections. The presence of three or more competitive parties in a 
constituency permits instrumental tactical voting as voters have an opportunity for 
rational action to remove unwanted MPs (Mitchell 2005: 168-9). Hence, there was much 
anti-Conservative activity during the Thatcher and Major years; it was thought that the 
party lost between 25 and 35 seats to this behaviour in 1997 (Curtice and Steed 1997: 
317). Moreover in 2005, there was a noticeable backlash against the Blair Labour 
government over Iraq policy. (Norris and Wlezien 2005: 670-1). Partisan dealignment 
was also a key factor in the trend to tactical voting (Heath and Evans 1994: 560). 
In terms of organisational performance, Cox (1997) presented these issues strategically as 
a co-ordination problem. In tactical voting, support for weaker candidates typically 
haemorrhaged as many knowledgeable voters switched to stronger candidates to avoid a 
wasted vote. Information provision to enable such action was provided by political elites, 
both national and local. It was thus in the interests of both party elements to reconcile any 
divergent interests and co-ordinate their activities to gain parliamentary seats. 
Panebianco's solution to this problem was through top-down management. His view was 
given support by Rose, who argued that as the electorate became bigger and campaign 
technology more complex, so the co-ordination problem became greater, as more tasks 
needed to be undertaken. The parties' response was specialisation (1974: 86). 
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Professionals were assigned to the key tasks; thereby questioning local capability in this 
regard. 
3. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
The primary suppliers to political parties were the providers of professional services such 
as advertising agencies, opinion pollsters and policy think tanks, but more fundamentally, 
the donors of financial resources to pay for them. The growing power of the contracted 
professionals, both external and as employees was alluded to in the previous section, their 
status giving them preferential access to, and influence over, the party's strategy. 
Financially, the relative power of party donors was controversial. Greater professionalism 
both in day-to-day politics and in campaigning came at much increased cost. Spending on 
the latter in 1997 reached a staggering £54m for the two major parties. The British polity 
though, was characterised by the fact that it was essentially legally unregulated (Webb 
2001: 312). This position was addressed by the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), which was designed to change party behaviour. 
Nevertheless, politics remained a multi-million pound preoccupation. Critically, the need 
to respond to opponents' campaign innovations led to an 'arms race' mentality (Neill 
1998: 42). The problem for parties was exacerbated by the fact that membership 
subscriptions from local parties formed a relatively small proportion of central income. 
For the Conservatives, this was typically less than 10% and indeed, reached a nadir of 
2.6% in 1997. Consequently, national funding relied on institutions and increasingly, 
wealthy individuals. 
Institutional donations to the Conservatives accounted for some 50% of total income in 
the 1980s (Pinto-Duschinsky 1985: 344; Neill 1998: 32). However, this steadily declined 
so that by 2001, business was reluctant to contribute to a party that was not only in 
opposition, but showed little prospect of an early return to power (Collings and Seldon 
2001: 627). Mindful of shareholder discontent, many companies preferred to channel 
their 'political' funds through professional lobby firms (Webb 2000a: 236). Hence, this 
funding was replaced by a reliance on a few very rich individuals, so that a dependency 
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relationship resulted. The party was desperate to retain its financial advantage against a 
resurgent Labour Party, which in the desire to reduce its dependence on trade unions had 
launched an initiative to professionalise its fundraising. Webb commented that this 
changed the party'at the levels of both political linkage and organisational style' (2000b: 
166). Reliance on individuals though, inevitably led to both parties suffering high-profile 
embarrassments concerning the potential for bought influence. The Elm donation from 
Formula One supremo Bernie Ecclestone was symbolic of Labour's difficulties. 
Intriguingly, for the Conservatives, Stuart Wheeler played an important role in the 
removal party leader Ian Duncan Smith by withholding donations (Seldon and Snowdon 
2005b: 727). Whilst preferential treatment was often assumed rather than demonstrated 
(Fisher 2002: 395), access to politicians undoubtedly conferred an advantage on those 
who donated. Overall, it was the cumulative impact of financial incidents that brought a 
genuine unease about how parties raised money (Seyd 1998: 204). 
Conservative leadership perceptions of the need to spend heavily to win elections meant 
that acquiring large amounts of money was an on-going priority. Its dependence on a 
relatively small number of individuals was a function of switching costs. In absence of 
extensive state funding in Britain, it simply had nowhere else to go. State provision was 
eschewed by the Neill Commission, which instead argued that spending limits, as enacted 
in PPERA, were a better way of addressing mounting party debts. Moreover, there was 
sensitivity to the idea of 'forcing taxpayers to contribute to costs of party political 
activities of which they do not approve' (1998: 89). Parties enjoyed considerable state 
funding, but it had not yet been linked to voters 4 However, a further extension of state 
funding was under consideration, emanating from the Hayden Phillips Report (2007), as 
part of broader discussions on party funding. Nevertheless, whether it was the private 
system or greater public subventions, party financing could 'open the way to oligarchic 
tendencies in a modern party', since both 'generally co-operate with the party 
headquarters more than with the constituencies' (von Beyme 1985: 236). Wealthy 
individuals typically donated to the national party to support the offices of senior 
politicians and national campaigning. The exception was Michael Ashcroft's donations to 
the Conservative constituencies; these were controlled by his team and allocated subject 
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to scrutiny of a business plan and an individual association's financial position (Ashcroft 
2005: 282-6). Ultimately, it was vital for the national Conservative Party to remain 
financially viable, but its recovery also required local competitiveness. The fundraising 
capacity of the local parties was not just important in this regard, but would partially 
offset the political damage inflicted by the presence of wealthy national donors. 
However, this further suggests the potential for a dependency relationship with the local 
parties. Critically though, as with voter strategy, effective competition required co- 
ordination, in this case of the party's full resources. 
4. Substitute Products 
Substitutes perform the same function as the industry's product and can be subtle in 
nature (Porter 1980: 23); the train for example, is a substitute for the motor car. Voters in 
this sense do not have a direct substitute for casting their vote. However, they do retain 
the option to express their political views by other means. It is therefore, the elasticity of 
expression that is important to parties. A key indicator is electoral turnout. The figures for 
2001 and 2005 at 59.4% and 60.9% represented low points for parliamentary elections, 
the former being the lowest since 1918. Moreover, they compared unfavourably with the 
82.6% recorded for 1951 and 78.8% for February 1974. 
The role of political parties was questioned as a result. Webb (1996) found no strong anti- 
party sentiment, suggesting an enduring adaptive capacity. Nevertheless, the legacy from 
a long period of Conservative government was reduced confidence in politicians and the 
political system generally, following numerous incidents of sexual and financial 'sleaze' 
(Curtice and Jowell 1997). This outlook persisted. A cross-national survey of public 
opinion revealed continuing pessimism and distrust towards parties and the notion of 
party government, Britain scoring below average (Dalton and Weldon 2005). These 
sentiments were reflected in feelings of cynicism and displays of apathy at the 2005 
general election (Kavanagh and Butler 2005: 179). Moreover, the fourth Audit of 
Political Engagement found a paltry 27% of people trusted politicians with 71% generally 
mistrustful. Only 35% were satisfied with the workings of parliament and just 33% had 
confidence in the political system. At 54%, approximately half the population enjoyed an 
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interest in politics (The Electoral Commission and Hansard Society 2007). Finally, Ellis 
pointedly concluded that 'party has succeeded in defending Britain's oligarchic political 
culture while the country's social culture has undergone a revolution, that the two cultures 
are now incompatible' (1999: 163). 
The core substitute problem was articulated by Curtice and Seyd's (2003) observation that 
the malaise was more associated with ballot box politics than an unwillingness to engage. 
Their study of the relationship between education levels and participation discovered 
healthy evidence of non-electoral participation. This was echoed by Byrne, who 
contended that people retained interest and activity in a range of political issues, but 
identified more closely with single issue groups, manifested in movements such as the 
Countryside Alliance, fuel protest and the anti-war campaign: 'traditional institutions 
became increasingly remote and seemingly irrelevant to modem life' (2005: 615). His 
view was consistent with earlier analysis, which suggested that a new assertive style of 
citizen politics was not necessarily channelled through parties (Dalton 1988). The result 
was highlighted by the Power Inquiry, which identified citizen discontent towards the 
formal democratic process. This was deemed to offer insufficient influence over political 
decisions, to provide an electoral system riddled with unequal and wasted votes, and to 
contain parties that were too similar and lacking in principle (Power 2006: 17-18). The 
challenge for the modern Conservative Party was therefore to reinvent itself to assimilate 
such social change. 
This analysis points to the perception of politics as a 'people' phenomenon. Indirect forms 
of political communication such as national advertising, and aggressive voter targeting 
from the centre, were unlikely to contribute to the renaissance of parties. A revitalised 
local effort was more appropriate in line with Coleman's (1996) contention that strong 
party organisations contributed to public support for parties, as they improved the linkage 
function with voters. Johnston and Pattie (2003) for example, demonstrated a positive 
link between local constituency campaigning and electoral turnout. Underpinning the 
substitute problem is Putnam's concept of social capital, which he defined as 'features of 
social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
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society by facilitating co-ordinated actions' (1993: 167). Mass political parties were 
identified with organisations such as sports clubs, choral societies and neighbourhood 
associations as forming these networks, which were essential to social capital. The 
'denser' these community networks, the greater the likelihood of citizen co-operation for 
mutual gain. They bred the reciprocal relationship between trust and co-operation (1993: 
171-175). Later in America, he demonstrated the link between civic norms and networks 
and the effectiveness of political institutions. Accumulated social capital further impacted 
positively on social problems such as crime reduction, educational attainment and health. 
However, he found a weakening in voting, political knowledge and grassroots activism 
(Putnam 2000). The importance of Putnam reflects the substitute argument in that a 
withering of local parties contributes to a fall in social capital, which in turn undermines 
effective government. An electoral-professional stance would propel this process further. 
5. Competitive Rivalry 
Rivalry between the major parties is intense, since not only is politics a fast-moving 
game, played out under a 24 hours a day, seven days a week media spotlight, but also 
they are of similar size and resource capacity. This type of environment underpinned 
academic explanations of party competition, which emphasised the national level. Local 
competition was deemed to be of secondary significance. This was reinforced by the 
stringent limits placed upon campaign expenditure at the local level, at least during the 
immediate campaign, by the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883. Kavanagh (1995) 
thus stated that modern campaigning involved three key groups of actors: voters, the 
media - both press and television - and politicians along with their campaign managers 
and professional advisers; he ignored the local parties. This position was underlined by 
successive Nuffield Studies, which maintained that constituency campaigning made little 
difference to electoral outcomes (Butler and Kavanagh 1992,1997,2002). They agreed 
that the 2005 election saw enhanced professionalisation of local campaigns, with micro- 
management of target voters from party centres, but their impact was still deemed to be 
limited (Kavanagh and Butler 2005: 177). However, set against them was a growing body 
of evidence, which highlighted the importance of local campaigns. This can be 
categorised by methodological approach. Johnston and Pattie employed the level of 
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campaign expenditure as a measure of their intensity (Johnston 1987; Johnston and Pattie 
1995,1998,2003: Pattie et al 1995). By contrast, Seyd and Whiteley's approach involved 
surveys of party members to estimate activism rates locally (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; 
Whiteley et al 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 2002,2003). Both of these were labelled by 
Denver and Hands as 'indirect', these authors instead preferring nation-wide postal 
surveys of election agents, the people actually responsible for organising and directing 
local campaigns (Denver and Hands 1992; Denver et al 1998,2002,2003a); Conservative 
agents however were largely concentrated in safe seats. 
The consensus of these authors was that local activity mattered. However, consistent with 
the electoral-professional outlook, recent evidence suggested attempts at alignment 
between national and local campaigns through increased efforts by central professionals 
to control the latter, especially in marginal seats. There was more emphasis on central co- 
ordination of local campaigns, focusing resources on key constituencies and modernising 
local campaign organisations (Denver et at 2003b). Fisher et at (2006) found this process 
being extended, but their research revealed little electoral impact in the Conservative 
Party. This suggested a campaign tension, which they acknowledged might owe much to 
the continuing autonomy of the local associations. Lagroye pointed to the knowledge and 
expertise of local activists in their own sphere in terms of understanding what worked 
locally (1989: 368-9). There was therefore a question concerning their preparedness to 
accept direction from above. Further evidence suggested this position has persisted. 
Fisher and Denver (2009) demonstrated that traditional campaign methods had greater 
electoral impact than modern techniques, though the latter were gaining acceptance; 
human contact was the suggested explanation. Again, results for the Conservative Party 
were moderate. Nevertheless, despite their emphasis on the benefits of central co- 
ordination, they concluded that if activists were allowed to wither, future problems would 
emanate. 
Whiteley (1997) argued that a major contributing factor to the Conservative Party's 
enormous defeat in 1997 was a lack of grass roots activists locally. This was at least 
partially a function of the massive losses of local councillors during the 1990s Major 
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government. Following the 1995 local elections, with fewer than 5000, the party had 
fallen into third place behind the Liberal Democrats (Rallings and Thrasher 1997: 125). 
Hence, much of its local campaign strength had been removed, leaving it in a weak 
position to fight the ensuing general election. Moreover, as the Liberal Democrats ably 
demonstrated, carrying the attack through' 'community' or 'neighbourhood' politics could 
reap electoral dividends. Once elected, their campaign effectiveness rendered them 
difficult to defeat (Philp 2006: 88). The party's focus on the local dimensions of national 
issues offered competitive differentiation. Here, Seyd rued the blandness associated with 
the structure of politics at the national level, complaining of too much emphasis upon for 
example, sound-bites, focus groups and swing votes (1998: 206). Strong local parties 
potentially offered a bulwark against the pure form of the electoral-professional model 
and the Americanisation of British politics, a notion that Kavanagh respected (1995: 220- 
1). However, the Conservative Party has only belatedly recognised the importance of the 
local outlook. 
The five forces model has enabled an assimilation of micro-environmental political issues 
into a single framework. These issues supplement the macro concerns upon which 
Kirchheimer and Panebianco based their models, thereby suggesting that party 
competition is more sophisticated than either of them recognised. Any interpretation of 
party evolution should therefore be more broadly based, reflecting a more integrated 
party wide approach. Each force revealed the importance of local parties, but equally 
alluded to a requirement for a co-ordination of national and local strategies. Hence, the 
Porter model highlights the managerial needs of the party leadership to improve 
competitiveness. This, in line with Webb's leadership strategic autonomy argument, 
would necessarily include a recalculation of the internal balance of power. In this way, 
the model assists in projecting the future evolution of party organisation. 
By taking a holistic approach to party competition, the Porter model offers a superior 
framework to the Downs model of spatial positioning, which could be integrated into the 
'rivalry' force. Downs examined political parties in terms of policy and asserted that 
'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to 
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formulate policies' (1957: 28). He argued that parties acted rationally in their decision- 
making to maximise political support, with the primary goal of election to office; policies 
were a means to an end. Citizens were also deemed to act rationally and vote for the party 
likely to provide the highest utility income, such that they would evaluate the 'expected 
party differential. ' Parties would thus take account of voters' utility functions and the 
policy proposals of their opponents. Scarrow et al interpreted this as leading to 'policy 
convergence in pursuit of the median voter' (2000: 119). `Five forces' showed this to be 
too narrow an approach to modern party competition; a broader array of political 
activities required management. Contemporary models of party evolution are moving in 
this direction. 
Contemporary Approaches to Party Evolution 
Contemporary scholars have taken different positions regarding the position of the party 
membership. They can be distinguished in terms of oligarchy and stratarchy. 
1. Modern Oligarchy 
Koole (1994) researching in the Netherlands, identified parties which had yet to reach a 
pure electoral-professional state, but instead could be described as 'modern cadre parties'. 
The parliamentarians remained pre-eminent, but the party bureaucracy had been 
strengthened rather than replaced by specialist professionals. Despite falling membership, 
the party organisation retained its importance as a vehicle for active members, the cadre. 
Consequently, whilst recognising the trend towards greater central control, it was not 
inevitable that electoral-professional would become the standard. 
Building on Koole, Heidar and Saglie cited evidence from Norwegian parties for their 
'network model'. Contrary to Panebianco's tight hierarchical control from the centre, they 
suggested that parties were 'loosening' their formal structures and 'opening up', with less 
strict boundaries in their operations. Leadership groups dominated, but accountability and 
legitimacy continued to be formally tied to the party organisation and membership. 
Moreover, the organisation's value was enhanced as a vehicle for leadership recruitment 
and policy expression. Policies and strategies were developed within informal party 
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networks with less emphasis on formal procedures. This approach allowed vote 
maximisation strategies without serious dilution of the party's political profile. Finally, 
funding was through both public and private sources (2003: 221-2). Their network party 
could not be applied to British parties, but its importance lay in the loosening of 
boundaries within the organisation and the potential for innovation at lower levels. 
Oligarchy though, remained likely, as the network required co-ordination (Neidar and 
Saglie 2003: 235). 
In sharp contrast to the network model, Hopkin and Paolucci conceived a more extreme 
form of electoral-professional model. Based upon two unusual cases in Spain (Union de 
Centro Democratico) and Italy (Forza Italia), they observed parties dominated by a single 
person, their political fortunes fluctuating accordingly. The characteristics of their 
'business firm model' were a high level of central control, a limited bureaucracy and tasks 
frequently contracted out. Membership was typically restricted to those willing to hold 
public office or occupy political positions within the party (1999: 333). This approach 
was unlikely in Britain, but the contracting out of activities to third parties was an 
interesting development, along with its treatment of voters as consumers rather than 
identifiers. 
2. Stratarchy 
The authors discussed to this point rooted their analysis in a party's relationship with 
society. Katz and Mair though, argued this ignored its association with the state, which 
they maintained was undergoing 'an ever closer symbiosis' (1995: 6). Social, cultural and 
political developments, particularly the decline of membership activity and the growth of 
single-issue groups, were driving parties to seek resources from elsewhere. State 
subsidies and privileged access to the media were important components of their 'cartel 
party model. ' They argued that 'in short, the state which is invaded by the parties, and the 
rules of which are determined by parties, becomes a fount of resources through which 
these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also 
enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilised alternatives' (1995: 15- 
16). The importance of the cartel concept was its influence on elite thinking. For 
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example, the fear of cartel behaviour was a factor in the Neill Committee's (1998) report 
into party funding and the resulting PPERA. However, by its explicit distancing from the 
electorate, the model sparked numerous criticisms. These will be examined using 
Detterbeck's (2005) framework of organisational, competitive and functional 
dimensions. s 
Organisationally, the characteristics of the cartel model were elite ascendancy and 
stratarchy. Leadership power was strengthened through control of the key party 
committees at the national level and an ability to appeal directly to the enfranchised 
passive membership. Activists were consequently unlikely to involve themselves in 
national politics. Recognition though, was afforded to a need for autonomous local 
parties to manage local issues and to encourage members and supporters (Katz and Mair 
1995: 21). However, given the importance of local campaigns for winning a general 
election, it seems anomalous that party leaderships would operate without strong local 
links. Instead, Koole suggested that 'federalisation' was more likely, arguing that local 
involvement on national bodies was inevitable, as their contribution could not be ignored 
(1996: 518). Competitively, Katz and Mair advanced a revised democratic posture in 
which'voters choose from a fixed menu of political parties. ' National policy convergence 
implied reduced voter ability to punish individual parties. Unpopular ones, such as 
Labour in the 1980s, did not disappear because of continuing access to state patronage 
and the media (1995: 17). Enhanced cartelism resulted because the main opposition party 
would inevitably return to power provided it retained its strength, which the state assisted 
(Blyth and Katz 2005: 48). However, state funding did not insulate parties from 
competition. Furthermore, Kitschelt stressed that far from downplaying voter needs, 
parties were increasingly sensitive to their preferences, as weakened partisanship and the 
emergence of minority parties have induced strategic vote switching (2000: 174-5). 
The functional dimension involved changes to the resource base of parties. Katz and Mair 
combined more state financial provision with a fairly brutal downgrading of the 
membership (1995: 20). They acknowledged that a relative lack of state funding in 
Britain provided weak conditions for cartel activity, but later Blyth and Katz cited the 
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Blair-led Labour organisational reforms as evidence of its strengthening (2005: 48). 
Detterbeck however, pointed to Blair's courting of business and a membership growth 
strategy as initiatives to moderate trade union influence, rather than turning to the state 
(2005: 184). Moreover, the Conservative Party retained its hostility to state funding. 
Blyth and Katz argued that its reform programme after the 1997 defeat by-passed 
activists and further increased central control, thereby enhancing the potential for cartel 
behaviour (2005: 48). This was an exaggeration. The active membership remained an 
integral component of the party's campaign strategy and a means of maintaining its 
profile in the country. Finally, media access to the state did not necessarily afford parties 
greater influence. Indeed, the reverse was feasible as media pressure could influence the 
political agenda and thereby provided a 'powerful counterweight' to cartelisation (Koole 
1996: 519). 
The cartel model represented an ambitious, but erroneous attempt to suggest the rules of 
the political game had changed. Importantly, it also suggested that parties were becoming 
more stratarchic. Mair talked of organisational realignment in favour of the leadership 
groups: 'it is really only the party on the ground which is becoming less important or 
which is in decline, whereas the resources of the party in central office, and especially 
those of the party in public office, have in fact been strengthened' (1994: 4). Enhanced 
leadership power though could be misconstrued. In contrast to the opposing hierarchical 
models of Duverger and Kirchheimer, he pointed to a 'process of mutual and growing 
autonomy', in which relationships were more stratarchical, so that each level of the party 
was becoming more autonomous of the others. Consequently, he foresaw local parties 
largely confining themselves to candidate selection and local issues (1994: 17). However, 
the concept of stratarchy was unclear. It does not feature in the organisational behaviour 
literature. As the natural opposite of hierarchy, it would imply that everyone within the 
party organisation possessed equal status; this would be unlikely. Instead, Mair seemed to 
imply decentralisation, but in the sense of segregation. His hypothesis therefore, whilst 
addressing division of labour, neglected the other primary structural problem of co- 
ordination, which was increasingly vital in modern elections. This issue was addressed by 
Carty. 
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Carty argued that Duverger, Kirchheimer and Panebianco portrayed parties in hierarchic 
terms, power distribution being a zero-sum game, in which growth at one level weakened 
another. Reinterpreting Mair, he argued that 'mutual autonomy' implied interdependence 
between a party's units. His 'franchise model' recognised both autonomous units and a 
holistic concept of organisation, reconciling both stratarchy and co-ordination. Power was 
not necessarily zero-sum, but likely to be 'broadly shared' between party actors keen to 
realise their common purpose. Nevertheless, it was the stratarchy concept that 
underpinned his franchise idea, which he depicted as `an organisational model that can 
accommodate and institutionalise the stratarchical dimensions of modern parties with 
their demands for internal autonomies'. However, he did concede that his ideal type was 
unlikely, noting that `any party's position on the stratarchical continuum is an open 
question' (2004: 6-10). 
The core of Carty's franchise model was a fixed contract, which delineates the important 
party units in terms of their autonomous powers and responsibilities, identifying the 
relationships among them and indicating how their autonomy is to be maintained'. The 
franchise contract was presented as a 'stratarchical bargain', realised through the critical 
electoral activities of policy, candidates, campaigning and so forth. Flexibility was 
carefully crafted into the model to accommodate the notion that different electoral 
systems and party traditions could imply varying multi-level systems for candidate 
selection and policy development. In a similar manner to McDonalds, the centre's 
responsibility was overall product and communication strategy (depicted as policy, 
leadership and the national campaign), and for organisational management and finance. 
The local parties by contrast were given the more basic tasks of product delivery, local 
organisation, mobilising the vote and providing feedback to the centre; in this, they were 
supported by intermediary and specialist units. Each component of the party would 
execute its tasks relatively unhindered, but importantly the centre would have the 
authority to intervene against poorly performing constituency parties; although he also 
suggested that there should be reciprocal mechanisms concerning central policies and 
responsibilities (2004: 10-13). Carty saw the formal constitution instigated by the 
55 
Conservative Party in 1998 as a vivid realisation of his idea, as it set out both detailed 
responsibilities and institutional trade-offs. Importantly, the A 21"' Century Party 
document explicitly outlined proposals to convert local associations into franchises, 
seemingly based upon his work (Conservative Party 2005a). 7 
However, Carty's model was simply a formal extension of the electoral-professional 
model. It firmly belittled the local parties and suggested that they have little meaningful 
participation. In line with McKenzie and Panebianco, he adopted the perspective of the 
franchisor; there was no consideration of the viewpoints and indeed the willingness of the 
franchisees, the voluntary membership, to embrace the concept. It was difficult to 
envisage binding contracts providing much incentive for membership. This would be 
reinforced by his assertion that within parties, the relationship between the centre and the 
local units, conceived in terms of the level of independence and power, could vary by 
size, wealth and level of importance (2004: 10). Such a move would negate the voluntary 
principles of democracy and fairness, but would also contravene the notion of 
standardisation, a primary feature of franchise systems. Moreover, the number of 
different types of franchises that Carty identifies to illustrate his assertion that `there is no 
standard franchise party structure and the model should not be taken to imply that parties 
need adopt the simple central office-local outlet pattern' (2004: 14-15), casts doubt on the 
applicability, and indeed viability, of the whole concept of `franchise party'. Furthermore, 
in a fast moving political environment, formal contractual agreements could easily 
become rigidities preventing organisational adaptation, as lengthy re-negotiation and 
bargaining might be required. The formal franchise approach ignored the complexity of 
relationships within political parties, as Rose observed, 'in the hot-house atmosphere of 
party politics, personal relationships between individuals are always important' (1974: 
82). It is the nature of relationships which is hence important. This requires an 
examination of membership issues. 
Party Membershi 
The status of party members has been an important focus of this chapter. This section 
discusses a number of specific issues relating to them. It commences with the costs and 
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benefits of members and then considers member incentives, membership strength and 
their internal democratic responsibilities. 
1. The Costs and Benefits of Members 
The evolutionary theorists implicitly addressed Scarrow's question of 'what level of 
engagement is demanded of members the party considers to be assets' (1994: 50). This 
implied a leadership interpretation of the costs and benefits of maintaining a vibrant 
membership, resulting in decisions regarding which activities to emphasise, but more 
fundamentally on how much effort to expend on membership drives. Over time, these 
issues would be subject to continual leadership evaluation. Maor (1997: 95) identified 
member benefits at both system and organisation levels. In terms of the political system, 
members enabled the continuation of democracy, in that it could not function properly 
without parties. They provided an indication that the party was embedded within society 
and hence served to legitimise it (Beer 1965), or at least allowed the leadership to present 
the image of a mass party for this purpose (Pierre and Widfeldt 1994). Organisationally, 
Maor stressed the vital voluntary work essential for party politics to succeed. Here, 
Scarrow noted a number of benefits, suggesting members: gave financial help through 
subscriptions and fundraising; provided valuable ideas for policies; engaged in the 
electoral tasks of canvassing and leafleting; offered themselves as candidates at both 
national and local levels; multiplied votes through everyday contacts; and were loyal 
voters themselves (1994: 46-9). In this respect, members performed the function of 
'ambassadors' in the community (Seyd and Whiteley 1995: 458). However, membership 
also incurred costs. Direct costs included establishing representative committees, 
maintaining offices for recruitment and management, and organising meetings and 
conferences to accommodate their needs (Maor 1997: 96). These activities consumed 
resources that could alternatively be employed on communications with the electorate 
(Scarrow 1994: 46). The time and cost of involving members in political decisions 
through party ballots added to this. Indirectly, members could be 'a source of demands of 
both a policy and a personal nature' (Katz 1990: 152). Active members particularly, were 
deemed to be ideologically motivated, such that they could hinder leaders wishing to 
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remain flexible to accommodate voter needs; their role in selecting candidates underlined 
this (Scarrow 1994: 45). 
This argument was based upon May's (1973) 'law of curvilinear disparity', which 
suggested that middle-level elites or activists were likely to be the most radical and policy 
driven of the membership. Seyd and Whiteley (1992) found some support in the Labour 
Party, but the evidence was not universal; other authors discovered no noticeable traces 
of the law's applicability (Minkin 1978; Gallagher and Marsh 2004). Kitschelt (1989) 
argued that Labour's position was a special case, an example of a loosely-coupled party 
organisation where ideologues had few constraints imposed upon them. Leaders though, 
have also been found to be more radical than followers to give their parties competitive 
differentiation, although the latter might adopt more extreme positions on selected issues 
(Pierre 1986; Norris 1994,1995). Activists could therefore be located between leaders 
and voters, suggesting 'linear disparity' (Webb 2000a: 212). 
In politics, perceptions are crucial. It would suit leadership ambitions and strategies if the 
activist layer were deemed the most radical. From this perspective, Mair suggested that 
leaderships were separating out the different elements of the voluntary party and 
empowering ordinary members regarded as the more docile and likely to endorse their 
policies. Activists were becoming increasingly marginalised, whilst at the same time the 
central party was enhancing its power to the extent that 'democratisation on paper may 
actually co-exist with powerful elite influence in practice. ' A democratised party 
remained susceptible to leadership control (1994: 16-17). Membership ballots, controlled 
by party leaders, were an innovation in support of this. However, Seyd's research within 
the Labour Party found apathy rather than docility amongst members and moreover, little 
evidence to suggest that the leadership had attained greater freedom of manoeuvre from 
enfranchising the ordinary member (1999: 395-6). Kelly also noted apathy amongst 
Conservative members, though he took a more strident view regarding centralisation 
(2002: 40-1)8 Ballots were more of a public relations exercise to demonstrate to the 
public that the party was managed according to democratic principles. Mair thus 
acknowledged that in this respect and to reflect the image of a mass party, as well as for 
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fundraising and officer occupation purposes, parties still valued their members (1994: 14- 
15). However, the change of emphasis implied would potentially impact on participatory 
incentives. 
2. Member Incentives 
Any re-calculation of the costs and benefits of members would impact on individual 
motivations. Incentive frameworks have been developed to assess them. Clark and 
Wilson (1961) classified incentives in three ways. Firstly, the material benefit of 
becoming a councillor or MP, or perhaps receiving the award of a business contract. 
Secondly, solidary incentives that accrued through the emotive benefits of enjoying the 
process of politics. These involved canvassing, social events and generally making a 
contribution with like-minded individuals. Thirdly, the politically relevant purposive 
incentives, which related to policy or ideological concerns and the desire to work to 
ensure the party was returned to government. Their classification was superseded by the 
more comprehensive framework of Seyd and Whiteley. (1992) and Whiteley et al (1994). 
They began with the rational choice problem of why individuals should wish to 
participate to achieve a collective political outcome when there was the option to free ride 
on the efforts of others. Olson (1965) provided a solution to this 'paradox of participation' 
through selective incentives only available to members; these were process, outcome and 
ideological in nature. In addition, altruistic reasons, emotional or affective attachments to 
a party and social norms were integrated into their model (Whiteley et al 1994: 80-9). 
Whichever approach was used, it could be inferred that leadership strategies to undermine 
the active members would have serious implications for the attractiveness of both 
purposive and solidary incentives. 
A reduction of purposive incentives changes the relationship between activists and 
leaders, thereby undermining the notion of exchange. This was articulated by Strom 
(1990). His basis was the assumption that leaders were political entrepreneurs seeking 
office. For this, they needed to accommodate the preferences of extra-parliamentary 
organisations. The extent of this recompense was a function of the labour-capital 
campaign mix and the ability of leaders to substitute professionals for volunteers; the 
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former receiving financial compensation in contrast to the latter's mix of incentives noted 
above. However, the rewards accruing to volunteers were typically 'prospective', realised 
only when the party was in government, thereby providing leaders with the possibility of 
reneging on promises once elected. Equally, members could under-deliver if they 
suspected the likelihood of such behaviour. Strom thus concluded that both 'have a 
mutual interest in mechanisms that allow party leaders to make credible compensation 
commitments to activists' (1990: 574-7). Electoral-professional tendencies weakened the 
membership's part in this relationship. However, these would enhance the potential for 
tension, as Ware observed that in an era of declining membership, those that remained 
were often motivated by purposive incentives, and hence were becoming less manageable 
than in the past (1992: 91). The key test remains candidate selection. Whiteley and Seyd 
maintained that 'as a reward for their campaigning, members have been given the power 
within their constituency parties to select parliamentary candidates and to send 
resolutions to party conferences' (2002: 27). 
3. Membership Strength 
Party membership level, the traditional indicator of strength, has persistently declined 
since the 1950s. In their study of European parties, Mair and van Biezen found 
widespread evidence of disengagement from party politics and a'general unwillingness to 
rely on existing institutional structures to represent and articulate what appear to be 
increasingly particularised demands' (2001: 14). In Britain, membership of the 
Conservative Party declined from 2.8 million in 1953 to a mere 247,000 in 2006 and 
Labour followed suit with figures of 1.0 million and 182,000 respectively. Raw numbers 
however, offer an incomplete picture. Katz and Mair (1992) suggested the ratio of 
members to the electorate (M/E) provided a better measure of density. In this, between 
1964 and 1998, British parties collectively declined from 9.36 to 1.92, revealing them to 
be close to the bottom of a league of European democracies (Katz and Mair 1992: 344; 
Mair and van Biezen 2001: 16). Furthermore, Seyd and Whiteley cited evidence of a de- 
energisation process at work amongst existing members of both main parties, with a 
marked reduction in time-consuming activities such as canvassing and meetings (Seyd 
and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley et al 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1998a/b; Seyd and Whiteley 
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2004). This was linked to their explanation for membership decline, which distinguished 
between structural and choice-based reasons. The former related to social factors such as 
family and work pressure, and the availability of other leisure pursuits; these were 
essentially outside of the control of parties. However, they argued that choice-based 
explanations, relating to the incentives offered by parties, were a better predictor, to the 
extent of suggesting the trends can be reversed through provision of the right incentives 
(Seyd and Whiteley 2004: 357). Consequently, periodic membership drives tended to be 
'more symbolic than real' (Seyd 1999: 384). Indeed, Whiteley and Seyd (1998b) noted a 
new type of member consistent with this view, one who identified with the party and 
donated money, but who expected others to perform the activities. Hence, party leaders 
seemed to be tacitly accepting decline, their widely announced commitment to boosting 
membership therefore being questionable. 
This suggested an additional question concerning the threshold level of members needed 
to run a local party effectively. Scarrow (2000) argued that although decline in numbers 
had impaired local constituencies' communications ability, they contributed in other 
ways. In line with Epstein, she suggested that organisational strength should be measured 
in terms of the tasks to be undertaken, such as filling local government candidacies and 
achieving an acceptable level of constituency geographical coverage, and the resource 
capacity to accomplish them. A lack of members could be counterbalanced by 
professionals, who filled gaps where local organisations were not fully equipped. Seyd 
and Whiteley though, contested her argument in that it rendered parties susceptible to the 
greater influence of political entrepreneurs and special interests, to the detriment of 
responsible government. It would undermine parties' ability to discharge their linkage 
function with voters effectively (1995: 467; 2004: 363-4). 
Organisational strength could also be assessed by its composition. Party members were 
not a homogeneous group. Instead, they possessed a variety of educational and 
occupational skills, opinions and personalities (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley et al 
1994). Moreover, Heidar observed that activists could be distinguished by the degree of 
time devoted to the party, the type of involvement in terms of, for example, socialiser, 
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ideologue or office holder, and the quality of that involvement as indicated through 
listener, speaker or political achiever (1994: 61). Consequently, they combined and 
functioned in unpredictable ways, which in amalgamation with the equally heterogeneous 
parliamentary and professional groups led to a complex political system of 'individuals 
and sub-groups with highly diverse motivations and aspirations' (Maor 1997: 134). 
Hence, for von Beyme 'the image of parties acting as monolithic units is a fiction which 
cannot be sustained' (1985: 224); a view which contradicted McKenzie. 
In addition, Drucker identified a collective party ethos in terms of a set of values which 
emanated from the experiences of its primary group of supporters. For the Conservative 
Party, this manifested itself in a middle class outlook, which was an important indicator 
of its operations and relationships (1979: 9-11). This perspective and the degree of 
internal diversity suggested a potential for stubborn resistance to central initiatives to 
wrest control of local affairs. Unlike Labour, the party had never formalised the 
relationship between its constituent parts and importantly, had always functioned 'on the 
basis of accepted practice rather than formal rules', in contrast again to the explicit 
approach adopted by Labour at most levels in the party (Drucker 1979: 17). The 1998 
party constitution, which included the replacement of the Model Rules by a new set of 
largely mandatory ones, thus posed a clear challenge to the Conservative ethos. In 
practice, much would depend upon the capacity of the centre for enforcement of 
initiatives on a voluntary body of people. Here, Drucker contrasts Labour with an army: 
central command in the latter would result in the merging of doctrine and ethos. 
However, this was not the case within parties, where relationships between the various 
party components differed. Hence, behaviour in the constituencies differed from that of 
MPs and party headquarters, thereby rendering the character and expectations of each 
different (1979: 18). This offered potential for internal tensions over the core democratic 
activities performed by the local parties. 
4. The Democratic Responsibilities of Members 
Candidate selection was the most critical, and visible, test of intra-party relations. 
Strategically, Schattschneider argued that 'the nature of the nominating procedure 
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determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the 
party' (1942: 64). Given their limited influence over policy, the ability of local parties to 
select their own parliamentary candidate was jealously guarded, and indeed, could be 
regarded as a primary source of leverage (Shaw 2001: 35). Hence, for the Conservative 
Party, in 1988 Denver stated: 'there are unlikely to be any successful attempts to increase 
central influence over selection ... any diminution of local control of candidate selection 
would be strenuously resisted by party members' (1988: 69). It would be seen as a 
challenge not just to local autonomy, but also to the whole meritocratic ethos of the party. 
However, the need for competent, and importantly representative, candidates in each 
winnable seat became a contentious matter. The relative lack of women, black and ethnic 
minority candidates was politically sensitive following the positive steps taken by Labour 
in this regard and its subsequent attacks on the Conservatives for being complacent. The 
localities were seen as frustrating the leadership renewal strategy, as historically they 
were reluctant to broaden their selection beyond the stereotype middle-class, middle- 
aged, white male (Ingle 1987: 63). The party hierarchy had gradually increased its 
influence over candidate selection through mechanisms such as the Parliamentary 
Assessment Board, the candidate 'Approved List' and central control of by-election 
procedures, but initiatives consistently stopped short of any serious attempt at curtailing 
local choice. However, David Cameron's ascendancy to the leadership in 2005 brought 
fresh thinking. His introduction of a priority list of highly qualified candidates, half of 
whom were women, and new rules governing selection options, including American style 
open primaries, threw down the gauntlet to the constituencies to comply with the centre's 
requirements. This development could thus open a new phase in central-local relations, 
where continuing local autonomy became conditional on meeting central conformance 
criteria. 
Members now had an enhanced role in the selection of the party leader. Labour had 
moved to an electoral college consisting of the parliamentary party, trade unions and 
constituencies, with an inclusive commitment to providing each individual with a vote. 
This brought a belated Conservative response. Traditionally, it was a parliamentary party 
responsibility reflecting the party's origins. Prior to 1965, there was no formal process: 
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the leader emerged from a consultation procedure. External criticism though, led to the 
adoption of formal rules operated by the backbench 1922 Committee. However, 
following the 1997 defeat, Fresh Future enshrined membership involvement. The 
parliamentary party was charged with conducting a succession of ballots to reduce the 
field to two candidates, who then submitted themselves to a one-member-one-vote ballot 
of grassroots members (Conservative Party 1998a: 21). Their being frozen out of the 
process had long been a source of discontent (Alderman 1998: 3), but the size of the 
defeat, the internal fallout, and the fact that the Conservatives were the only party with 
such a restricted franchise influenced change. Even so, members had no role in the vote 
of confidence in the existing leader, neither did they have any powers of nomination of 
leadership candidates. 
The limited choice led Mair to describe intra-party democratisation as 'meaningless 
and/or illusory' (1994: 16). Moreover, Alderman concluded the reforms to the leadership 
process were 'more of a tactical manoeuvre to preserve MPs' power than a massive 
surrender of it' (1999: 269). The process though, was fairly prolonged, possessing the 
potential to visibly display the party's divisions. Denham (2009) stressed that it rendered 
it difficult for a unity candidate to emerge, as he would have to declare at the outset. 
Moreover, it could produce a leader whom the majority of MPs had not voted for or who 
was attached to a particular faction. Hence, against the spirit of democracy, A 21ST 
Century Party (2005a) proposed to bring it back under the sole control of the 
parliamentary party. Its defeat by the National Conservative Convention, largely 
comprising constituency chairmen, suggested that the membership possessed some teeth. 
Organisationally, leadership candidates were now obliged to cultivate grass roots links 
and speak at regional conferences to enhance their chances. They would have to 
campaign strongly in the constituencies, particularly those well endowed with members 
(McSweeney 1999: 482). Importantly, it was in the interests of those with leadership 
ambitions to develop long term relations with local activists. Nevertheless, for the victor, 
despite having been elected by the membership, he or she did not become more 
accountable to it. Instead the winner's position could be strengthened by the greater 
legitimacy provided. Denham and O'Hara (2007) however, contended that 
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democratisation in this way had little impact. Ultimately, the leader's performance was 
judged by MPs; it was they alone who could remove that legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the primary academic literature pertaining to the distribution of 
power within political parties. The models identified, especially those concerning party 
evolution, were essentially abstractions and ideal types, and hence were not fully 
realisable in practice. They attempted to simplify a complex reality and explain the 
direction in which party organisations were moving. However, because of this, such 
models were often very influential: `catch-all', `electoral-professional', `cartel' and 
`franchise' have all found favour in the political lexicon and/or have influenced the 
thinking of commissions and parties. The Conservative Party, for instance, wanted to 
introduce the pure form of Carry's franchise contract. Therefore, it was important that a 
critical approach was adopted accordingly. 
The oligarchy slant was the starting point; it conceived the notion of power between the 
centre and periphery as being one of struggle. However, scholars typically adopted a top- 
down perspective conversant with political competition at the national level. The local, 
organisational outlook was overlooked, seemingly on the grounds of its unimportance. 
This was equally reflected in the evolutionary literature, where activists were often 
presented as a potential constraint on party leaders' attempts to adapt their organisations 
to changing environmental conditions. Nevertheless, Porter's 'five forces' model enabled a 
reappraisal, by collating into a single framework important developments pointing to a 
renewed role for local parties. The conclusion though, suggested that they were in need of 
central co-ordination for effective performance in the modem political environment. The 
implications of this were seen in the final section on party membership, which showed 
that it was undergoing change both in terms of local strength and activities. 
The introductory chapter provided an overview of the Conservative Party. It had long 
considered itself to be the natural party of government and the party for the whole nation 
(Drucker 1979: 117). To be suddenly confronted with a lengthy period of opposition was 
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therefore a shock. Fresh Future was the initial organisational response, but it was 
followed by other initiatives. The party thus had to give more attention to what Gamble 
termed the 'politics of support' in the country, by building an organisation to compete 
more effectively. It was temporarily relieved of the 'politics of power' apparent in 
government. Nevertheless, it was the task of leaders to reconcile the two. In so doing, 
they operated under constraints meaning that they were to some extent prisoners of their 
party and its traditions as well as of democracy as a whole (1974: 7). Importantly, 
resistance to change was believed to be endemic within Conservative thinking and 
activity (Girvin 1994: 721; Butler and Kavanagh 2002: 42; Kelly 2002: 41). Local 
autonomy was a constraint, in this respect, to positive party evolution. Chapter two will 
begin the task of examining how the leadership change initiative has impacted upon this 
autonomy and hence on the recovery from electoral failure. It will do so by assessing the 
local party organisation in terms of its strategy, structure and people. 
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1 McKenzie noted the party conference of 1950 where the voluntary party had a decisive influence in 
committing the leadership to a target of 300,000 new homes per year (page 197). The conference of 1987 
had a similar impact regarding the introduction of the 'poll' tax. 
2 The National Policy Forum was designed to provide members with an opportunity for policy discussion 
and influence prior to the main conference, but disputes over for example, pensions, suggested it was 
ineffectual (Kelly 2001: 331.2). The Joint Policy Committee was charged with overseeing the new policy 
process. It operated under heavy guidance from the leadership and Labour headquarters (Russell 2005 
chapter six). 
3 In the six general elections between 1951 and 1970, the third placed Liberal Party won 6,6,6,9,12 and 6 
seats respectively. 
Parties enjoyed: free candidate election address postage; 'Short money', designed to assist opposition 
parties in the House of Commons and the more limited'Cranbome money', which helped the two leading 
parties in the House of Lords; an allocation of television media time for Party Political/Election broadcasts, 
estimated to be worth around £68m for the 2001 election (Grant 2005); a Policy Development Fund 
introduced by PPERA; and extra resources made available to MPs to undertake local case work, which 
could be construed as a form of electoral expense benefiting the incumbent (Gay 2005). 
s Detterbeck's study addressed cartel behaviour in four western democracies: Britain, Germany, Denmark 
and Switzerland. 
6 The Conservative Party did, however, willingly accept the policy development grant introduced by 
PPERA. An expansion of state funding was an option being considered through the Hayden Phillips' report 
(2007) and discussions with the parties. The Conservative Party was an active participant in this respect 
see chapter three). 
The A 21" Century Party proposals, outlining the franchise arrangements, were presented to the local 
parties as a response to the 2005 election defeat. They were eventually omitted from the Constitutional 
College vote (Bale 2010: 267), thereby permitting the centre to try to implement them on a piecemeal basis. 
It is questionable how far it has succeeded with this strategy since then. 
$ As noted in the Introduction, with the exception of a Europe policy ballot, which achieved a 60% turnout, 
membership response was lethargic. 
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Chapter Two 
The Local Conservative Party Organisation 
A primary aim of Fresh Future was 'to produce a modem, effective and campaigning 
political force across the whole country' (Conservative Party 1998a: 11). Fresh Future 
was the cornerstone of the Conservative Party's organisational renewal, its provisions 
articulated formally in the subsequent 1998 constitution. It was also a direct challenge to 
the notion of local autonomy. This chapter examines the impact and assesses the party 
organisation both in terms of the distribution of power and of improving organisational 
effectiveness. The results have implications for party evolution, which will be discussed 
in the conclusion. 
The political science literature tends to discuss organisation in terms of the traditional 
variables of strategy, structure and membership numbers; organisational renewal is 
examined accordingly. However, Peters and Waterman argued that organisational 
effectiveness equally required attention to implementation, such that `any intelligent 
approach to organising had to encompass, and treat as interdependent, at least seven 
variables. ' These were not only the hard elements of strategy and structure, but also the 
softer management style, systems and procedures; staff or people, skills, and guiding 
concepts or shared values (1982: 4-11). Their model, known as the McKinsey 7-S 
Framework, is shown in diagram 2.1. It stresses the `interconnectedness' of the variables, 
with the implication that management failure in one or more of these would most likely 
lead to sub-optimal performance (Waterman et al 1980: 272). 1 It can therefore be asserted 
that positive engagement with an organisation's human resources is essential for effective 
organisational performance: change requires not just restructuring, but also a rejuvenation 
of its people. In this, the model has sustained over time a reputation for conducting 
thorough organisational analysis (Mullins 2005: 961). The 7-S Framework thus permits a 
broader analysis of the Conservative Party, incorporating the softer people-related issues. 
As such, it enables a more nuanced view of management structures and power. This 
chapter will show that reform has embraced both political and organisational dimensions, 
but that it resulted in an inefficient and unbalanced organisation. Local autonomy has 
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essentially become operational rather than strategic, but remains in diluted form for 
activist motivation. 
Strategy 
The strategy of a Conservative constituency association was derived from its purpose. 
This has always been depicted in electoral terms, as now embodied in the party 
constitution: 
The objects of the association shall be to sustain and promote the objects and 
values of the party in the parliamentary constituency of ...... ("the constituency"); 
to provide an effective campaigning organisation in the constituency; to secure 
the return of Conservative candidates at elections; and to raise the necessary funds 
to achieve these objectives; to contribute to the central funds of the party 
(Conservative Party 1998b: 27). 
Strategy involved the penetration of the local electoral market (the constituency) by 
achieving competitive differentiation. Local parties had no executive product or policy 
development role, except in local government. Moreover, they did not engage in market 
development in neighbouring constituencies; although they were encouraged to provide 
additional help winnable seats. 
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Diagram 2.1. The McKinsey 7-S Framework 
Structure 
Strategy Systems 
Skills 
Staff 
Style 
Source: Peters, T. J. and Waterman, R. H. Jr. In Search of Excellence (1982: ). (Diagram 
sourced from: valuebasedmanagement. net) 
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Maxwell Fyfe (1949) described local parties as electoral machines. Activists were 
believed to concur and it was certainly the opinion of the parliamentary party (Ingle 
1987: 61). Evidence from the constituencies was in accord: 'that machine exists for one 
purpose and that is to elect the MP ... if you have any other purpose whatsoever, you 
might lose. Some extended it to include local councillors and to maintain the party's 
profile with the public, but the essence was the same. The renaming of Conservative 
Central Office as Conservative Campaign Headquarters (CCHQ) in 2004 substantiated it. 
Value creation was a function of the constituency's electoral performance, rather than any 
wider political achievement. Others expressed a preference for'political machine', which 
subsumed the electoral perspective as the primary component in a broader framework 
which included information communication and social roles. The latter was recognised as 
part of the fabric of local Conservatism (Ball 1994b). National Conservative messages 
required local codification to accommodate not just geographical variations, but also 
whether the main competitor was Labour or Liberal Democrat. However, purpose was 
also interpreted as the identification and articulation of political issues important to the 
local community and which could not be effectively managed from London. Many in 
Somerton and Frome for example, believed it germane to act as a form of internal 
pressure group to ensure that countryside and agricultural issues remained on the political 
agenda. This broader perspective was consistent with why individuals joined the 
Conservative Party, and gave interpretation to purposive incentives. It also had potential 
to dilute the leadership's aim of aligning national and local interests, which re-structuring 
hoped to achieve. 
Structure 
Senior identified organisations as 'social systems' that structure people and process. 
Structure involved responsibility allocation, activity grouping and their co-ordination and 
control, but the social element also acknowledged an informal structure, built upon 
friendships, interest groupings and political alliances (2002: 70). The Conservative 
Party's solution to these structural issues was inherently political. The need for 
organisational flexibility was a source of frustration to the centre, underlined by the 
continuing presence of constituency parties: 'the reason they maintain their fundamental 
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importance is because parliamentary constituencies continue to be the building blocks of 
our parliamentary democracy'. 3 This thinking was reinforced by Fresh Future (1998a: 
10). However another official added: 'if we were starting afresh, we wouldn't start with 
this system ... we certainly wouldn't start with so many constituency officers around the 
country ... but we are where we are and at least the party is trying to fit local 
circumstances'. 4 This view has long been accepted centrally. Steps have been taken to 
group constituency associations (see chapter four), but the underlying local structure 
remained quasi-fixed; it was difficult for the leadership to alter it to match strategic 
initiatives. The relatively static nature of local structures can be seen in the organisation 
charts shown in diagrams 2.2 and 2.3, which depict the Conservative Party position prior 
to, and after, the implementation of the Fresh Future reform programme. The charts 
delineate the formal relationships and chains of command, but the dotted lines 
additionally reveal the difficulties in this regard inherent in voluntary organisations, 
especially those that possess an emotive base such as politics. Hence, such relationships 
are often advisory or specialist in nature; this has been customary within Conservative 
Party politics. Nevertheless, a key feature of diagram 2.3 is that the party leader is now 
formally the leader over the entire party, thereby providing central professionals with 
vastly more scope to exercise formal control. This will be a recurrent theme, beginning in 
this section with an examination of structure through the division of responsibilities, local 
co-ordination and accountability. 
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Diagram-2.2. -Organisation Chart Prior to the Fresh Future Reforms 
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Diagram 2.3. Organisation Chart Following the Fresh Future Reforms 
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Key to Diagrams 
Lines 
Abbreviations 
WC/Wom 
YC/CF 
TU 
Educ. 
Agric. 
LG 
CPC/CPF 
Recog. Org. 
Mgt. 
ACD 
Sources 
Direct relationship or line management: formal chain of command 
Direct two-way relationship 
Looser one-way relationship: functional, specialist, advisory 
Looser two-way relationship 
Subsidiary unit of higher entity 
Women's Committee/Women's National Committee 
Young Conservatives/Conservative Future 
Conservative Trade Unionists 
Education Committee 
Agricultural Committee 
Local Government Committee 
Conservative Political Centre/Conservative Policy Forum 
Recognised Organisations 
Management 
Area Campaign Director 
Diagram 2.2: (1) Norton, P. and Aughey, A. (1981) Conservatives and Conservatism. 
London: Temple Smith. (2) Tether, P. (1996b) 'The party in the country two: members and 
organisation', in Norton, P. (ed) The Conservative Party. London: Prentice-Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. (3) Garner, R and Kelly, R (1998) British Political Parties Today, Second 
Edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Diagram 2.3: (1) Conservative Party (1998a) The Fresh Future: The Conservative Party 
Renewed London: the Conservative Party. (2) Conservative Party (1998b) Constitution of the 
Conservative Party. London: the Conservative Party. (3) Personal knowledge of the author. 
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1. Division of Responsibilities 
Fresh Future introduced a revised local structure with streamlined decision-making, 
designed to create a more effective campaigning force (Conservative Party 1998a: 11), 
but a comparison of the two organisation charts strongly questioned this. Considering 
organisation generally, it needs to be acknowledged that there is a lack of detailed 
information in the academic literature pertaining to the position of the Conservative Party 
prior to the 1998 reforms. Nevertheless, there is sufficient to enable an assertion that the 
unwieldy body that was the National Union (Ball 1994a; Tether 1996b), was replaced by 
an even more elaborate organisational arrangement. The new structure embodied control: 
it shows the party board extending its reach across many areas of the party. Activities that 
were previously the preserve of the National Union, such as candidates, and conference, 
were subsumed into the board's committee structure. The result was a far more powerful 
entity than the `Board of Party Management' incarnation established by party chairman 
Norman Fowler in 1993. However, far from being streamlined accordingly, the 
organisation has actually mushroomed. Structurally, the number of different party units 
and the complexity of the web of relationships that have materialised pointed to an 
inward-looking organisation which is in no way consonant with the desire to strengthen 
the local `electoral machines'. 
The campaigning deficiency is further evidenced in diagram 2.3 by the preservation of 
the distinctiveness between the voluntary and professional wings, so that a configuration 
of parallel structures was reinforced. This was manifested both at, and above, the 
constituency level. Immediately above the local association, an area tier was charged with 
enhancing local performance through co-ordinating activities and efficient resource 
management. This consisted of three elected officers: an area chairman and two deputy 
chairman responsible for political and campaigning, and membership and fundraising 
respectively. This mirrored the constituency association structure. Above them was a 
series of regional co-ordinators, again comprising three elected officers with similar 
titles. Their task was to co-ordinate activities in the areas (Conservative Party 1998b: 8- 
10). The professionals were set alongside. There were a number of regional campaign 
centres, headed by professional regional directors, appointed by, and paid for, by CCHQ. 
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These managers were supplemented by area campaign directors, whose function was to 
co-ordinate target seat strategies, and by regional staff. In the voluntary party, Fresh 
Future clarified the communication chain by confirming the area executive as the 
primary link between the association and the central board (Conservative Party 1998a: 
12-13). However, the emphasis was switched to the regional chairmen, who retained a 
powerful overseeing role. This change between area and regional authority reveals the 
implicit weakness of organisational charts in depicting relationships and organisational 
nuances, as diagram 2.3 does not capture the diminished position of the area executive. It 
was the regional chairmen who attended important meetings in London and who sat on 
the new regional boards. A Northern Board for example, was established in January 2007 
under the chairmanship of William Hague and another was planned for the South West. 
Some viewed these with scepticism: 'they get to raise and spend their own money, and 
each region has a project director to bring in money ... it's just a talking shop to make it 
look as though they are taking the north seriously ... it's just another layer ... whereas the 
reforms were supposed to get rid of layers, they've now doubled them' .5 
In adopting a board approach, the Conservative Party was emulating the practice of the 
charity sector and becoming more business orientated. Nevertheless, by constructing an 
increasingly tall and hierarchical scalar chain of command, it was creating an 
organisational morass, which was meaningless to many activists. Many did not know the 
names of area and regional officers, and were in complete ignorance of those above them; 
typically it was the three senior association officers only who were wholly conversant 
with the structure. Even then, some saw their first point of contact as area, some the 
regional office and others simply went straight to CCHQ. Blonde! noted that 'as parties 
grow in size and complexity, the relationship between the top and bottom of the hierarchy 
also becomes more complex' (1978: 148). The Conservative Party epitomised this. There 
was no direct line from the constituencies to the management board at CCHQ. Indeed, 
one senior local officer asserted: 'central command is essential, but a lot is diffused in the 
middle, ideas are getting swamped ... get rid of the flabby middle and take it straight 
down ... if you can do that, you will be successful ... you get much more dynamic 
responses' .6 Overall, the revised structure was designed to improve central co-ordination, 
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but the complexity, manifested in a plethora of roles, has rendered it more difficult. 
Moreover, whilst there was much communication between the voluntary party and the 
regional professionals, their parallel construction suggested that the party took a political 
approach to structure, and not one that enhanced organisational efficiency. It was though, 
a structure which rendered it easier for the centre to separate out local tasks. This 
separation will be analysed further in later chapters, but needs first to be recognised at the 
basic level, locally. 
The constituencies were obliged to accept a new decision-making structure. The 
association chairman, traditionally a powerful figure, continued at the apex in an 
enhanced role, supported by the agent where appropriate, and by two deputy chairmen 
responsible for the tasks noted above (Conservative Party 1998a: 10-11). Importantly, the 
association's affairs were managed by a small, focused officer team, meeting on a 
monthly or bi-monthly basis. This replaced the old Finance and General Purposes 
Committee. The wider executive council, consisting of the officers and representatives 
from the branches and constituency committees, remained the ultimate decision-making 
body, but it was the officer team that possessed day-to-day responsibility. In particular, it 
was the three senior officers who were focused upon by the professionals and CCHQ. 
Decision-making efficacy was strengthened by the presence of an agent, traditionally the 
catalyst for a vibrant organisation (Bealey at al 1965). He acted as the chief executive of 
the association and used his experience and skills to advise, to implement decisions taken 
by the executive council and to develop the association for the overall benefit of the 
party. His role was to set the template and agenda for the officer team to work to, but it 
also included member persuasion to accept central objectives. 7 This was given added 
spice by the centre's assumption of training responsibility and a development that saw 
agents being subject to annual appraisal by their regional director. Consequently, diagram 
2.3 now depicts them separately from the constituency association structure. Ball 
identified the relationship between the agent, chairman and MP/PPC as being critical for 
electoral success; disputes could seriously undermine this (1994b: 269). In target seats, 
the professional area campaign director was now added to this triumvirate, thereby 
tipping the balance firmly towards the centre, at least for campaign purposes. 
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Professional infiltration of the localities was therefore taking place. Structurally, local 
autonomy was reduced to the appointment of discretionary personnel to the officer team. 
Somerton and Frome for example, totalled 10 officers including three area vice-chairmen, 
reflecting the geographical spread of the constituency. Cheltenham had eight, which 
included distribution and local government officers. The local agenda continued to 
address fundraising, membership, social and campaign matters; political discussion 
remained largely absent. 
The local branch structure within associations was retained, albeit with some 
consolidation. The rationale behind its maintenance was the significance of councillors; 
they were important to local vibrancy and activist morale generally; many members had 
personal links to them. Critically though, they were identified as the foundation for 
obtaining an MP. Branches essentially reflected electoral geography, being ideally 
attached to wards, although in rural locations the scattered nature of the population 
sometimes meant polling districts within wards. The branch was the basic unit of 
Conservative politics. It was where politics mattered to many members. It was where 
they joined or were assigned, and where much of the voluntary work was undertaken 
(Ingle 1987: 60). Fundraising events were organised to meet quotas agreed with the 
association head and electioneering was co-ordinated. Branches elected their own officers 
and committees, but possessed no executive power (Ball 1994b: 273). 
Although membership decline led some to conclude that 'they have had their day, ' most 
area and local officers, and regional professionals, were fiercely protective of branches 
for their political role in party identification and as a locus for recruitment, as well as for 
social cohesion. Associations recognised a need to revive weak and lapsed branches and 
to establish new ones; in target seats, a branch in every ward was the aim. Branch balance 
though, was a problem. Some were 'moribund', where few people attended meetings and 
typically discussed the same things. They were usually located in electorally hostile 
areas, but the evidence also pointed to better ones. Derby, for example, listed 16 in 2006, 
but half contained under 10 members. The implication was that the full constituency was 
seldom represented on local decision-making committees. Executive council minutes 
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further revealed problems in finding branch chairmen and cancellations of social 
fundraising events. 8 One branch in Somerton and Frome was revived by a dedicated 
individual, but would seemingly- return to a dormant state without such commitment 
9 
Preventing staleness was thus difficult. The situation was further exacerbated by 
traditional local rivalries, commonly based upon personal animosities underpinned by 
'thwarted ambitions', a characteristic of organisations containing voluntary activists (Ball 
1994b: 269,273). These were slowly diminishing, but `troubleshooting' remained a key 
role of area and regional officials, to their obvious frustration. Branch dynamism was 
hence likened to a 'living organism' in which even relatively strong ones could depend 
upon one or two people, so that they tended to ebb and flow through time. 1° 
Membership decline also affected specialist branches. These were typically for women 
and young people, but sometimes bodies such as coffee clubs were so designated. A 
professional noted: 'in the 50s and 60s, we had an enormous membership, so they formed 
lots of committees to give people things to do, to get them involved, the political 
committee, the ladies committee, the lunch committee ... the problem until recently was 
that all those committees still existed, but there was nobody there ... one person on the 
trade union committee, so he got on the executive and two in the area so one was on a 
national committee ... that all went in 1998, but there are still 
ladies representing, the 
women's committee, but gradually it's going'. " There was evidence that many 
constituencies retained women's committees, but with falling numbers. 12 They were more 
concerned with social activities than political concerns. In Somerton and Frome, its 
activity was limited to a major fundraising event, the Autumn Fair. Young Conservatives 
was re-launched as Conservative Future to attract young people keen to serve their 
political apprenticeship. Provision was made for branches in constituencies (Conservative 
Party 1998a: 25-6), but success was patchy. The young Somerton and Frome PPC was 
eager to initiate one, but faced a difficult task given the nature of the constituency. 
Overall branch weakness led to consolidation in some constituencies, though not without 
controversy. High Peak was the most radical, pruning its network through mergers from 
24 to six. The received wisdom that this created poor constituency coverage and further 
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decline because the resultant larger, more cumbersome, committees looked after bigger 
areas, was not realised. Instead, closer communication and control by the officer team 
brought more social events and political activity, and healthy branch competition in 
membership and fundraising. This unexpectedly resulted in less need for constituency 
wide events. After numerous financial deficits, the association returned to profit and the 
larger branches brought greater canvassing 'critical mass', and hence impact. This showed 
a capacity for local innovation to improve performance; the gains at the 2007 local 
elections were a testament to this. 13 It also demonstrated effective local decision-making 
independent of the centre and the ability of the officer team to overcome initial activist 
resistance to a progressive proposal. The consolidated branch structure translated into a 
smaller executive council, which rendered it difficult to overturn the officer decisions. 
Derby achieved the same objective by reducing branch representation from two to one, 
though the vote was close. 14 Somerton and Frome merged some branches, but on an ad 
hoc basis, resulting in an unbalanced structure, with Frome in difficulties. Cheltenham, 
being more compact, possessed relatively few branches: seven. Here, innovation was 
reflected by officers twinning geographically weak branches with their stronger 
neighbours to share political activity and cover deliveries; ls this permitted mutual 
political learning. 16 It might be expected that area and regional officials would be in 
favour of branch consolidation to achieve greater co-ordination and control. However, 
with the exception of non-winnable seats and redundant areas, the notion that 'small is 
beautiful' was advocated: 'its all about involving people, pulling people in'. 17 Branch 
consolidation could also founder because without local support it would lead to rivalries 
and animosity. 18 At this level, participation was thus preferred over efficiency. 
A primary activity of branches was constituency coverage, which typically meant leaflet 
delivery to households (see chapter four). CCHQ recognised that good local co- 
ordination was needed to construct extensive delivery networks. It required contacts 
throughout the constituency; in every village in rural areas. '9 Such networks were social 
as well as political in nature. They consisted of both members and supporters. The latter 
either believed it unnecessary to make the full commitment to join, or who were for 
example, local traders not wishing to reveal any political allegiance. Their contribution 
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was incalculable. In addition to assisting with communications, regular attendance at 
social events boosted fundraising and in rural areas particularly, they permitted reach to 
outlying areas. These networks were a fundamental component of local Conservatism, 
particularly amongst the elderly. They were growing in significance, but critically they 
were linked to, and largely constructed by, local councillors. 
2. Local Co-ordination: The'Pyramid' 
The importance of local councillors and networks contributed to an intuitive feeling 
amongst many activists that the party was built from the bottom. Instead of the 
constituency association, as asserted by the leadership, it was the branch that was deemed 
as the basic building block of the party. High Peak, for example, argued that councillor 
gains followed an intensive campaign of leafleting, surveys and canvassing; they were 
not simply a reflection of the national political picture. Local success was believed to 
provide the foundation for future general election success, as councillors become known, 
generated branch activity and helped co-ordinate the campaign. They related to local 
people and could portray an integrated team with the PPC 2° Defeat meant that local 
networks withered, branches fell apart and coverage waned. In this way, some activists 
pointed to a form of reverse co-ordination, with requests to the centre to support their 
locally conceived strategies. 
The concept of organisational 'pyramid' was cited by a number of activists, area and 
regional officials. The councillor dimension meant that many of the former stressed that it 
peaked at the top, whilst the latter not surprisingly countered that any campaign - 
membership, fundraising or election - ultimately required higher co-ordination. Critical 
decisions originated high above the constituencies, initiatives being transmitted down 
through a 'cascade' process in which the branch structure was the final component; it was 
the local task to operationalise them. Whether this was undertaken at constituency or 
branch level was of no concern: 'I'm not fussed about which way they do it ... I'm not 
going to be prescriptive ... at the constituency level, they make their own judgements'? 
' 
Hence, the function of local people was strategy implementation; this was largely 
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accepted by senior local officers. Nevertheless, the dichotomy of feelings meant that co- 
ordination was not as straightforward as for a business organisation. 
3. Accountability 
The existence of parallel structures affected accountability, both within the localities, and 
in terms of their relationship with the central board. The striking observation was that 
democratic accountability was not generally a concern of activists; becoming the party of 
government was more crucial. Accountability though, was murky and imprecise. Locally, 
the officer team was accountable to the executive council and was elected each year at 
the annual general meeting (AGM). Hence: 'the process is clear and most people buy into 
it'. 2 Members had participation opportunities, but often one nomination only was 
received for each post, few being prepared to take on the senior positions. The 
importance of 'an agent to hold it all together and ensure the jobs are done' was thus 
stressed. 23 Indeed, one viewed it as his task to find and develop individuals to hold the 
key offices: 'with the ability to carry on the roles they are expected to achieve ... an 
association without a constituency agent sometimes ends up with less able, less qualified 
officers'. 24 Despite this, at least in target seats, officers either achieved or they were 
dispensed with by a combination of local and higher official pressure. 5 It was evident 
that voluntary association officers had, through the party constitution, become more 
accountable to higher officials for their decisions and actions. 
Accountability of councillors was less clear. Ultimately, it was to the electorate, but they 
could be removed by the association for political mistakes. Some survived with the 
minimum of effort, whilst others were deposed through personal disputes. Concern was 
expressed over the quality of councillors, good ones felt to be in the minority. Moreover, 
the councillor group was a distinct entity, so that a situation could be reached whereby 
neither fully understood the other's position. High Peak encountered such a problem and 
addressed it by the chairman and council leader sitting on each other's committees. 26 
There was inevitably some overlap in personnel, but for managerial purposes the 
councillor group was separate, and consequently enjoyed some autonomy. In 
Cheltenham, most of the association officers were councillors, so the issue did not arise. 
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Nevertheless, the question of whether councillors should be separated or integrated 
within the association was apposite. 
The central management board appeared to be accountable to nobody, except perhaps the 
leadership through the party chairman. The 1998 constitution charged it with 'the 
oversight of the management and administration of constituency associations' 
(Conservative Party 1998b: 7). It was given ultimate responsibility over a wide range of 
activities, enabling it to encroach at will on local affairs. Kelly maintained that given its 
powers to co-ordinate and discipline the constituencies, it was not surprising that 
members were alienated and that it won 'few friends' locally (2003a: 112). However, 
whilst a number of activists agreed with his sentiments regarding an accountability 
deficit, there was scant concern locally. At best, the board was described as intolerant, but 
most of the criticism was directed at its performance; for example, in its perceived 
unwillingness to listen to local concerns and suggestions, and in its role as a provider of 
central services. In particular, there was no mechanism for auditing its level of 
effectiveness: 'it's more of an understanding at the centre of what the capacity of the 
organisation is and how it delivers ... if you want to get out a national piece of paper 
in 
the constituencies, there is a lead time, particularly if that message is to be localised to a 
greater or lesser degree ... understanding what the strengths of the 
local organisations are 
and using them'. 7 Nevertheless, to area and regional officials, it kept the party moving 
and made the necessary campaign policy decisions and appointments. It took action only 
where constituencies were perceived to be under-performing, but on its terms. For this 
role, there was also support locally, as taking a lead from the business world, there was a 
need for some authority. One local officer likened it to the civil service, therefore no 
requirement for elections. 28 
The Campaign for Conservative Party Democracy took the opposite position, but the 
proprietors were regarded by professionals as being out of touch with reality: 'they start 
with a fairly entrenched position and are often just articulating their own opinions and 
prejudices. Politics is a hugely fast moving environment ... it isn't practical to have 
Greek 
style democracy'. 29 Board membership required individuals with the necessary abilities 
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4 
and time, so that a wholly elected approach might result in inappropriate people. 
Dissenters were perceived to be on the fringe: 'a small minority of people that have got 
excited about something which the vast majority of members don't care about'. 
30 Many 
had no time for such sentiments when much work needed to be done for electoral 
success. As one area officer put it: 'why don't members kick up a stink? ' 
31 The board was 
either not seen to impact upon what happened locally, or else activists resignedly 
maintained that they had lived with central initiatives for years and simply ignored them; 
for example: 'the board makes suggestions and we interpret them as we wish'. 
32 It was 
only when the centre was seen to be interfering locally that upset was caused. Many 
members though, were simply unaware of what happened above the association level. 
Parallel structures meant a clear distinction between volunteers and paid staff regarding 
accountability. Democracy underpinned the former, but professionals were governed by 
traditional line management practices. This reflected a political settlement regarding 
organisational structure. Division of responsibilities was inefficient and lacked adequate 
flexibility, ultimately being designed to keep the volunteers motivated. Democracy in the 
localities was also germane for public consumption. Central co-ordination of the 
localities was improved, but remained imperfect. This was further apparent in the 
organisation's systems. 
Systems 
Systems refer to the procedures that enable the organisation to operate effectively and 
will be examined in terms of decision-making, communication, performance and rules. 
Local weakness could also result in the application of supported status. 
1. Decision-making 
Structural reform was designed to improve local decision-making by relegating the 
executive council to the task of approving officer proposals. As such, it highlighted the 
tension between the need for efficient decision-making and the quest to involve as many 
people as possible, as it was the members who facilitated political outcomes. 33 The 
officer responsibility was to prepare an annual strategic plan containing objectives and 
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activities such as leaflet campaigns, membership drives, finance and so forth for the 
forthcoming year (Conservative Party 1998b: 28). In Cheltenham, this was agreed by 
officers and endorsed by the executive; amendments could be made, but rarely interfered 
with the broad thrust. The executive thus performed an important information function to 
maintain commitment to the association's direction. 34 Operationally, executive minutes 
revealed a formal approach of reports and discussion by officers and branch 
representatives, in a manner similar to a public sector meeting. Effectiveness could be 
hampered by officer non-attendance. Moreover, specific issues such as joint working 
were delegated to sub-committees. The process though, was often frustrating, as 
deliberations could result in a 'vacuum' with much 'dithering', leading to, for example, a 
shortfall in campaign funds. 35 Somerton and Frome embodied much executive council 
decision-making. A consensus was usually reached, with officers' recommendations 
upheld, but sometimes only after lengthy and fractious discussion. With 23 branches, 40 
or 50 people could attend the executive: 'many with their own pet agendas, so that trying 
to reach agreement on one issue can be difficult, and renders the process unwieldy' 36 
Despairingly for the officers, a protracted debate occurred over the raising of the annual 
membership subscription from £15 to £25 in line with a central edict. It happened when 
the newly selected PPC was attending her first executive council, thereby presenting a 
poor collective impression. 37 The evidence thus revealed different decision-making styles 
across constituencies, which were shaped by historical precedent and personalities. They 
rendered professional co-ordination of local efforts harder. 
In its desire for improved co-ordination, the centre preferred control by the officer teams. 
There was a desire for 'small group decisions which then filter out', as the centre was 
adamant that 'considering what's at stake (electoral success), you can't allow a situation to 
develop where you get important decisions, such as the sharing of facilities, overthrown 
by the executive'. 8 Critically, an analogy was presented of the three senior officers 
'forming a strong nucleus' and 'sticking to their brief in the manner of a small business 39 
This was reinforced by central instruction guides, detailing the objectives, roles and 
responsibilities of these officers 40 A strong chairman could also manipulate or guide 
committee decision-making in a preferred direction. He could still set an agenda for 
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achievement during his tenure. In addition, there was evidence of a capacity to 
circumvent the executive council to realise necessary change. Decisions were taken with 
limited consultation and explained at a later date to the executive, at which point they 
were difficult to overturn. In Derby, the 1997 defeat left the association in a fairly 
moribund state, action being urgently required. Members generally accepted the restricted 
decision process as they could see progress being made, but as long as senior officers 
kept within accepted behaviour tolerances 41 The lack of an agent was apparent here, and 
in High Peak where similar action was effected to improve a deteriorating position. It was 
difficult to conceive disregard for local democracy happening in Somerton and Frome, 
where tradition was important. In normal circumstances however, the consensual 
democratic approach was almost universally accepted as the only way of running a 
voluntary organisation without resorting to dictatorship: 'it is a good way of decision- 
making because it takes it down to the lowest possible level'. 2 
The focus of responsibility on the three senior officers led in practice, to many activists 
being largely omitted from the communications loop, so that they were often ignorant of 
party developments until after decisions had been effected. However, an agent asserted 
that generally: 'not that many significant decisions have to take place locally'; it was more 
the implementation of the constituency plan that formed the basis for discussion. 3 Local 
decision-making autonomy must now be seen in these terms. 
2. Communication 
Communication, explicitly the lack of, was a persistent problem in the Conservative Party 
and rankled a good number of activists. Fresh Future was supposed to bring 
improvement, but nowhere in the document or the constitution was it formally addressed. 
Communication discrepancies could, at least partially, be traced back to this failure. The 
problem concerned both process and content. Professionals and some senior local officers 
argued that the communication process to the constituencies was good. They pointed to 
the widespread use of e-mail and the depth of material available on the party's website. 
Moreover, despite the number of levels in the structure, reassurances were offered that 
information was communicated down quickly through 'cascade' and without dilution 44 
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They highlighted a rump of activists who liked to 'whinge' about a lack of consultation, 
when: 'you can only communicate with those who are prepared to be communicated 
with' 45 Refusal to use e-mail was symbolic of this. In addition, some constituencies 
ignored central requests for campaign-related feedback. Pointedly: 'the local party doesn't 
listen because they don't understand, as they have not been to a regional meeting ... they 
don't understand how the whole system works ... central communications are 
just put to 
one side'. 46 This would not be tolerated in future, especially in target seats, owing to the 
electoral imperative; it was a regional task to rectify the problem. 
The main grievance was that the centre saw communication in campaign terms, whereas 
activists wanted broader political dialogue. Whiteley et al found 43% of members 
believing the leadership did not pay much attention to the views of ordinary members 
(1994: 63). Activists complained vehemently that it persistently did not listen. In terms of 
feedback: 'the chairman and myself get e-mails, but it's more like instructions of what you 
have to do to comply with this, more than what is exactly going on ... we rely on our 
agent to feed back what he can, but I haven't seen a lot of direct feedback ... with a sitting 
MP in Wells, he's probably picking up more from talking to the MP than we ever 
would . 47 Two-way communication was lacking. In the 2001 election for example: 'they 
especially asked us for comments from the doorstep ... as the campaign went on, 
William 
Hague and the shadow cabinet were banging on about keep the pound and nobody on the 
doorstep was mentioning it; all they were talking about were education and health ... we 
kept sending messages, they didn't want to know' 48 Such neglect resulted in much anti- 
London feeling. This was combined with perceptions that the professionals thought only 
they could win elections; the local input was not deemed worthy. Regarding political 
content, one officer commented: 'my experience is that they've got their own agenda and 
the rest of it is just trying to keep people encouraged ... it is very rare that they 
listen to 
what people have to say ... it's very frustrating'. 
49 The grammar school fiasco in summer 
2007 was viewed as badly handled, with a lack of engagement with the constituencies. 
Some observed this shortfall practically, saying the party was 'a bit London-centric' as 
'people working there do not necessarily see what goes on out there in the field', a 
problem that was not uncommon in large organisations. 50 However, a senior local officer 
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concluded: 'as far as the national organisation is concerned, it's a cultural shift seeking 
views of local associations'. 51 
The communication problem was not just vertical. Some activists complained of a lack of 
information sharing locally, with much being confined to the senior officers. This could 
be attributed to individual officer style, but equally was a reinforcement of the practice by 
the centre of focusing on the key local officers. Undoubtedly, an agent ensured better 
communication beyond the officer team: 'if you take the agent out, then communication 
falls away'. 52 Someone locally needed to understand the importance of communication. 53 
For this, informal systems were important. Those who made the effort to develop 
contacts higher in the party felt they could get their point across, but again it was activists 
in senior officer positions who thrived as it was they who possessed the opportunities to 
develop contacts. Following Heidar (1994), it was a product of the quality of the officer, 
essentially: 'being persistent and having good evidence ... if you can put forward a 
persuasive case, then most people will listen'. 4 In this respect, there was: 'a mutual 
dependency, the influence is not massive, but they will listen if the information is 
important to them'. 55 Nevertheless, it was the personal dimension, reflecting the 
importance of individualism within the Conservative Party; it was commonly agreed that 
constituencies as a whole had no influence with the party nationally. Generally, this was 
not a worry: 'they will voice their concern over something like grammar schools and if it 
is perceived to be an inappropriate way to have done it, but it's done in a very gentle 
way ; essentially, the localities stuck to their own sphere of operation. 6 Undoubtedly 
though, intra-party communication was a problem. It indicated power politics over 
organisational effectiveness; the localities were deemed politically inferior by central 
professionals and communication reflected this. 
3. Performance 
Performance was focused upon increasingly, especially in target constituencies. The 
foundation was the centre's power to audit associations. This originated at the 1984 party 
conference as an annual request to provide information on resources and campaign 
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activity, but the response was typically poor, being seen as Central Office interference 
(Tether 1991a: 29-30). Since Fresh Future, audits have been compulsory, undertaken by 
a CCHQ team on a periodic basis. One was conducted in 2006 to identify the strengths 
and weaknesses of target seats and hence campaigning gaps that could be filled by 
regional campaign centres. 57 Indifference was the local response. High Peak were pleased 
with their top three placement, but were disappointed with the lack of feedback on their 
achievement and areas for further improvement; another example of the communications 
deficit. This shortfall was seen elsewhere, being indicative of how the centre viewed its 
constituencies. 
Derived from the audit was a growing culture of target setting, particularly in winnable 
seats. However, there were differences in approach. One regional officer asserted: 'we 
want these targets to be assisted, supported and directed by a professional whose full-time 
job is that'; the regional campaign centre was there to help the associations achieve the 
targets S8 By contrast, an area officer talked of agreed targets as: 'more of an accepted 
standard to aim for ... for example in money, membership and pledge base ... I cannot 
direct them how to do it'. 59 This view was more consistent with the constituency outlook: 
'if the ward or association feel they cannot achieve these targets, it just won't happen'. 60 
Hence: 'you need a realisation of what is achievable and what isn't ... by not placing too 
onerous demands on people with unrealistic targets about how much money to raise or 
members to generate ... whereas you've got to keep a gentle pressure to keep them 
performing ... you can't go too far otherwise people will walk away, so it's a fine 
balancing act'. 61 There were still sufficient higher officials who appreciated the goodwill 
of voluntary members, but the desperation to get back into government was beginning to 
corrode this. 
Local judgement was important in target setting. High Peak viewed targets positively, 
tasking branches to increase membership and fundraising, and monitoring them closely. 
Cheltenham's focused performance model pointed to willing adherence to the centre's 
campaign-orientated objectives, their continuing independence being judged accordingly. 
There was evidence of 'benchmarking' against other constituencies, performance 
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indicators thereby being useful to those willing to embrace change. It was an area role to 
facilitate this: 'the number of Conservative votes, number of members, how many leaflets 
they've put out and press releases, coverage for certain issues, how many councillors ... 
all these statistics ... we compare so we can encourage them'. 
2 Resistance came from 
older experienced activists particularly, but was slight. In Derby however, people were 
generally oblivious to performance indicators: 'they don't know ... they've not really 
taken a lot of notice ... they've basically passed them by. 
63 They made little difference to 
local operations, as the professionals were: 'quite happy to let us do our own job and 
they're available to help if we need it, which is very good' 64 The presence of periodic 
audits and performance indicators had the potential to constrain local associations, as 
argued vociferously by Kelly, who pointed to their negative impact on local autonomy 
and membership retention (2002: 42). The evidence though, was more varied. Both local 
and higher officers maintained that they neither constrained their activities nor stifled 
new initiatives. Nevertheless, local acceptance of the target culture was mixed. 
4. Association Rules 
In contrast to previous practice, the new set of association rules articulated in the party 
constitution were largely mandatory, covering structural and campaigning issues: 
membership, officer appointments and responsibilities, committees and meetings, 
branches, agent status, dispute procedures, finance and candidate selection (Conservative 
Party 1998b: 27-39). Area and local officers reported a high degree of adherence and 
even contentment, providing they did not mushroom into instructions. Important was the 
local slant: 'there will be an interpretation of the rules and regulations, then we apply 
them to the best of our understanding and ability, with a view to ensuring that local 
consideration is given' 65 Nevertheless, a regional professional noted: 'we have some who 
just don't know what the rules are because they've never bothered to read them ... some 
of these we turn a blind eye to because it doesn't matter, but others we have to step in and 
Temind them'. 6 Moreover, there were other associations 'who attach themselves slavishly 
to the rules' to the point where 'we had to spend a bit of time troubleshooting'. 
7 This 
could also lead to officer frustration: 'there is too much formality in the Conservative 
Party ... we still have a lot of people who say we cannot discuss so and so 
because "it 
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isn't the right forum" ... we still have area meetings where they try to say "we do it this 
way", yet they don't engage with you unless you go to an area meeting'. 68 Another 
complained that he did not receive minutes of meetings he was unable to attend. 9 Central 
power at the micro level though, was indicated by the three-year officer position tenure 
rule (Conservative Party 1998b: 28). When a senior officer attempted to extend the 
duration against the wishes of a significant number of activists, the centre through 
regional and area officials could prevent it; although it was usually undertaken jointly 
with other local officers. Somerton and Frome encountered this problem when the 
president attempted to stand for a fourth year, supported by a number of activists, because 
of the dispute regarding the sale of the Wincanton office (see chapter three). 70 
The three-year rule was designed to encourage a healthy turnover of officers for 
improved local management and the generation of fresh ideas, but, with the partial 
exception of High Peak, associations were relying upon the same group of people to fill 
the positions. The workload of the three senior officers was especially burdensome: 'after 
three years as chairman, including an election, which is a full-time job, I had run out of 
energy, so it's healthy to reinvigorate' 7' Nevertheless, even in Somerton and Frome, 
there were few to choose from, to the extent that the association experienced difficulties 
in persuading people to take up positions or stay on. Most were content to undertake 
lesser tasks or else to free ride on the efforts of others. This was reinforced by the nature 
of politics itself. 'the stronger people tend to come through at the AGM' 72 In electoral 
terms, there was concern for the loss of experience after a chairman or deputy retired 
from the post; the rules thus served as a competitive rigidity. 73 Nevertheless, a process of 
'musical chairs', with little challenge once elected, discouraged new blood. Indeed, it 
could lead to complacency and might serve to reinforce parochial tendencies. 74 Politics 
tended to attract 'title seekers, ' individuals committed to enhancing personal local 
standing 75 This was summed up by: 'the same people going round and round as if they 
have a need to feel they are a senior part of the ship ... whether indeed they've still got a 
real purpose, not necessarily' 76 Pointedly: 'some people like to hold power, whereas 
others actually get things done'. 77 Related to this was the problem of personality clashes. 
Long regarded as a key factor in local Conservative politics (Ball 1994b: 269), this issue 
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perpetuated and could be exacerbated without the presence of an agent. Strong 
personalities and misperceptions could bring: 'great rows, with blood on the carpet'. 78 
Sensible application of the rules usually occurred where a CCHQ-trained agent was 
present. Ultimately though, they were a subtle form of control, enforced against 
volunteers, even if applied loosely. They reduced the need for officers to have to think for 
themselves and hence impacted on creative thinking. By tightening up association rules, 
the centre has tipped the balance between formality and freedom in its favour. Poor 
adherence to the rules could lead to supported status. 
S. Supported Status 
Desperation for power meant that weak performance in target seats was unacceptable. 
Fresh Future introduced the 'supported association' concept to rectify this. None of the 
constituencies in this study had been put into supported status, although but for strong 
and sensitive leadership by its chairman, it was clear that Somerton and Frome could 
have been (see chapters four and five). Local knowledge of this mechanism was therefore 
restricted, but there was sufficient to advance a plausible interpretation. Difficulties were 
usually political in nature, organisational ones being derivative. That associations were 
designated as campaigning organisations, rather than political ones, provided the 
justification for intervention. A regional professional explained the thinking: 'activists are 
the local face of the national party and as such they trade on its reputation ... therefore, 
they have responsibility to the party nationally and sometimes where things have gone 
very awry, it will step in and take them over ... a decision would be made 
by the board of 
the party ... one of my campaign directors might say there's such a seat, they're just 
killing each other ... I would see if there was a nice way through it ... I would 
be asked 
to make a recommendation in conjunction with the voluntary officers in that area to the 
board ... we would try to find a former chairman of a nearby and preferably successful 
association, and we would ask him to effectively manage it until ... it's a bit like putting a 
small business into receivership ... you would appoint corporate administrators and they 
would go in there and sort it out ... (power to remove officers and put someone 
in their 
place) ultimately, yes ... (re-build) ultimately, yes ... (in target seats) by and 
large 
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because that is where the maximum interest is and therefore the greatest potential for 
identification, but we are increasingly conscious of under-performing safe seats, because 
where we have places which are demographically and politically obviously very 
Conservative-inclined and they are not conducting themselves in a manner which 
maximises their contribution ... a safe seat with 10,000 plus majority, Conservative 
councillors, well-off people and only 200 members and pay no quota and above all these 
days contribute nothing to the highly target seat next door, then it's time to do something 
about it and we will use supported status to do so'. 79 Ball alluded to the notion that local 
parties could not be treated like retail outlets to be managed, as the centre relied upon 
activist goodwill to make progress (1994a: 215). The supported status concept reverses 
this perception from the professional viewpoint. 
Supported status though, was stressed as exceptional: 'if people have mismanaged the 
association, supported status can happen, but that's normally a last resort where things 
have gone completely wrong'. 80 An association: 'when it's functioning well, it's adding 
value ... it only detracts if you have someone in a public position who is not perceived as 
doing the job'. 81 A professional noted: 'if the association does the right things, it is left 
alone ... if not, the party board from a recommendation of myself and area officers can 
close an association down overnight, take all the funds and put people in to reform it ... it 
has not happened in the East Midlands so far ... intervention is for all sorts of reasons: 
officers acting in an incorrect manner or useless, maliciously or not, or they are standing 
in the way of making progress, a chairman and wife running it who don't want members, 
association with no funds and making no attempt to raise them, not putting candidates up 
in local elections, or entire income spent on the office with nothing left to campaign, or 
not wanting to share offices to save money ... we can threaten them if they 
do not group 
together ... it's all been done so far by agreement, persuasion and money ... 
if you do 
this, we are able to give you money ... there were a couple of associations they've 
had 
discussions with, it didn't get as far as a threat before the penny dropped'. 82 However, 
another official added: 'some associations shouldn't be trusted to look after themselves, 
because they can't ... Westmorland and Lonsdale slipped so far from where they should 
be and yet up to the last election they had a Conservative MP ... they had to 
have some 
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autonomy taken away because they were not carrying the Conservative brand well 
enough and that's what they should be doing, that's all they should exist for ... 
in 
business, if they were performing well, you'd let them get on with it, if they weren't you'd 
be breathing down their neck and that's what's going to happen ... too many associations 
forget who we are actually meant to be fighting'. 83 A business orientation was clearly 
being applied by professional staff, reflecting campaign priorities. As such, it was not 
necessarily compatible with the perceived interests of activists. 
Activist views on supported status were equivocal: 'if they are under-performing then the 
centre has to do something, I don't object to that ... the difficulty arises where they 
change policies and procedures without consulting us ... they change the rules or change 
the way they are doing things without coming out to us first and saying what do you think 
about this? '84 Moreover: 'there's got to be some control ... 
if you've got a wayward 
constituency, you close them down, their candidates will not be approved ... it's the 
ultimate sanction ... it is a trend of centralisation happening in all spheres of life, not just 
party organisations, which should be resisted ... I'd rather have an imperfect organisation 
with lots of mistakes than where nobody is allowed any initiative'. 85 Equally, the 
Campaign for Conservative Party Democracy observed: 'occasionally constituency 
associations are put into supported status, which effectively means that Central Office 
takes control of them. There are often good reasons for this', but reportedly 'in quite a few 
cases a constituency association is not told why ... or what it has to do to get out of it'. 
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There is also no appeal procedure. This emphasises the political, rather than 
organisational, motivation behind supported status. The centre prefers to employ it as a 
threat to bring associations into line, but it is clear that action is increasingly being 
effected. 87 
Organisational systems are inevitably diverse as they cover a range of issues. However, 
the central theme across them is formalism. This is occurring in a piecemeal manner as 
the centre tries to impose a more performance-orientated culture. This posed a direct 
challenge to voluntarism. Supported status evinced a stigma with the potential to 
undermine activism. The centre was sensitive to this and the need to keep members 
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motivated. That few important decisions were now made locally meant it should not 
happen for organisational reasons. Activists though, joined to engage in politics, allowing 
potential for conflict. Nevertheless, the changes made to the organisational systems 
suggested that the party leadership had recalculated the costs and benefits of members, 
reflecting Scarrow's (1994) question of the level of engagement demanded of activists. 
They were expected to conform to the centre's express instructions. The style of 
management reinforced this. 
Style 
Style is concerned with the manner in which leaders manage and communicate with the 
organisation, and how the latter perceives its approach (Waterman et at 1980). Formalism 
was a key development. This was combined with a change in the approach to control 
from socialisation to a more mechanistic style. Moreover, there was evidence of a very 
dismissive stance taken by the centre towards the localities. 
1. Formalism 
The advent of greater formalism in the party's systems percolated the style of 
management. In this, it undermined the traditional informal mode of 'accepted practice' 
(Drucker 1979). However, formalism was not universally dismissed locally because of 
the perceived need to modernise: 'we had failed miserably ... something new 
had to be 
created'. 8 Indeed: 'the party has to get into the 21" century ... there are so many 
associations that are so way behind'. 9 It enabled some localities to achieve greater focus: 
'the formal aspect is what sets the agenda, drives it, and should be leading it ... the 
informal relationships between people are what makes it work and provides the 
workforce' 90 This sentiment reflected how the party was trying to address the 
competitiveness-voluntarism tension: 'if you were a business, you'd just do it and in some 
circumstances that is what the Labour Party have done ... they've said this is what we're 
going to do and if you don'tlike it, tough ... we've taken the approach that we know what 
we want to do, but we prefer to persuade people, to keep people with us, because if 
people join any voluntary organisation, to a certain extent it's to support it, but it is also to 
enjoy themselves' 9' Party management was about: 'getting the right people to take office 
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who can make the best use of informal contacts and relationships, so that the organisation 
doesn't become too bound by rules and structures'. 2 
Some activists however, expressed concern over greater formalism: 'in the past, it was 
much more free and easy, a more informal arrangement, which worked imperfectly, but 
well ... I don't like this rigid structure we have now' 
93 In addition: 'they are trying to 
make us function like a business and we're not, we're a voluntary organisation, more like 
a charity ... they should respect that and let us do our job in our own way'. 
94 Moreover: 'it 
can't be formal, you can't issue an order, you have to encourage'. 95 Indeed, Conservative 
'people have other lives, other focuses beyond politics. As a result: 'there's a certain 
sensitivity in the way you handle them ... they have varying abilities and 
different 
expectations, and differing levels of time they can give, so its managing these to get the 
best possible result' 97 Essentially: 'you are relying on people's goodwill', so that 'its 
impossible to enforce formalism ... in this part of the country 
(Derby), we would just 
ignore it or rebel against it' 98 Despite the introduction of formal systems therefore, 
people and individual 
, 
relationships remained vital; voluntarism was still valued. A 
professional thus conceded that to achieve progress, managing the personalities of 
volunteers was: 'a question of balance between pushing, persuading and threatening. 
The importance of local goodwill meant that the professional approach to influencing 
local decision-making was both formal and subtle. Constituency officers commonly 
agreed that area and regional officials had no influence on local decision-making, unless 
invited to contribute. Therefore, employing benchmarking, a regional official viewed his 
role: 'to monitor, to challenge and to encourage the localities'. 100 As a professional, he 
could be 'an ally to senior officials having difficulty making progress' on campaigning 
and organisational matters, but also in disputes. 101 Area officers and professionals used 
their experience to suggest alternative courses of action in an advisory capacity, thereby 
acquiring influence through rational argument. This was reinforced by an 'information 
conduit' role from central and regional meetings to which constituency chairmen were not 
invited. 102 However, as noted above, both paid and unpaid regional officials were now 
invested with powers of intervention into perceived failing constituencies; the threat 
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would influence behaviour. Hence, for a membership drive: 'unless we have a regional 
approach as part of a national campaign, it won't happen on the ground; too many 
constituencies will pass it over'. 103 Higher officials pointed to the inevitability of 
improvement through technology and the benefit of a focus on officer teams, but equally 
alluded to associations that have gone backwards. 
2. Control 
In the Conservative Party, 'control' was a sensitive word. However, increased central 
pressure on target seats, backed by the threat of supported status, meant that control 
through socialisation was yielding to a more mechanistic approach. Most activists 
believed the balance remained with the former. One official stressed that the centre was 
only: 'really interested in you doing what you should do and make sure you win elections 
... they would only be more strong-armed 
if you were not'. 104 A local officer though, 
retorted: 'it's just control, but we're a belligerent lot and it won't alter anything ... too 
much encroachment and people will not do anything'. 115 Nevertheless, the need for some 
control was alluded to: 'I accept that the board needs to have a say in what happens 
locally to make sure the party is singing from the same hymn sheet ... it 
is important for 
association chairmen to understand that so they are better able to sell the necessity for it 
in the constituency ... how you conduct a campaign ought to 
be on the local side, what is 
good in one area may not be good in another, so there has to be some flexibility ... but 
there are some things that the national party should have jurisdiction over'. 
106 It was also 
made clear that the 'thirst for power' would mean greater formal control if another general 
election setback occurred. This would be assisted by the new Merlin network computer 
system which provided the centre with a comprehensive databank on local campaign- 
related activity. 107 A regional officer also asserted: 'you are a volunteer', but in future 'you 
are a professional volunteer ... that 
is, we've got to be a lot sharper'. 108 This interpretation 
overstated activist development, but it was a good indication of central thinking regarding 
the future of local parties. For those who already viewed CCHQ as being too dictatorial', 
it would be too direct, but such members were not necessarily the concern of the centre. 
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The change in the approach to control was indicative of an intensification of a centralised 
style of management. Most officers concurred, but did not always view it as a retrograde 
step. They preferred a decentralised stance, but typically interpreted it in operational 
rather than strategic terms by focusing on a local presence and maintaining local identity; 
they did not expect to take significant political decisions. Incisively: 'you could have a 
centralised decision-making organisation with local activity, so having local decision- 
making is not necessarily crucial to that ... take a branch of a bank, very 
little power is 
desired, but it would have a presence on the high street, which would be important'. 109 
Other officers were practical: 'they are trying to increase centralisation, but we know the 
problems locally and we know how to handle things locally and we've got the skills to do 
it, so why should they take that away from us'. 110 In addition: 'decentralisation is a 
strength in line with our philosophy or approach to government and therefore a very high 
proportion of the membership want to work in that way ... if you try to impose on people 
a way of doing things which goes against their beliefs, you're going to get trouble, but if 
you allow them the flexibility they want, you'll get a happy organisation'. 11' However 
another officer was perceptive: 'it depends on the calibre of the people you have 
decentralised to ... get someone who acts like a 
professional and who drives the 
constituency and who can relate to people ... we've nobody like that 
in Derby ... we 
could do with some younger talent'. ' 12 Nevertheless, for voluntarism: 'decentralisation is 
very strong, it's very important and I would back that all the way because people can 
identify with the local association, and ward officers too, and after all, that's what you 
need'. 113 Concern was hence expressed over the managerial approach: 'its basic instincts 
are to centralise, they're capable of it ... it will be harder because of the more 
disparate 
base ... power in the Labour Party has been concentrated for 100 years, the unions ... 
'. 114 
Moreover: 'it is more centralised ... if there were better performance, co-ordination and 
communication it could benefit the party, but they are doing it in spite of the associations 
rather than with them ... because it's all co-ordinated and planned at a higher 
level, you 
have the flexibility and freedom to do your own thing, but based within the overall 
campaign, so you have to write messages nationally and locally working together'rather 
than diametrically opposed'. 1L Again though, the decentralised approach was interpreted 
operationally. 
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3. Dismissiveness 
The more control-orientated and centralised style was reinforced by the outward manner 
adopted by higher officials towards the localities. This was symbolised by certificates of 
excellence for financial contributions (see chapter three), but importantly by the 
condescending language employed. Patronisation was indicative of the stance taken by 
some officials to the perceived lack of competence of local activists. They were labelled 
amateurs in an increasingly professional game: 'telling us silly little people what we 
should be doing'. 116 Moreover: 'you, the voluntary party will do better if ... ' and an 
exhortation of the effectiveness of the team concept to an audience of business and 
professional people. 117 Furthermore, the statement that 'all the constituencies have to do 
is follow the plan, 118 suggested that activists were only good for mundane tasks such as 
leaflet delivery, and lacked the capability to add value themselves. This formed part of a 
wider view that CCHQ assumed constituencies could be managed in a standardised form. 
Many activists though, were: 'strongly independently-minded people, particularly 
chairmen who are used to doing things and know what they want'. 11' Characteristically: 
'it's not a party which attracts people who are going to listen to central organisations ... 
we're not socialists'. 120 These sentiments stressed the philosophy of Conservatism and 
gave support to the rejection of A 21sß Century Party because 'it was presented as a fait 
accompli'. '2' Most local officers shrugged off condescending behaviour and pursued their 
electoral task. However, patronisation was a subtle contextual factor in intra-party 
relations. 
Patronisation contributed to definite feelings of remoteness and insignificance: 'there is 
the M25 barrier ... London, in many cases they 
don't want to know northern people ... 
they don't understand the local ... some 
in London just don't want to get out or they want 
to go back again as soon as they can instead of finding out what people feel ... they 
forget it's about people'. 122 Hence: 'they've got difficulty understanding the needs of areas 
outside London ... they work on everything as though it's London 
based, when it isn't ... 
they have these whiz-kid graduates in Central Office who come up with these ideas, who 
haven't got a clue how it operates in real life ... if they, came to us, we would tell 
them, 
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but they don't ... (causes frustrations) sometimes, yes'. 
123 Moreover: 'they've got to do 
their learning as well, which they are not doing ... you can't 
just do it by sitting in Central 
Office and saying this is how you should'. 124 This was stressed in rural constituencies: 
'living in London, Central Office was a visible place and you knew and had dealings with 
people in it ... out here in the rural areas, you 
don't ... it's a remote place ... so 
the 
perception is different ... it is them, whereas in London 
it was HQ ... 
if you were in 
town, you popped in for the latest pamphlet or a chat to somebody ... it's not part of 
life 
down here, there's the South West regional office, that's the connection, you don't tend to 
deal direct with CCHQ apart from receiving edicts which are given to you generally 
speaking by e-mail or by the agent'. 125 Practical implications for local officers derived 
from this: 'you have to go to London, because they won't go to you anywhere outside the 
M25, it's difficult ... all the council and LGA meetings are in London, the national ones, 
they never take place anywhere else ... anything Central 
Office does tends to be in 
London, it's normally within the Westminster village and you are expected to go ... but to 
get there for a 6pm meeting is difficult, the cost of train and taxi ... '. 
126 It was clear that 
such feelings were also historical; they had perpetuated over decades. These feelings 
represented a barrier to improving organisational effectiveness, but equally were a clear 
indicator of how the centre interpreted the power structure within the party. 
The style of management mirrored the formal approach to systems outlined in the 
previous section, although the importance of informal relationships was still recognised, 
even if in weakened form. The treatment of activists closely reflected the ascendancy of 
the Westminster model. Patronisation and remoteness were thus not surprising, but the 
party needed its volunteers and had to retain motivation. Style was a significant soft issue 
in intra-party relations. The centre's stance in this respect would inevitably adversely 
impact on the party's overall recovery prospects. 
Staff 
Staff relates to the people at the party's disposal. There are paid personnel and voluntary 
members. These also have to be viewed in activity terms in order to give an indication of 
quality. 
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1. Paid Personnel 
Many associations had part-time 'organising secretaries', but they were administrative 
personnel and were given scant training; the poor salary level reflected this. They worked 
alongside agents, but were often replacements for them. The importance of agents was 
alluded to above, but the party's movement towards a more electoral-professional stance 
led to a waning of their numbers, with severe implications. There were believed to be 
only 82 in early 2006,127 the majority being employed in safe seats and hence under- 
utilised. A shortage of money was one explanation. However, as a regional official 
stressed: 'in the late 1990s, the decision to run down our field force of agents was a 
terrible, terrible mistake ... it is a quite easily established fact that our highest 
membership is in the constituencies where we employ professional agents'. 128 Where they 
were lacking, the administrative and campaign burden transferred to local officers: 
'because there are fewer constituency agents to do the administrative leadership in the 
office, it tends to be an organising secretary or just a typist or someone who's in there 
part-time, the chairman has to do a lot himself these days, so he needs to be efficient and 
well organised ... local autonomy is important on that basis'. 
129 In High Peak, financial 
considerations meant the role was being performed by the PPC, but the officers felt this 
might be unsustainable as the general election approached. In Derby, tasks were fulfilled 
by the officers, but they were also laden with other commitments. Co-ordination and 
communication were hence inconsistent, and time constraints led to some perceptions of 
a lack of professionalism. ' 30 Where agents were absent, it was clear that the de- 
energisation process (Whiteley et al 1994) was being exacerbated. Agents were belatedly 
recognised by the centre as being important to both control the campaign and manage 
activists. They were still largely employed by constituency parties, a practice the centre 
continued to push on financial grounds, but increasingly leaned towards the centre. 
2. Membership 
Chapter one noted a marked decline in voluntary membership. The 247,000 in 2006 for 
the Conservatives exceeded Labour's 182,000, despite the latter's brief ascendancy under 
Blair; the Liberal Democrats were substantially weaker, reporting around 69,000 (Liberal 
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Democrats 2006). However, the statistics masked a wider Conservative problem that 
three-quarters of members lived in the South and the Midlands. 131 Moreover, Pattie and 
Johnston (2009) presented evidence of reduced membership and flat fundraising in 
marginal constituencies, so that central support was required. Member retention and 
recruitment efforts thus warranted examination. 
Local officers attested to a lower membership turnover rate than other parties; once 
committed, people tended to stay. Inducements included newsletters, correspondence, 
personal contact and traditional political and social stimulants such as discussion groups, 
leafleting, coffee and luncheon clubs, dinners, quiz nights and so forth. However, the link 
between membership and fundraising, whilst unlikely to bring'exit', did deter some from 
activity (see chapter three); one officer ruefully remarked that there was an implicit 
assumption that'you will put your hand in your pocket'. 132 Morale was a further problem, 
being linked to the fortunes of the party, particularly events nationally: 'its a virtuous 
cycle: the party's doing better nationally, so people are more motivated, so they're 
prepared to go out and leaflet and canvass more, that brings in more new members, that 
improves morale'. 133 Here, the importance of the leader could not be underestimated, 
many stressing the Cameron effect. To this, was added the revival of councillor strength; 
the previous loss of councillors, many of whom were personal friends of members, 
adversely affected willingness to campaign. Nobody alluded to Kelly's (2002,2003a) 
analysis that organisational reform had demoralised activists. However, Whiteley 
calculated that recent membership loss peaked in 2006, suggesting grassroots' 
dissatisfaction with Cameron's modemisation strategy (2009: 249). 
Membership recruitment was a jealously guarded local responsibility (Whiteley et at 
1994: 20-1). However, professionalism was often lacking. It was described as 'a bit hit 
and miss', and one officer observed: 'we almost expect people to turn up and ask to 
join'. 134 A lack of money and presentation skills was a problem, with 'roll your own, 
scruffy letters' producing a corresponding response. 1 ' Somerton and Frome achieved 
some success by writing to lapsed members, but there were complaints that the pledge 
base was out of date; in other constituencies it was under-utilised. In 2006, party 136 
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chairman Maude reported that the party knew the location of approximately half of its 
voters, reflecting the potential. 137 There was though, a general absence of national-local 
co-ordinated membership drives. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, it was clear that membership was afforded a low 
priority in the Conservative Party. The centre linked it strongly to finance. Fresh Future 
had established a national database permitting central members; a membership and 
marketing department was set up to manage the process (Conservative Party 1998a: 27- 
8). Local upset ensued, but also frustration at being unaware of national members living 
within the vicinity, thereby rendering the party 'silly' by revealing a lack of national-local 
communication. 138 The counter-productiveness of national recruitment subsequently led 
to its abandonment, the centre emphasising its consequent loss of £400,000 per annum; 139 
this was compensated by the increase in subscription levy (see chapter three). All 
members were now allocated to their local association. 
Curiously, membership was omitted from the list of constituency association 'objects' in 
the constitution. Most local officers outwardly treated membership equally with 
fundraising, a dearth of membership drives being explained by a lack of activists and a 
reluctance to divert campaign money. However, there was low confidence in their ability 
to boost numbers, even though fundraising potential would be enhanced. This was 
compounded by wide acceptance of the membership decline thesis, with many citing 
other leisure pursuits, a lack of interest in politics and scepticism towards politicians. The 
evidence though, also pointed to a lack of innovation in recruitment; it was commonly 
agreed that the party was better at retention. Whiteley and Seyd maintained that since the 
1960s, recruitment drives were essentially 'symbolic', reflecting their unimportance 
(2002: 16). This remained the inescapable conclusion. 
Executive council minutes acknowledged membership concerns, but gave little attention 
to specific drives. 140 Even then, the methods employed usually resulted in the attraction 
of like-minded people both in terms of political outlook and age profile. Typical 
recruitment vehicles were social events and 'cut-off invitations in campaign literature. 
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Associations were permitted access to central data from 'Voter Vault' technology to target 
high-value potential Conservatives, but the results were mixed, one officer noting that 
this meant anonymous letters to 1000 people, which did not elicit any 'sense of 
community'. 141 Presence in the community was critical: 'you need ambassadors to 
expand, and we haven't got that'. 142 High Peak attempted to engage the new University of 
Derby campus at Buxton, but was repelled as the institution disallowed political activity, 
though a lack of contacts and an anti-Conservative bearing were apposite. Fairs and 
advertising initiatives were additionally attempted locally and constituencies launched a 
membership drive following Cameron's accession to the leadership in 2005, but officers 
reported only sporadic activity since. Such developments were isolated departures from 
traditional procedures. Instead, co-optation was most apparent through connections with 
family, friends, neighbours and work associates, and Somerton and Frome actively 
sought referrals. A regional official added: 'the, number one way of recruiting new 
members is still face to face ... we'd stopped doing it and relied on computers and 
direct 
mail, but having a membership drive by knocking on doors will still find more members 
than writing to people'. '43 
Recruitment neglect was an explanation for the ageing membership profile, which was 
apparent. Whiteley et at had revealed the average age of Conservative Party members to 
be 62, just under half being 66 or over (1994: 42-3). An aspiration of Fresh Future was to 
encourage young professional people to become chairmen. 144 However, local inability to 
recruit sufficient individuals under 40 was attributed to the factors noted above, but also 
to a lack of preparedness to take responsibility generally. Britain had ceased to be 'a 
nation of joiners'. 145 Moreover: 'there is a reluctance, particularly amongst the young, to 
hold office and give something back'. 146 Parties were suffering in the same way as other 
voluntary and community organisations. Local associations though, were failing in the 
socialisation process, as it could be 'immensely difficult to break into the association', 
receive the necessary support and adjust to meetings full of middle-aged and older 
people. 147 There was also a political dimension to the problem, articulated by: 'there is a 
great difference between the membership in High Peak and the potential voters we need 
to attract as Conservative voters of the future ... we need to lose a few members 
in order 
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to gain others, which is quite radical and is happening to a certain extent ... this is what 
Cameron is doing ... he's bringing the party more towards 
the centre ground of 
politics'. 148 A 21"' Century Party echoed the age gap in terms of representativeness of 
society generally (Conservative Party 2005: 4), but contained no concrete proposals for 
resolution. It merely couched local incentives in financial terms through the subscription 
ratio. 149 Overall, it was clear that the party itself, both nationally and locally, was 
contributing to Putnam's (1993) thesis concerning the decline in social capital. 
Membership monitoring by higher officials was undertaken using the ratio of party 
members to party voters at the previous general election (MN). This was an indicator of 
market penetration which assumed, incorrectly, that the party had a fixed electorate (Katz 
and Mair 1992: 331). It enabled comparisons as a basis for challenge and encouragement. 
CCHQ ambitiously sought 10%, but on the ground 5% was deemed realistic. A flexible 
approach was taken: 'if we are going to measure an association's performance, we will 
expect to see it in this sort of range ... there are always going to 
be local factors which 
will adjust the position ... that's mainly being applied to the target seats which we need 
to 
win to regain power'. 150 In Gloucestershire however, where significant electoral gains 
were expected, only two associations exceed this threshold, the majority being down in 
the 1-2% category, and lower in some cases. '51 High Peak achieved some success 
through branch targets, but elsewhere these could be unrealistic and demotivating. 
'52 
Moreover, the presence of a Conservative MP was not a strong indicator. The very 
affluent south-west constituency of Woodspring for example, with a large majority, 
possessed around half the membership of Somerton and Frome which lacked one; 
performance was the most important predictor. 153 Higher officials reported that gaining 
the co-operation of some associations could be difficult. Overall, local capability in 
membership recruitment was severely lacking. Without an agent and a fully equipped 
office, it tended to be neglected; even then, it was afforded low priority status. 
3. Activity 
In terms of activity, there was a political deficit locally. Whiteley et al found that 
approximately 22% of members devoted some time to the party (1994: 68). Local officers 
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in this study were similarly consistent in their appraisal of 20-25% being active in some 
way, though a few believed it closer to 15%. Activism was described as 'loose' depending 
upon the task or event. 154 Attendance increased significantly for the AGM, a high profile 
guest speaker and particularly for the candidate selection meeting; in Somerton and 
Frome for example, this attracted around 30%. However, these were not politically 
productive activities from a campaigning perspective. Associations found difficulty in 
encouraging individuals to become politically active. Those who were usually attended 
social events as well, but the reverse was not true; no more than 10% contributed 
politically. Responsibility thus fell on the 'same few people', with the implication that an 
insufficient amount of quality political time was being expended to provide a good 
constituency presence. Just 30 of Somerton and Frome's large membership turned out for 
a NHS action day. This burden could be further illustrated by 40% of officers admitting 
to over 30 hours per month activity, rising to 60% for over 20 hours. Officers tended to 
be very active in the standard activities of social events and fundraising, leafleting, 
canvassing, newsletter contributions and campaign planning, but contribution tapered off 
when it came to member recruitment and political debate. '" Essentially, it was the senior 
officers and senior councillors who were the 'political animals'; for them it was a way of 
life. 156 The implication was that only a core group was continually aware of party issues 
and events. Hence, there was a clear political deficit locally in the Conservative Party. 
Some officers alluded to a re-balancing of the social-political mix amongst newer 
members. Younger people particularly, had greater political expectations from their 
membership than previously, so that some left the party if their political ambitions or 
expectations were not realised within a reasonable timeframe. Importantly, there was a 
common agreement that a 'political spark' was needed to join. 157 The politically 
committed then gravitated towards officer or councillor positions and could be described 
as political self-starters. Of the interviewees here, just over 60% joined from their own 
initiative, becoming 80% when co-optation, usually by existing officers, was accounted 
for. '58 Nevertheless, a regional official lamented: 'the trouble is, as we have become more 
political, we've become less social and less social means less financial and therefore we 
want to do more politically, but can't always afford to do so ... local government 
has 
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become much more political'. 159 The existing 'any member is welcome' outlook was 
hence unsatisfactory for meeting the party's needs. 
The party's commitment to membership accumulation was lackadaisical. There was a 
political deficit, but a shortage of political incentives to join. Maude alluded to the likely 
future strategy: 'we have not given the emphasis to membership growth in recent years 
that we should have done ... I'd also like to see us being better and more systematic in 
building up our non-member people'. 160 Supporter networks had a lesser stake in the 
party. However, supporters needed connections to the party in order to be engaged. 
Without existing members, these would not happen in the numbers that the party 
required. The natural consequence is that the Conservative Party would become even less 
embedded in local communities. 
Skills 
The quantitative political deficit implicitly suggested a need to examine the local skills 
base. Here, there was evidence of a purposeful de-skilling of local activists for political 
reasons. This was reinforced by the centre's opinion of local capabilities and its focus on 
local leadership skills. 
1. Membership De-Skilling 
Whiteley et al provided aggregate socio-economic data for all members, which revealed a 
preponderance of salaried individuals working in business-related organisations (1994: 
43-5). The present study found that the party was attracting enough professional talent to 
occupy the officer roles; although higher officials maintained this was not universal. A 
broad cross-section of occupational expertise was apparent, many individuals having 
supervisory or management experience, some at director level. 16' It was thus easier to 
identify skills that were lacking. Legal, media and information technology were the 
primary areas of deficiency, though marketing generally was weak. A regional official 
noted: 'we are probably as a party, the best e-campaigners in the country, certainly the 
computer press acknowledge that the Tory website is the best ... but (locally) there 
is still 
a reluctance to embrace new technology'. 162 A survey of association websites indicated 
108 
this, revealing a wide disparity from excellent to mediocre; some in target seats could not 
be found. 163 The presence of an agent and regional campaign centre were important for 
covering skills gaps. Central training provided agents with a comprehensive set, which 
included electoral law, campaign management, media and communications, constituency 
management, fundraising, political structures and personal development. 
164 
However, there was redundant capability locally. A few officers reported appropriate 
skills that they had not transferred to the party, some in the deficient areas; although 
insufficient to enable a definitive conclusion. Many had important occupational links and 
had held office in a range of voluntary community associations and local groups. 
165 An 
officer declared: 'Conservatives generally are people who do things in the community'. 
'66 
Activists possessed a wide variety of skills, experience and contacts, but there was doubt 
over whether the party was making the best use of them. From this, it could be postulated 
that CCHQ did not require or wish them to become creatively involved, preferring the 
key tasks to be performed by their centrally trained professionals. Indeed, it was clear that 
technology combined with the central board's assumption of responsibility for many local 
activities have led to a de-skilling of the constituency function, with the resulting 
implication for the quality of members needed. 
This was supported by the dearth of local training. Other than the website-based 
Conservative Training College, there was little formal assistance. It was acknowledged as 
a function of political success, but would have been more valuable when the party was 
struggling: 'we used to run regular area and regional training sessions, but as our fortunes 
diminished a lot of that just fell by the wayside', so that 'we've got to pick it up and learn 
it all again!. 167 Training was now recognised. The problem was: 'there are opportunities 
for ordinary members and for councillors and campaigners, but they tend not to go'. 
168 
Lethargy was present, but training tended to be infrequent and associated with basic 
campaign skills such as get-out-the-vote, postal voting, canvassing and so forth, rather 
than more comprehensive political skills. 169 Moreover, activists were encouraged not to 
talk politics on the doorstep. 170 This was wise advice, as there were not enough 
politically-minded members to compete with the 'political zealots' of Labour and the 
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Liberal Democrats. Evidence from each of the constituencies revealed that apart from the 
very committed, Conservatives did not like canvassing. '7' Hostility after 1997 offered a 
partial explanation, but equally the middle-class disposition was apposite (see chapter 
four). 
Canvassing remained important to area and regional officials, but required confidence 
and political knowledge. Policy detail though, was not a traditional role for local parties, 
a notion officers re-confirmed. Despite this, there was some frustration at the lack of 
meaningful political discussion and political action committees locally: 'the more serious 
members, who we ought to be retaining, would like to feel that they have an intellectual 
input on policy discussion'. 172 The primary vehicle was the CPF. It was run locally by the 
deputy-chairman political, but was separated from the association mainstream. It was 
regarded as lightweight, involving peripheral subjects and being too much dictated by 
CCHQ. 13 A central council, controlled by leader appointees, decided the topic for 
discussion, which was circulated to the constituencies on approximately a quarterly basis. 
It was presented as a policy brief with accompanying questions for discussion and 
answer; the local remit was not to suggest further questions or issues. Contrary to Kelly's 
(2001) evidence, local officers believed the CPF was ineffectual, CCHQ largely ignoring 
it, or more tersely: 'we might as well have thrown it in the bin ... they may see them, they 
may read them, but whether or not they take any notice ... my experience 
is they've got 
their own agenda and the rest is just trying to keep people encouraged'. 174 To some, the 
CPF was simply a vehicle for policy 'anoraks', 175 Turnout figures supported this. 
Cheltenham reported no more than 15 people, less than 2% of its membership, High Peak 
similarly, around 12 individuals, whilst Somerton and Frome acknowledged just 'a few 
of its large membership. This was consistent with practice elsewhere. '76 The party thus 
relied on the personal knowledge of the highly committed, who generally professed to 
having a fairly deep understanding of political affairs. 177 
2. The Centre's Stance: Local Leadership 
The centre's attitude regarding the CPF was consistent with the notion of patronisation 
identified earlier. Indeed, there was much evidence that the centre had a poor regard for 
110 
r 
local capabilities: 'they think we haven't a clue what we are doing and there is an element 
of they know best ... I can't remember the last time they came to me and said what 
do 
you think about this or would you like to join this working party and help us formulate 
policy on that, so their loss'. 178 Moreover: 'the professionals at Central Office think they 
are the only ones that know how to do it ... they don't tap into the 
innovative potential at 
the local level, on how to promote the party locally'. 179 This translated into an 
understanding of local issues: 'it tends not to be the senior guys, it's often the flunkies 
they bus in particularly for general elections, some of the media people who haven't a 
clue what the issues are, but because they've been told you have got to do this ... so it's a 
case of sorry it's not going to happen, they just don't understand why'. 180 Equally: 'the 
trouble is, if the professionals have never functioned in associations, then their judgement 
could be skewed'. 18' Finally, an area officer summed up the problem: 'they're not all that 
interested, they've got their own agenda ... they find volunteers in many cases a bit of a 
waste of time, a bore, they much prefer things to be run professionally ... they should pay 
more attention to the volunteers than they appear to do'. 182 Activists were thus seen very 
much in support terms, rather than as equal partners in the quest for electoral success. 
This outlook reflected the observation that instead of activist expertise, the centre valued 
the leadership skills of senior local officers as the primary capability. These were unique. 
There were hard and soft skills. Strong leadership was required to provide a sense of 
direction, to take decisions, and to overcome adverse political circumstances, vested 
interests and branch-level cliques. Here, there was an expectation that officers would 
utilise skills transferred from business. It was the softer skills though, that were difficult 
to replicate. Politics was an emotive pursuit, arousing much passion locally, so that in 
line with voluntarism, a very sophisticated set of skills was essential. It was necessary to 
lead by example, to understand the critical issues, and to communicate decisions and 
explanations effectively, so that 'people become a part of what you are doing'. 183 
Diplomacy and empathy were important competencies, as individuals needed to feel 
appreciated; managing some was like 'walking on eggshells'. 184 From the centre's 
viewpoint, there was the critical ability to motivate members to canvass, deliver leaflets 
and fundraise; this was a 'balancing act' of encouragement and applying gentle 
pressure. 185 Moreover, a gradualist approach was needed for future officer development, 
'you need to encourage people, carefully bring them on, be very subtle'. 186 Ultimately, 
local management required local leadership; it could not be achieved by central or 
regional professionals, who were inherently distrusted by many. Constituency chairmen 
represented the membership, so that in discussions with the agent and higher officials, 
judgement was needed when to follow the latter's view and when to proceed in a different 
way; local democracy needed to be seen to be operating. 187 Nevertheless, they were 
expected to lead in their own domains. That was their remit; it was not to indulge 
themselves higher in the party. Hence, a chairman confirmed: 'I want to focus on how we 
are organised within this association ... how we are able to develop the organisation and 
our campaign ability on a local level'. 188 
Essentially, there was a skills deficit locally with regard to providing a full electoral 
capability. This was partly the result of a conscious effort by the centre to ensure its 
professionals were ascendant. Hence, the focus on local leadership skills in its terms. 
Shared Values 
Shared values are the guiding concepts, 'a set of values and aspirations, often unwritten', 
(Waterman et al 1980). In the Conservative Party, there were higher and lower order 
values. The undoubted higher one was simply to win: to acquire power, to govern the 
country, to control local councils. For some, a win at all costs mentality meant that 
perceived anachronisms such as local autonomy should not be allowed obstruct electoral 
success: 'we've got to be absolutely brutal ... Labour had to be and won a general election 
... we have never been so brutal and it upsets some of our members ... its because 
politics are about power, without power we're nothing ... I will 
do what is necessary and 
I've got the backing of the party chairman and the board'. 189 This approach would be 
denounced in a constituency like Somerton and Frome, where the party needed local co- 
operation. Middle class values of independence and personal competence combined to 
present an argument that they should be left alone to get on with the task of maximising 
the local contribution. There was genuine confidence in their capacity to achieve success, 
but this would not be at the expense of local autonomy. 
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Local autonomy was the core lower order value. Ball stated that 'the principle of local 
independence has been vital to the health of the whole body and to the maintenance of the 
voluntary members' morale and commitment' (1994b: 262). This remained the case. To 
local officers, it meant the right of self-governance, specifically: 'rights to select, rights to 
deselect, rights to raise and spend money within the bounds of the rules and regulations, 
the constitution and the political manifesto'. 190 Another added: 'within the framework laid 
down about the way we should properly behave and financial propriety, that we've got 
complete freedom to act as we think appropriate, and we do ... I can't think of an 
example in the last couple of years where I've gone to Central Office and said can we do 
this or that, because we wouldn't do that ... we all do things in different ways and that's 
healthy for the organisation ... local autonomy is the basis in that it makes people want to 
be involved, because they've got more say about what happens, it retains members, it 
gives them an interest and a commitment to do things because they're making the 
decisions ... it's the glue that holds it all together ... if it became centralised without the 
local presence and local autonomy, people would just walk off. 19' Furthermore: 'it has to 
be this way ... it would not work if we were controlled totally from above ... we need 
advice from above, we need direction from above ... we do not need to be told what to 
do, we don't need to be micro-managed'. 192 
Higher officials moderated this stance: 'with autonomy goes responsibility and a 
requirement to perform ... you get the awkward squad, people who turn up at party 
conferences and bang on about autonomy and democratic rights ... I need to 
be 
convinced that those people are also out delivering as much literature as our other 
workforce, raising as much money, recruiting as many members, finding local 
government candidates'. 193 This was reinforced by: 'they can run their own organisations 
as long as it fits into the bigger picture ... in the 2lst century, key performance 
indicators 
are the norm'. 194 Presented in this form, local autonomy was not a hindrance to 
achievement if local knowledge and expertise were applied appropriately. Nevertheless, 
far from being an impediment, local autonomy was believed: 'to add to leadership 
strategy ... if we didn't have that autonomy, if they tried to regiment it or organise it 
in a 
113 
different way, people wouldn't do it', so tasks would not be accomplished. 
195 The 
Conservative philosophy did not like central control. Nevertheless, it was clear that local 
autonomy meant different things to different parts of the organisation, thereby rendering 
it difficult for any management initiatives aimed at fully reconciling their respective 
interests. 
Most local officers and higher officials however, believed local autonomy was waning. A 
few of the former were content: 'the one thing I would say about our members is that they 
are pretty astute ... they know they have to move with the times'. 
196 They found it easy to 
reconcile local autonomy with the higher order value of success, provided some local 
leeway was allowed. This reflected perceptions of living in the past: 'this area hasn't 
recovered from the John Major defeat ... some activists are still 
behaving as though the 
Conservatives are in power ... it was that attitude that 
lost us power ... something 
has to 
change'. 197 A local official asserted that these people typically formed a rump of 
'traditionalists who don't like change ... they're the most vociferous. 
' He thus added: 
'local autonomy means a more complicated relationship between the centre and the local 
party than there would be in a big business organisation and that's not always a good 
thing ... it means that there is sometimes a lack of trust between the centre and 
the local 
party and some scepticism ... but the alternative 
is a more centralised party ... I'm not 
sure that would be the answer ... you might lose some able people 
from the senior side of 
the local party ... it will become more centralised, 
but may be in terms of groups so that 
local autonomy may be group based ... it is gradually 
happening ... as long as you 
don't 
do things too quickly, then the resistance wouldn't be crucial'. 198 The common belief was 
that local autonomy would survive in a weaker, more performance-related form; but with 
intervention in those deemed unfit. It was the professionals nevertheless, who decided 
what was, and was not, a competent level of performance. 
The collective middle class ethos that Drucker (1979) articulated with respect to the 
operations and relationships within the Conservative Party was under challenge from a 
more performance-focused central party. To the professionals and some activists, 
winning a general election required a modification of local autonomy to reflect a close 
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alignment of national and local interests consistent with the more competitive political 
outlook. Not all activists, however, concurred. 
Conclusion 
This chapter conducted an assessment of the party organisation to understand how reform 
had improved its effectiveness and impacted upon the balance of power. The McKinsey 
7-S Framework facilitated this. It permitted an examination of softer issues such as 
systems and management style, as well as structure and people. It was clear that 
organisational change accommodated both political and organisational dimensions, and 
hence the result was inefficient and unbalanced. Business principles were introduced, but 
were not wholly compatible with voluntarism. Activists could not be engaged on such 
terms. 
Fresh Future reinforced the parallel structure separating the voluntary and professional 
wings, but along with later modifications created an organisational morass not suited to 
effective communication and co-ordination. Progress was made towards the latter 
through focused decision-making on the officer teams, the three senior ones particularly, 
and a belated recognition of the importance of agents. However, in other areas the 
organisation was coasting. Membership recruitment was not a priority. The skills of 
existing members were also underutilised and undervalued, reflecting a central preference 
for the expertise of its professionals. Critically, a de-skilling of activists was taking place, 
largely for political reasons; leadership was deemed the core skill locally to facilitate 
central instructions and to sell them to members. Furthermore, the centre's approach to 
management systems and style was lacking. Whilst greater control was needed, more 
mechanistic procedures, to the detriment of traditional socialisation, would not endear 
activists. Moreover, mandatory rules, compulsory audits and supported status, all part of 
a performance culture, would not encourage higher activism rates, especially as there was 
scant feedback. Despite this, many local officers simply tolerated central initiatives and 
carried on regardless. Nevertheless, the organisation that emerged was one that was 
geared towards improving the alignment between national and local interests; it was 
unlikely to dramatically improve campaign effectiveness. It would not contribute to any 
115 
enhancement of Putnam's (1993) social capital in local communities. Ultimately, it 
reflected the conflictual nature of politics, rather than purposeful organisational 
development. 
The systems and style changes alluded to above, significantly modified the form of local 
autonomy to a position where it'now reflected operational, rather than strategic concerns. 
This was reinforced by additional soft initiatives and stances by the centre such as 
benchmarking constituencies, subtle alterations to local decision-making procedures, 
omitting activists from the communications loop, the disparaging of their capabilities, 
patronisation and remoteness. In this way, the 7-S Framework has highlighted nuances in 
power relations not immediately apparent from a structural analysis. Moreover, the role 
of the localities was more closely being defined for them and attendant instructions 
handed down through the cascade process. This reflected Carty's (2004) franchise model 
design; although it was repulsed by activists. The evidence though, pointed to enhanced 
hierarchical management rather than stratarchy, and the organisational complexity 
implicitly revealed negated the simplicity and standardisation of franchise systems. 
Nevertheless, the centre was now conceiving local autonomy on its terms, whilst being 
conscious of the need for its outward preservation for activist motivation purposes. The 
reduction in member numbers and their purposeful de-skilling rendered it difficult for 
them to counter the centre's initiatives; greater emphasis on building supporter networks, 
rather than members, compounded this. Change had undermined Drucker's (1979) 
observation of 'accepted practice' in the Conservative Party, but the stubborn resistance 
associated with the middle class ethos ensured that local autonomy would not disappear 
altogether. 
The change in status of local autonomy has implications for party evolution. It was clear 
that the centre has re-calculated the cost-benefit ratio of members. In Maor's (1997) 
terms, it was keen to emphasise the perception of democracy at the system level, but 
organisationally local parties had seen tasks removed and creative decision-making 
curtailed. The issues identified above pointed towards an adoption of Epstein's (1967) 
looser flexible organisation, but not for the voter reach reason he suggested. Instead, his 
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advocacy of 50-100 active members per constituency to enable the party to manage 
electoral peaks was coming to fruition; it was they who will organise the supporter 
networks. Here, the officer team represented the cadre, with the hoped for quality in the 
three senior officers and councillor group. It was their job to co-ordinate the local effort. 
The revision to local autonomy needs to be interpreted in electoral-professional terms. As 
noted, the new organisational settlement was political to effect greater alignment of 
national and local interests, consistent with the discipline needed for political marketing. 
This would facilitate greater professional control from the centre, reflecting the perceived 
amateur status of activists. However, the command model was not compatible with 
voluntarism. Despite the political deficit locally, activists were still required for 
campaigning and for occupying councillor positions. Indeed, the centre has finally 
recognised the importance of councillors, to the extent of seeking to retain local branch 
structures. Critically, Ball's assertion that Central Office 'depended upon the goodwill of 
the voluntary associations if they were to achieve anything' (1994a: 195), remains 
apposite, albeit in diluted form. Activists compete to ensure that their local issues remain 
on the political agenda. Electoral-professional has thus been pursued centrally, but has 
not been realised in Panebianco's (1988) pure form. The centre has instead sought to 
influence local activities in a variety of direct and subtle ways. This will be shown further 
in chapter three, which looks at finance. 
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1 The original 7-S Framework was published by Waterman et al (1980). However, this version employed 
'superordinate goals' as its central and linking variable, rather than 'shared values'. The Peters and 
Waterman (1982) model used in the text here is the refined version. It was deemed more suitable for the 
study. 
2 South West officer - 20. 
3 Regional official - 42. 
4 South West local official -35. s Area officer - 36. Fresh Future stressed: 'The guiding principles behind the reform of the party are 
that 
there should be the fewest possible layers of communication between party members and the party 
leadership, and that there should be a much greater degree of involvement for party members' 
(Conservative Party 1998a: 10). This was discounted by the evidence. 
6 East Midlands local officer - 9. 
7 South West local official - 35. 
° Some of these cancellations were prestigious, such as golf days which have the potential to attract quality 
members and donors. 
9 South West local officer - 32. 
10 South West local official - 34. 
11 Regional official - 41. 
12 From the sample conducted for the financial analysis (see chapter three), 46 out of 120 constituencies 
(38.3%) still possessed a CWCC or women's committee. 
" The Conservatives gained 14 seats to take overall control of the council ('The Times', 5th May 2007). 
" Derby Executive Council minutes for AGM 29 March 2007. 
15 South West local officer - 19. 16 South West local officer - 22. 17 Regional official -42. " This was felt most strongly in Somerton and Frome. 
19 South West local official -35. 20 South West local officer -20. 21 Regional officer -40. 22 Area officer - 37. 23 Area officer - 38. 24 South West local official - 35. 25 South West local officer - 34. 26 The problem was the proposed closure of the Buxton Octagon Theatre. Councillors were prepared to see 
it become a supermarket. The association officers intervened against the councillors because of the reaction 
of the public. 
27 South West local officer - 19. 2$ South West local officer - 28. 29 Regional official - 42. 30 South West local official - 35. 31 Area officer - 36. 32 East Midlands local officer - 12.  Regional official - 43. 34 South West local officer - 23. 35 South West local officer - 23. 36 South West local officer - 28. " South West local officer - 29. 31 Area officer - 36. 39 Area officer - 38. 40 Conservative Training College 16th March 2005 (Conservative Party 2005d). The documents relate to 
'chairman', 'deputy chairman political and campaigning', and'deputy chairman membership and 
fundraising'. They stress adherence to party rules and detail all the officer functions and ways to proceed. 
41 East Midlands local officer - 6. 42 East Midlands local officer - 8. 
43 South West local official - 34. 
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14 Regional officer - 40. 
45 Regional official - 42. 46 East Midlands local officer - 6. 
47 South West local officer - 28. 
" Area officer - 36. 49 East Midlands local officer - 15. so South West local official - 34. 51 South West local officer - 25. 52 East Midlands local officer - 14. 
s' South West local official - 35. 
54 South West local officer - 19. 
ss South West local officer - 22. $6 South West local official - 34. 
s' Regional officer - 40. 
sa Regional officer - 40. 59 Area officer - 37. 60 East Midlands local officer - 4. 
61 East Midlands local officer - 8. 
62 Area officer - 39. 
6' East Midlands local officer - 6. 
64 East Midlands local officer - 3. 
6s South West local officer - 18. 
66 Regional official - 42. 
67 Regional official - 43. as South West local officer - 23. 69 East Midlands local officer - 9. 70 Somerton and Frome correspondence and South West local officer - 25. 
71 South West local officer - 26. 72 South West local officer - 21. 13 Regional official - 43. 74 East Midlands local officer - 6. 75 Personal observations of, and discussions with, party officials by the author. 
76 South West local officer - 20. 77 Regional official - 43. 78 East Midlands local officer - 13. 79 Regional official - 42. 60 Area officer - 39. 11 South West local official - 34. $2 Regional official - 41. 
11 East Midlands local officer and campaign official - 16. A CCHQ audit found a weak and divided 
association that lacked a campaign team and a website. The PPC subsequently resigned as the constituency 
was placed in supported status. Association officers had to sign green forms to accept central authority 
imposed upon them and pink forms if they didn't. The latter meant instant resignation from their position 
('CCHQ's action against Westmorland and Lonsdale is warning to all associations', ConservativeHome 5 
December 2006). 
" East Midlands local officer - 8. °S East Midlands local officer - 2. "'Supported Status', The Campaign for Conservative Party Democracy 18 March 2007. 
87 The Conservative Party does not publish information concerning how many associations have been put 
into supported status. The National Conservative Convention annual report, for example, alludes to it 
happening and being managed; the party board has also set up a sub-committee for this purpose. The 
incidence of supported status is also somewhat haphazard: some areas make every effort to achieve 
practical conciliation (e. g. East Midlands), but in others (e. g. North West) the local professionals, and 
indeed voluntary regional chairman, are more 'trigger-happy' to show that they are exercising their 
authority to bring the associations into line and hence impress the party leadership. Moreover, the duration 
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that associations spend in supported status is variable depending upon the magnitude of the problem, as 
again determined by the professionals. It was thus estimated that since the 2005 general election, between 
10 and 15 associations have succumbed to supported status. 
ee East Midlands local officer - 10. 19 South West local officer - 17. 
90 East Midlands local officer - 16. 91 Regional official - 41. 92 South West local official - 35. 
9' East Midlands local officer - 2. 
94 East Midlands local officer - 3. 
95 South West local official - 34. 
" South West local officer - 31. 
9' East Midlands local officer - 8. 
9' East Midlands local officer - 3. 
9' Regional official - 41. 10° Regional official - 42. 101 East Midlands local officer - 6. 
102 Area officer - 37. 
103 Regional officer - 40. 104 South West local official - 34. 
105 South West local officer - 33. 
106 East Midlands local officer - 13. 
107 The Merlin system would enable central professionals to see which constituency associations were 
delivering on their promises, as it accumulated information on leaflet deliveries, canvassing, surveys and so 
forth. It would therefore become an important control instrument. 
"' Regional officer - 40. 109 South West local official - 35. 110 East Midlands local officer - 12. 111 East Midlands local officer - 3. 112 East Midlands local officer - 6. 1" South West local officer - 20. 14 South West local officer - 31. 115 South West local officer - 23. 116 South West local officer - 32. 
117 Delivered at an area AGM, which the. author attended 12th September 2005. 
118 Area officer - 36. 119 South West local officer - 31. 120 South West local officer - 33. 121 Area officer - 39. 122 Area officer - 38. 123 East Midlands local officer - S. 124 South West local officer - 17. its South West local officer - 29. 126 South West local officer - 19. 127 Somerton and Frome Constituency General and Political Report 5`h March 2005 to Yd March 2006. The 
report attributed the low number of agents to the financial position of the local parties after the 2005 
general election and to constituency grouping (see chapter four). Somerton and Frome complained that 
finding an effective agent, should they have the money, would be difficult because of the shortage. The 
accuracy of the figure of 82 agents is questionable, but is given some credibility by a steering committee 
briefing in January 2006 which stated that 'we expect to have 200 agents in the field by summer 2007, 
double our present number'; this suggests a figure of no more than 110. 'Briefing about FRAC meeting on 
12 January 2006' document that the author had sight of. FRAC stands for Farming and Rural Affairs 
Committee. Known to have been in attendance were: Party Leader David Cameron; Party Chairman 
Francis Maude; Paul Marland, a former MP who was attending on behalf of Raymond Monbiot, the 
Chairman of the National Conservative Convention and a deputy chairman of the party; Simon Mort, 
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member of the party board 2004-2008 and Vice-President of the National Conservative Convention; Gavin 
Barwell, the Director of Operations in 2006; Jeremy Middleton, an influential volunteer and future 
chairman of the National Conservative Convention; and Bernard Jenkin, Deputy Chairman candidates 
2005-2007 and Chairman of the Candidates Committee. The subjects discussed were: organisational 
weakness and agents, policy, information technology, mergers and groupings, candidate selection, 
membership subscriptions and recruitment, supported associations, conference and the reorganisation of the 
regional professionals. 
128 Regional official - 42. 
129 Regional official - 43. $30 East Midlands local officer - 2. 
131 'The Times' 13 March 2001. Cited from Cowley, P. and Quayle, S. (2002) 'The Conservatives: Running 
on the Spot', in Geddes, A. and Tonge, J. Labour's Second Landslide: The British General Election 2001. 
Manchester. Manchester University Press. 
172 South West local officer - 24. 133 East Midlands local officer - 3. 1" East Midlands local officer - 2. i" Regional official - 41. $36 Area officer - 36. 131 Report from a national meeting, January 2006. 
138 East Midlands local officer - 2. 
139 Conservative Party internal document August 2006, which the author had sight of. 
$40 Executive council minutes for Derby, Cheltenham, and Somerton and Frome identify member gains and 
losses, but generally detail only social events for membership initiatives. 
141 East Midlands local officer - 5. 
142 South West local officer - 28. 143 Regional official - 41. 1" Area officer - 36. 143 Regional official - 42. 146 East Midlands local officer - 6. 147 East Midlands local officer - 5. For this study, only two young activists/officers were interviewed. 
The 
author though, has also witnessed this kind of socialisation problem within the party. 
wa East Midlands local officer - 13. 149 Whilst A 21" Century Party was rejected by the National Conservative Convention in September 2005, 
the proposal for an 80: 20 local: national subscription ratio was introduced in January 2007. This was given 
more meaning with the minimum increased from £15 to £25. Previously though, local parties kept all the 
subscription. 
iso Area officer - 37. 151 Area officer - 39. $52 The author had sight of a document of a constituency whose branches were each given a target of a 25% 
increase in membership for the year 2007. 
15' Regional official - 42. The membership numbers for Woodspring for 2005-7 were 643,592 and 
539 
respectively. Those for Somerton and Frome for the corresponding period were 1139,1092 and 1104. 
154 South West local officer - 18. 155 Results from the Political Activity and Skills Questionnaire administered at the time of interview. 
$56 Area officer - 38. "' South West local official - 34. "' Political Activity and Skills Questionnaire. 
159 Regional official - 42. 
160iChallenge the Chairman' 4. Tory Radio 29 November 2006. 
161 Political Activity and Skills Questionnaire. 
162 Regional official - 42. 163 A view of 40 constituency association websites was undertaken in June 2007. They were selected 
randomly from the constituency finance sample (see chapter three). 
1" Irraining to be a Conservative Party Agent', Conservative Training College, 28 September 2005. 
165 Political Activity and Skills Questionnaire. 
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South West local officer - 27. 
167 Regional official - 42. 
16° East Midlands local officer - 6. 
169 Author's question to regional party officials attending North West Bow Group meeting 
9`" November 
2007. 
10 Reported by several Somerton and Frome activists. This advice was given by the speaker, a senior 
frontbench politician, at an area dinner. 
171 Acknowledged by both local and area officers. 
172 East Midlands local officer - 2. 
173 Examples of topics included: 'Policing, working out an agenda for reform' 
(September 2006); 
'International Development' (December 2006); 'Uniting the country' (March 2007); 'Cities and Local 
Government consultation' (July 2007); 'Fixing our broken society' (August 2007); Transport' 
(December 
2007). 
170 East Midlands local officer - 15. 
"s The view from a North West Bow Group meeting I1 November 2005, and supported 
by several local 
officers. 
"b For example, at the CPF in Altincham and Sale West, a safe Conservative seat, the maximum attendance 
during the two years 2006-7 was nine, but usually it was six or seven. 
'" Political Activity and Skills Questionnaire. In a question which asked for a judgement on their 
level of 
political knowledge on a scale of 1 (basic) to 5 (deep), local officers recorded average scores of: 
4.0 
Conservative Party policy; 3.9 Conservative Party organisation; 4.0 British politics generally; 
4.2 Current 
affairs generally. Only knowledge of Labour and Liberal Democrat policy was 
lacking at 3.2, but this 
knowledge is needed for effective canvassing. 
1e East Midlands local officer - 8. 
179 Area officer - 38. 
$80 South West local off icer - 19. 181 South West local officer - 20. 182 Area officer - 39. 161 East Midlands local officer - 16. '94 Conversation between the author and an experienced officer in his constituency. The author also 
observed some instances. 
185 East Midlands local officer - 8. 186 South West local officer - 20. 'a' South West local officers - 22,25. 
1' South West local officer - 25. 189 Regional officer - 40. 10 East Midlands local officer - 15. 19' East Midlands local officer - 8. 192 East Midlands local officer - 9. 193 Regional official - 42. 19' Regional officer - 40. 195 East Midlands local officer - 8. 
196 South West local officer - 22. 197 South West local officer - 28. 198 South West local official - 35. 
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Chapter Three 
The Local Conservative Party Finance 
Conservative electoral success was historically built on the strength of constituency 
associations and a capacity to outspend opponents (Smith and Ludlam 1996: 4). The 
belief that money wins elections is prominent in Conservative thinking. Fresh Future was 
partially a response to the financial problems the centre had endured prior to the 1997 
general election. Pointedly, it had been unable to access local funds to support its 
desperate attempt to retain power because of the legal autonomy of the associations 
(Webb 2000a: 195-6; Garner and Kelly 1998: 95). Moreover, in the introduction to A 21ST 
Century Party, party chairman Maude called for the party 'to focus resources on the seats 
we need to gain to form the next government' (Conservative Party 2005a: 2). This would 
require some redistribution of local assets and as such was a direct challenge to local 
autonomy, under which associations determined their own finances. Rose declared that 
'how money is raised and spent is at least as important as how much is raised, and from 
whom the money comes', and that 'the process of transferring funds within a party reflects 
power relationships as well as assumptions about economic effectiveness' (1974: 219). 
This chapter will examine the impact of reform on Conservative Party finance. It will 
commence with a review of the national party's position, especially in light of the new 
regulatory framework manifested in PPERA (2000). Local finance needs to be related to 
the national context and will be explored in section two. Local financial capability was 
important for both the party's recovery and local autonomy; this will be examined in 
section three. The final section will address central encroachment into local financial 
affairs to try and realise its aims. It will be shown that for electoral recovery, the centre 
was unable to fully co-ordinate local finance, so that an alignment of interests was not 
achieved; the local property portfolio particularly, was an obstacle. Consequently, the 
party's financial strategy remained sub-optimal with local autonomy preserved, albeit in 
diluted form. 
The National Financial Position 
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National finance sets the context for examining the local parties. This section addresses 
the financial position of the two major parties and discusses the culture of deficit 
expenditure in the Conservative Party, its sources of funds and response to regulation. 
1. Financial Data 
Table 3.1 shows the major parties struggling to raise the income needed to finance 
expenditure. Modem politics is commonly perceived to be expensive, accounted for by 
the explosion in campaign spending. However, Table 3.2 questions this, once adjustments 
have been made for PPERA and for Labour starting from a relatively low position. It was 
the increase in overall expenditure that was pertinent. The advent of the permanent 
campaign reflected a need to continually understand, and communicate with, an 
increasingly fragmented electorate. The micro-targeting of key voters was added to the 
costs of satisfying the requirements of the mass media (Denver et al 1998: 173). This 
involved significant investment in technology and new marketing techniques. In striving 
to achieve a competitive advantage, parties would argue for the most productive media 
available, to optimise information provision to voters (Ewing 1992: 47). In turn, this 
required the employment of highly skilled professionals. For the Conservatives, they 
accounted for 24% of total expenditure in the election year of 2005, and 43% in 2006. 
The party's accounts also revealed a rise in regional staff from 18 in 2001 to 46 in 2006, 
part of a move to establish regional campaign centres to provide constituency support and 
manage target seat strategies. Cumulatively, it was the failure of the parties to match their 
high expenditure with income that resulted in large accumulated deficits. Table 3.3 
provides the key statistics from their balance sheets for 2005. Notwithstanding the 
liability position (F), the current ratio (H) and debt ratio (I), measures of cash flow and 
debt coverage respectively, reveal virtual insolvency; it was difficult to imagine any 
company being allowed to trade in such circumstances. 
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Table 3.1. Conservative Party and Labour Party Income and Expenditure 2001-2006 
Conservatives 
Income Expenditure 
£m £m 
2000/1 31.2 23.8 
2001/2 23.3 24.7 
2002* 9.9 10.5 
2003 13.6 16.0 
2004 22.3 27.4 
2005 24.2 39.2 
2006 30.9 26.7 
Labour 
£m £m 
2001 35.5 44.4 
2002 21.2 22.0 
2003 26.9 24.3 
2004 29.6 32.2 
2005 35.3 49.8 
2006 25.8 26.6 
* The Conservative figure for 2002 is for nine months, when the party's accounts were 
brought into line with Labour and the Liberal Democrats in order to comply with the 
reporting requirements of PPERA. The previous year-end was 3 1st March. 
Source: Conservative Party and Labour Party Accounts 2001-2006. 
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Table 3.2. Conservative Party and Labour Party National Campaign Expenditure in 
General Elections 1974-2005 
Conservatives Labour 
£m £m 
1974* 1.5 0.9 
1979 2.3 1.4 
1983 3.8 2.1 
1987 9.0 4.4 
1992 11.2 10.2 
1997 28.3 25.7 
2001 12.8 10.9 
2005 17.9 17.9 
* The figures for 1974 include the combined expenditure for both elections. 
Sources: Pinto-Duschinsky (1985,1989); Neill (1998); Electoral Commission (2002, 
2006). 
Table 3.3. Selected Statistics from the Main Parties' Balance Sheets 31St December 2005 
Conservatives Labour 
Em £m 
A. Fixed assets 11.58 9.65 
B. Current assets 2.31 4.90 
C. Current liabilities (16.80) (29.70) 
D. Net current liabilities (B - C) (14.49) (24.80) 
E. Long term liabilities and 
provisions (15.17) (12.10) 
F. Total liabilities (D + E) (29.66) (36.90) 
G. Net liabilities (A + F) (18.08) (27.25) 
H. Current ratio (B = C) 0.14 0.16 
1. Debt ratio (C+E + A+B) 2.30 2.87 
Source: Based upon Conservative Party and Labour Party Accounts 2005. 
I 
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2. Deficit Expenditure 
The Conservative Party exuded a culture whereby expenditure drove income. Pinto- 
Duschinsky noted that the central budget for the 1983 general election was not 
accompanied by any guarantee of how to finance it (1985: 330). This outlook persisted. 
Parkinson acknowledged that the party was close to bankruptcy following the 1997 
defeat, noting that local parties were 'particularly exercised by our expenditure of £28m 
during the campaign' (2003: 218). Furthermore, Michael Howard's 2005 election 
spending spree contributed to the sale of the emblematic 32 Smith Square, Westminster, 
in March 2007; the £15m profit though, did not remove all debt. ' Commentators typically 
argued that parties lacked the finance to perform their functions effectively. Webb, the 
most vociferous, pointed to their 'chronic underfunding' and citizens consuming their 
party politics 'on the cheap', especially compared to European parties (2000a: 238-9). 
However, this was misleading. There was no compulsion to spend heavily on campaign 
technologies, high-salaried professionals and national advertising. Such expenditure 
failed to prevent the landslide defeats of 1997 and 2001. Moreover, Fisher (1999) showed 
that the impact of national advertising was unclear; although his methodology of relating 
annual spending data to opinion polls was simplistic; voter opinion analysis was more 
complex. Charities attracted funds and communicated their message on significantly 
lower budgets than political parties. Unlike them, parties had free access to national 
television on a daily basis. Ultimately, it was the ruthless and desperate pursuit of power 
which brought a cavalier approach to financial management. 
The belief that money wins elections pervaded the party. A need to outspend Labour was 
viewed desperately by some. Most local activists were personally against high national 
spending, expressed doubts over its effectiveness and wanted more stringent caps, but 
adhered to the competitive reality: 'you've got to have money to campaign ... money wins 
elections whether you like it or whether you don't, it makes a huge difference'? In 
addition: 'general elections are turning into giant advertising promotions and that costs 
money ... if you're going to win elections, you have to spend large amounts of hard cash, 
nationally and locally, unfortunately'. 3 Concern was expressed about: 'costly media 
politics ... but, it's very difficult to back out now we're in that era ... if you unilaterally 
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did, you'd get wiped out by the other crowd ... survival is the 
issue. The intensity was 
echoed by: 'there's no doubt during an election the party centrally goes all out to win ... it 
wants to be the leader of the day, Prime Minister, everybody wants to be ministers ... 
Central Office's job is help that happen the best way it can ... so they spend as much 
money as they can, probably more than they should ... and they end up with a massive 
deficit and wonder where the money's going to come from' .5 There was also a calculated 
strategic dimension: 'if people who give think we are rich, they are not going to give any 
more, so you've still got to say we are in debt to keep the money rolling in' 
6 
Nevertheless, many advocated more specific local spending: 'we've seen national parties 
raise and spend millions of pounds and it's made zero difference ... you can chuck money 
at anything, we espouse this as a party ... it's how you spend 
it, how it is used ... all 
parties waste money ... I've seen how money can be used effectively on the ground, and 
that's where it should be used'. Locally though, additional funds were always desired for 
extra advertisements and leaflets. The national-local dichotomy portrayed here did not 
seep into any financial tension between centre and periphery. Instead, there was a clear 
financial separation between the two: 'the big bucks don't come into the local 
associations, they go to the centre, so it doesn't cause us any problems' .8 Local parties 
operated in their own sphere, raised and spent their own funds. This outlook however, 
underpinned national difficulties in trying to align national and local expenditure aims. 
3. Sources of Funding 
Heavy national spending inevitably highlighted funding sources. The Conservative Party 
procured the bulk of its finance from corporate and high-value individual sources; 
-membership contributions were mainly symbolic (Scarrow 1996: 
122). As far back as 
1976, the Houghton Committee reported they no longer featured strongly in the budgets 
of major parties (Katz 1990: 152). Table 3.4 provides contemporary evidence and Table 
3.5 shows the ascendancy of wealthy individuals as the primary income source, although 
as many are businessmen or retired company leaders, it was merely semantic. 
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Table 3.4. Percentage Contributions to Total Conservative Party Income 2004-2006 
Income Vehicle 2006 2005 2004 
Donations 64.5 56.0 59.9 
Membership/Subscriptions 2.9 3.5 3.7 
Fundraising/Commercial 4.3 10.8 6.1 
State Grants 16.0 18.9 18.7 
The balance comprises investment, notional and other income. 
Source: Based upon Conservative Party accounts. 
Table 3.5. Number of Donations to the National Conservative Party by Type 2004-2006 
A. £50,000 and over 
2006 2005 2004 
Individuals 45 46 22 
Companies 26 15 9 
Unincorporated Associations 8 7 4 
Total 79 68 35 
B. L10,000-49,999 
Individuals 83 98 78 
Companies 44 54 36 
Unincorporated Associations 370 
Total 130 159 114 
Source: Based upon returns to the Electoral Commission. 
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The Conservative funding strategy epitomised Seyd and Whiteley's concern over the 
strengthening of 'political entrepreneurs' at the highest level of British politics (1995: 
467). Participation in the 2002 Policy Renewal Programme was dependent upon the size 
of contribution to party funds, members being sidelined (Kelly 2004: 400). Moreover, the 
role of a donor in determining a party's electoral strategy was controversial (Fisher 2004: 
409). Since 2004, Michael Ashcroft had bankrolled the marginal seats, thereby bringing 
irritation within the party over the excessive power held by an unelected individual; this 
was enhanced after David Cameron became leader through his appointment as deputy 
chairman in charge of the target seats campaign. 9 Secretiveness was also inherent; 
historically, details were released only as a response to pressure (Byrd 1987: 212). 
Disquiet over the Midlands Industrial Council, a major donor and an unincorporated 
association that did not have to publish accounts or disclose donor details, showed a 
continuation of previous practice. 1° The party had to respond to Labour's more 
aggressively commercial approach, which targeted individuals to become less dependent 
on the trade unions (Fisher 1996: 80). Initiatives included emulating Labour's donor club 
concept. The elite Leader's Club and Shadow Chancellor's Club formed the apex and 
provided opportunities for dinner with Cameron and Osborne respectively. " Others were 
established for the less affluent, with similarly tiered benefits. 12 In addition, there was a 
programme of dinners and balls; for example, a Blenheim Palace dinner at £5,000 and the 
Summer Ball at £800 per person. 13 Moreover, wealthy individuals helped to finance the 
offices and travel of members of the shadow cabinet. 14 Hence, a segmented approach to 
funding was adopted, which discriminated politically in terms of national influence, and 
which would seem to undermine local parties in terms of potential for influence. 
This interpretation of wealthy donors was dismissed locally. For example: 'we wouldn't 
be in existence without them'. 's Moreover: 'there is nothing wrong with wealthy 
individuals contributing vast sums of money to parties because we live in a democracy 
(sic) and a free country'. 16 There was a shrug of: 'influence out of all proportion or in 
proportion to the money they give ... it's always been that way, nothing will change'. 
'? 
Nevertheless, there was frustration over the level of indifference shown by the centre to 
the localities: 'they've always had large donations, it hasn't made any difference ... the 
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centre party has always been strong ... a lot of people 
have been anti-Central Office 
because they don't take any notice'. 18 It was generally held that this was a national issue 
which did not impinge upon the localities or threaten local autonomy in any way. 
However, the centre's ability to accumulate funds reduced its need to listen and 
importantly, indirectly assisted its capacity to intervene following changes to financial 
regulation. 
4. The Response to Financial Regulation 
PPERA (2000) was enacted to address national funding concerns and was signalled by 
Fisher as 'a huge sea change in terms of regulation and established practice' (2001b: 11). 
It addressed donations and expenditure, and established the Electoral Commission to 
monitor the process. Party accounting units, including local, whose turnover exceeded 
£25,000, had to submit accounts to the commission. Donations, including those in kind, 
above £5,000 nationally and £1,000 regionally and locally, had to be publicly declared on 
a quarterly basis; weekly during election campaigns. Anonymous donations in excess of 
£50, foreign ones and blind trusts were all banned. For the first time, national campaign 
expenditure limits, were imposed through a ceiling of £30,000 per constituency contested 
during the preceding 365 days before polling day for general elections. Hence, for the 
628 seats in England, Scotland and Wales in 2005 a maximum for each party of £l8.84m, 
still extremely high. Transparency was enhanced, but with the consequence that 
apprehension over adverse publicity deterred some individuals and companies from 
donating; Maude complained that raising money was more difficult. 19 
Income difficulties and expenditure limits nationally would impact upon the local parties. 
Firstly, Fisher (2001a) noted that the national campaign limit brought a redistribution of 
parties' spending priorities as they strove for greater electoral value from their budgets. 
This meant more attention to the local arena. Here, campaign expenditure was regulated 
by the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883, which imposed tight limits and disallowed 
paid canvassers, but this was confined to the defined election period, allowing heavy 
spending between elections. The Conservatives were exploiting this gap. Many 
candidates were selected early in the marginal seats for the likely 2010 campaign, most 
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being sufficiently financially endowed to be working intensively 20 Importantly, it meant 
closer attention to the composition of local expenditure. Secondly, problems of income 
generation were magnified by the secret loans scandal. PPERA covered donations only. 
Labour and the Conservatives solicited approximately £14m and £24m respectively in 
secret loans for the 2005 general election campaign. 21 Lenders' identities were thus 
protected. Legally, this was acceptable provided the loans were at commercial rates of 
interest, but the definition of commerciality was contentious. 22 The justification was 
competitive. Labour needed money to counter Conservative resources, and donors, upset 
with media attention, wanted anonymity. 23 Riddell asserted that the spirit of the law was 
contravened as the loans 'amount to a massive avoidance scheme'. 24 Labour bowed to 
pressure and revealed its lenders, but the Conservatives were characteristically evasive; 
treasurer Marland, saw no reason to do so25 The electoral fallout though, was articulated 
by the Campaign for Conservative Party Democracy: Cameron 'could have disclosed 
everything from the start, but he has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 
21'` century and he has still a long way to go' 26 Nevertheless, the adverse publicity 
impacted on fundraising nationally, with the inevitable subsequent increase in pressure on 
the local parties. 
Local activists could be expected to be attuned to the intricacies of national financing 
issues. However, knowledge was typically selective, few understanding PPERA and most 
exuding partisanship. Again, they were able to maintain separation: 'it didn't have any 
practical effect locally, it's a central thing ... there should be transparency, 
but people 
don't always want the general public to know that they have given money to political 
parties ... it might be fairer to have a list of donors who wish to remain private, which 
is 
available to the parliamentary ombudsman to see and various officers of the crown, but 
not blasted all over the papers'. 27 Competitively: 'the Labour Party has driven party 
funding to extremes ... Blair has stretched all the rules and conventions to the absolute 
limit and as a result it's turned into a major problem ... now people are chipping 
in as 
they can see an advantage ... you've got a far more conscious commercial outlook and 
that's made it very dangerous ... I don't know how they can regulate it ... Blair 
is totally 
shameless'. 28 The Conservative Party's own proclivities were ignored. Nevertheless, 
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astute officers were concerned about electoral image: 'the perception is that all parties, 
particularly Labour and Conservatives, have been doing it for years (including cash-for- 
peerages29) and it entails the whole political process that humans can be bought ... the 
perception of people that wealthy donors to any . political party 
must be doing it for a 
reason and not because they are philanthropists' 30 
Several reports have addressed the inadequacies of PPERA. The primary ones were the 
radical Cain and Taylor (2002), 31 the insipid Electoral Commission (2004)32 and the 
confused Hayden Phillips (2007). They all tinkered with donations, expenditure and state 
funding in varying degrees, but it is the extension of the latter that would impact 
significantly on local parties. Hayden Phillips (2007), commissioned against the 
background of 'secret loans' and 'cash-for-peerages', warrants consideration because it 
was influential at the time of this study. There were enhanced powers for the Electoral 
Commission to improve regulatory performance. Critically, he emulated a Conservative 
proposal from Andrew Tyrie's (2006) paper Clean Politics" for a £50,000 donation 
ceiling from any one source, individual or organisational. Under Phillips, unincorporated 
associations would also have to identify the participants. However, he was imprecise on 
expenditure, contemplating a return to pre-2001 general election levels. This would 
involve both major parties cutting their spending by £20m each over the life of a full 
parliament, but he prescribed no actual limits. He was more specific on state funding. 
Donation limits would impose financial hardship, so two mechanisms reflecting public 
support and engagement were proposed. Subject to agreed donation limits, parties would 
receive 0.50p a year for each vote at the most recent general election and 0.25p likewise 
for the devolved Scotland and Wales elections, and for the European Parliament. 
Importantly, he suggested a matching scheme to encourage parties to recruit supporters 
via the internet. A minimum £5 subscription would be matched by £5 public funding, up 
to an annual maximum of £5m. It was thus directed at supporters rather than members; 
there was no incentive for parties to strengthen their organisations. The political 
establishment was, in effect, preparing the ground for an enhancement of the state role. 
This was accepted by the Conservative Party, Tyrie proposing similar provisions. As 
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such, it was a remarkable retreat for a party that was traditionally hostile to state funding 
because of its financially advantageous position. 
The ability to implement financial reform depended upon the competitive position and 
political circumstances confronting the parties (Scarrow 2004: 669). Phillips faced two 
obstacles., Firstly, the donation limit would wreck Labour's relationship with the trade 
unions and severely undermine its resources. Table 3.5 revealed the Conservatives 
receiving 149,227 and 209 donations over £ 10,000 for the years 2004-2006. By contrast 
the figures for Labour, considering the unions singularly, would be 56,77 and 44 
respectively. 34 Tyrie's proposal, emulated by Phillips, was clearly strategic. Secondly, and 
critically for the local parties, Maude stressed that any modification of Conservative 
spending in the marginal constituencies prior to the election campaign depended on 
Labour reforming its trade union link and that any cap on constituency spending must 
'not be set at a level which gives an unfair advantage to sitting MPs, who now have tens 
of thousands of pounds of taxpayers' money in parliamentary allowances to spend in their 
constituencies'. 35 The average expense claim for the year to April 2007 was £135,850. 
Labour's Shalid Malik was the highest at £185,421 in a marginal seat. He stressed this 
allowed him to provide a better service to constituents. 6 Local Conservative officers 
offered a different slant. In Cheltenham: 'the Liberal Democrats are well resourced 
because they have an MP who takes advantage of his MP's allowances and gets £170,000 
a year ... okay within the rules which exist, but we know the rules can be played with'. 
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Furthermore: 'an MP's office and allowance and the ability to put out information in the 
way MPs do, means you are at a disadvantage if you cannot keep up with the incumbent 
... so there is a need to get money in place'. 
38 Local financial competitiveness was thus a 
critical issue and one the centre party was determined to influence. 
Ultimately, the Conservative Party would do whatever it took to achieve a financial 
competitive advantage both nationally and locally. Persistent national deficits and new 
regulation meant greater attention to local finance. However, the party leadership was 
hampered by the historic separation of national and local finance. 
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The Local Financial Position 
Given the national context, the capacity of the local parties to compete financially was 
essential to the Conservative Party's recovery, but also had implications for local 
autonomy. After reviewing their financial position, asset utilisation will be examined, as 
this was a critical test of financial alignment between the centre and the localities. 
1. Financial Data 
Nearly three decades ago, Pinto-Duschinsky calculated that local financial independence 
placed the centre in a relatively weak position; his income estimate for 1981-2 of £8m 
(£13,000 per constituency), was almost double that of Central Office. He did though, 
acknowledge steady decline in real terms from falling membership (1985: 330-2). 
Contemporary data, which also enabled an assessment of the constituencies' capacity to 
maintain an adequate local presence and to campaign effectively at the 2005 general 
election, is shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 39 The figures for opposition comfortable and 
safe in Table 3.6 should be treated with caution, as owing to the party's inherent secrecy, 
a representative random sample could not be obtained for them. Consequently, the means 
are believed to be a little high. In many seats the Conservative Party needed to win, there 
was financial strength, but this diminished in those extra constituencies required for good 
working parliamentary majority. Wealth was clearly skewed towards the safe seats. An 
adjustment for the opposition seat difficulty was made in Table 3.7 to calculate the 
overall income and expenditure position 40 The £25.1m for 2005 just exceeded the 
£24.2m raised centrally (see Table 3.1). At an average of £39,977 per constituency, the 
turnover figures were below Fisher's 1992 estimate of £44,304 (Neill 1998: 39). 
Allowing for inflation, the position was clearly waning in line with corresponding 
reductions in membership. If finance was critical for local autonomy, it was in the 
approximately 330 constituencies who exceeded the £25,000 threshold for reporting 
results to the Electoral Commission. Here, there was still sufficient to suggest that local 
parties mattered and that money would remain a sensitive resource. These statistics 
though, related to a period when Conservative political fortunes were at a low ebb. 
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Table 3.6. Average Conservative Constituency Association Income and Expenditure b 
Seat Type 2004-2005 
N. =120 
Type of Seat Income Expenditure 
2005 2004 2005 2004 
££££ 
Conservative Safe 
a) Mean 80,114 73,849 77,655 69,034 
b) Standard Deviation 45,678 50,194 50,813 47,367 
c) Range 2005 29,051-266,782 28,505-289,165 
Marginal: Heldfrarget 
a) Mean 73,934 60,768 77,087 59,235 
b) Standard Deviation 33,667 29,297 36,209 27,806 
c) Range 2005 24,573-169,083 30,897-185,857 
Opposition Comfortable 
a) Mean 51,716 40,081 53,987 43,593 
b) Standard Deviation 17,867 16,573 19,603 18,769 
c) Range 2005 23,123-91,021 20,500-102,318 
Opposition Safe 
a) Mean 28,548 23,108 19,907 22,010 
b) Standard Deviation 26,175 25,754 27,392 22,967 
c) Range 2005 861-100,859 183-107,274 
Sources: Based upon Conservative constituency association accounts; Electoral 
Commission. 
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Table 3.7. Estimates of Overall Income and Expenditure for Conservative Constituency 
Associations 2004-2005 
Income 
Type of Seat No. Seats 2005 2004 
£ £ 
Conservative Safe 124 9,934,136 9,157,279 
Marginal: Held/Target 116 8,576,344 7,049,088 
Opposition Comfortable 100 3,855,198 2,981,131 
Opposition Safe 288 2,739,782 2,213,378 
Total 628 25,105,460 21,400,876 
Mean 39,977 34,078 
Expenditure 
Conservative Safe 124 9,629,220 8,560,216 
Marginal: Held/Target 116 8,942,092 6,871,260 
Opposition Comfortable 100 4,034,181 3,261,983 
Opposition Safe 288 2,730,108 2,144,132 
Total 628 25,335,601 20,837,591 
Mean 40,343 33,181 
Sources: Based upon Conservative constituency association accounts; Electoral 
Commission; Conservative Party (2005a). 
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Most local officers believed a satisfactory local presence was maintained, but with some 
anxiety. For example: 'somehow, things get pulled out of the bag, that's the uncanny thing 
about it'. 41 In Derby: 'we have an office, but that's a struggle at the moment ... we keep 
our head above water, but only just ... we ought to be self-sufficient and we need an 
agent, but we had to dip into legacy funds'. 2 Similarly in Cheltenham: 'we managed to do 
it and maintain the subscription to the (Gloucestershire) group, but additional money for 
other things was a close run thing ... the problem is you always need more and more 
money when you are not winning elections and you don't have a huge prospect of 
winning them. For active campaigners: 'I would never admit to having enough because 
every penny you raise, you merely put out another bit of paper'. 44 In Somerton and 
Frome, the move to joint working with Wells helped. The association felt it could raise 
enough, but less than preferred. Greater concern was echoed over the practicalities of 
managing a large constituency: 'last time, funds were sufficient for new initiatives such as 
advertisements in the local newspapers and we did not lose the election through lack of 
funds or lack of literature ... it was more the lack of members to do the campaign work 
and the ageing profile,. 45 Finance and membership were intertwined locally: poor 
member recruitment performance, identified earlier, thus had financial repercussions. 
Turnover figures need to be considered alongside asset strength. Details of current assets 
are revealed in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. These include liquid cash balances, and stock market 
investments, which just under 10% of the sample indulged in. Liquidity was variable, but 
generally healthy in the important seats. Adjustment was again made to the opposition 
comfortable and safe figures in Table 3.9 to address the sample problem. Fixed assets 
include property investments and office equipment. 45.8% of the sample were found to 
own a property, usually on a freehold basis, almost a third receiving an income from it. 
Putting a value on the collective property wealth of the constituencies was difficult. The 
buildings were known to be in variable states of repair and some associations owned 
more than one. Furthermore, officials told of off-balance sheet properties held in trust by 
dormant local branches. The likelihood of property holding being skewed towards the 
safe seats was also discounted by the sample evidence and by local officials. Hence, a 
reasonable estimate was 288 properties, with a value somewhere in the region of £57.6- 
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86.4m. 46 Total constituency assets would therefore be in the £70-100m range, with the 
actual figure probably closer to the upper amount. It was clear that some local parties 
stockpiled assets to the detriment of those that needed money to campaign effectively 
against well-financed incumbent MPs, and hence disadvantaged the Conservative Party 
as a whole. Local autonomy in this way hindered the recovery process. 
2. Asset Utilisation 
The extent of asset accumulation, particularly the property portfolio, was a test of the 
centre's capacity to align national and local interests. Its seeming inability here was a 
huge irritation and brought a curt response from Maude, who argued there were 'still a lot 
of associations sitting on cash mountains they don't spend or on properties they don't use, 
and its not the right way to run things ... we only exist as a party to make 
life better for 
people and the main way of doing that is campaigning to win elections' 
47 Support was 
expressed by some area and regional officers: 'I agree totally, there's an absolute fortune 
stashed away in Surrey ... one or two constituencies 
have got hundreds of thousands ... 
they hold on to that money and what for ... just think what 
benefits it could have for 
target seats ... it's terrible ... I don't know the way around 
it ... it 
is a great problem for 
the party'. 8 Moreover: 'I remind constituencies regularly, they don't own any assets, they 
are the assets of the Conservative Party ... the Conservative 
Party is about government ... 
so let's translate those assets into governments ... until we get to that point, none 
of us 
should rest'. 9 They acknowledged a responsibility to persuade localities to sell. 
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Table 3.8. Average Conservative Constituency Association Net Current Assets by Seat 
Type 2004-2005 
N= 120 
Type of Seat 2005 2004 
££ 
Conservative Safe 
a) Mean 46,825 43,527 
b) Standard Deviation 28,239 26,843 
c) Range 2005 5,726-140,410 
Marginal: Held/Target 
a) Mean 28,135 31,068 
b) Standard Deviation 28,226 27,300 
c) Range 2005 -17,188-132,512 
Opposition Comfortable 
a) Mean 15,714 11,740 
b) Standard Deviation 20,609 14,089 
c) Range 2005 -7,878-105,239 
Opposition Safe 
a) Mean 21,047 20,508 
b) Standard Deviation 28,669 26,511 
c) Range 2005 -7,849-128,271 
Sources: Based upon Conservative constituency association accounts; Electoral 
Commission. 
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Table 3.9. Estimates of Overall Net Current Assets for Conservative Constituency 
Associations 2004-2005 
Type of Seat No. Seats 2005 2004 
£ £ 
Conservative Safe 124 5,806,300 5,397,348 
Marginal: Held/Target 116 3,263,660 3,603,888 
Opposition Comfortable 100 1,407,699 1,094,192 
Opposition Safe 288 2,332,631 2,311,899 
Total 628 12,810,290 12,407,327 
Sources: Based upon Conservative constituency association accounts; Electoral 
Commission; Conservative Party (2005a) 
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Local support for Maude was mixed and tended to be stronger in the non-property 
owning constituencies. For example: 'he is right where we have an asset that is being 
wasted ... a million pound property which is not used for campaigning ... I don't believe 
in frittering it, but if there's a gap in funding to do the necessary campaign work ... the 
Conservative Party exists by winning elections, where it doesn't win elections we don't 
need assets'. 50 For a young activist, the stockpiling of assets was a revelation: 'I didn't 
realise that until recently ... I was shocked ... the money would be better spent than tied 
up ... we're supposed to be fighting to get back into government, so it doesn't make much 
sense' 51 Whilst acknowledging the core argument, some objected: 'it's difficult, if they've 
got a lot of money tied up in property which isn't properly used, then that's right ... but, it 
comes down to autonomy, it's up to the association ... Francis Maude and the centre can 
persuade as much as they want to, but they shouldn't be in a position to dictate' 52 
Several reasons were advanced for local resistance to property sales. Firstly, the temporal 
argument suggested that national politicians took a short-term approach, desperate to win 
the next election, even when there was little hope, as in 2001 and 2005, whilst the 
localities adopted a longer-term perspective. In High Peak: 'if we hadn't owned, this 
building during the very lean period, when the bank looked upon us very favourably 
because we had this as collateral, we might not be here now ... I can see what he's 
(Maude) saying in principle, but it's a very short-sighted view ... I wouldn't consider this 
one building is over the top as far as this association is concerned ... 
it has been 
discussed within the officer team over the years many, many times and comparisons have 
been made if we rented a property down in the town, the pros and the cons, and we have 
remained where we are ... we have offices downstairs which are on a separate lease for 
rental, so that's a help as far as funding is concerned'. 53 In addition: 'having been around 
the executive for 15 years, there's never been a serious desire to want to sell it ... we don't 
need income from the centre'. 4 The building's importance in the main constituency town 
was underlined: 'you can see us, we have a focal point, we're fairly high profile ... it's 
important to have an office in the constituency, a presence ... the top may wish us to have 
no assets, but we don't intend to live like mercenaries going from pub to pub holding little 
meetings' SS Financial stability was also noted in Somerton and Frome: 'the property was 
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given to us in trust by somebody who very much wanted the association to have a 
sizeable asset, so we just can't sell it effectively ... beyond any emotional thing like that 
is the sheer fact that it gives us some measure of financial long term stability ... I would 
take the long term view ... take it and blow the money on campaigns and it's gone ... I 
wouldn't go along with that'. 56 
Secondly, the notion of money being usurped by the centre and subsequently poured 
down a 'black hole' aroused particular dismay: 'Central Office would love to get its hands 
on it ... they say we're not in the property business, we're in the political business ... I'm 
opposed to that ... if we sold any of it, they'd say you don't want a million pounds in your 
bank account, it should come to the centre ... they would spend it, it would be gone 
forever ... people gave that to us years ago because they wanted to help locally ... they 
didn't give it nationally ... that was meant to give a safe haven for local activity ... 
property should be earning money one way or another ... if 
it's not used for the party and 
you do sell it, buy something else and make sure that it's producing a good income which 
could be put towards local activity'. 57 Suspicion was further echoed by: 'the centre wants 
us to sell the property ... they would want the money in London, there's no argument 
about that ... the regional director's said that many times: "why can't you sell this place 
and we could have the money in London" and we say "not likely" ... the biggest problem 
is to make sure you get your "share of the cake", the financial position helps us to do 
that'. 58 
Thirdly, any sale would impact on local morale. Ball noted that maintaining an office was 
crucial to member commitment (1994b: 285). This outlook persisted: 'I can understand 
selling it off, but equally putting myself in the position of a chairman, with your members 
saying why are you going to sell our office or our club ... I can see why people wouldn't 
do that ... I'm not sure we should be so desperate to asset strip ourselves for one election, 
when we might need to have a slightly longer game plan' 59 It was further underlined: 
'now we're a target seat, Central Office have said if you have any capital available, it has 
to be sold or they won't give us any extra money towards fighting the campaign ... it's 
blackmail ... I believe in fairness, it's like being told you've got to sell your house to put 
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your granny into care ... why should we ... if we win the seat back, we shall have more 
funds coming in, then we would like our office back ... you don't sell the family silver 
and it would be very, very unpopular ... a lot of people would resign because they have a 
strong feeling ... if we do get an MP, we could sell it and buy somewhere else with 
better 
parking, better facilities ... it's a little foothold and a presence'. 
0 The latter argument was 
flawed, as: 'a Conservative MP is not forced to have an office which is in conjunction 
with the association ... I do not understand the ethos of running two offices ... you need 
members to do the legwork, you need that organisation underneath you, but there's no 
guarantee that they wouldn't set up an office elsewhere and contribute nothing to the 
association'. 1 In Somerton and Frome, a senior officer confirmed: 'if we succeed in 
getting an MP at the next general election, she will want some kind of constituency 
presence, but she will not want Wincanton ... there's £150,000 tied up in that ... we're 
here to fight elections'. 62 
The core tension revolved around the availability of funds in target seats. Little pressure 
was exerted on High Peak because of its rental income and because the association was 
perceived to be doing a good job. However, there was much conflict in Somerton and 
Frome. Its office was closed following a controversial move to joint working with 
neighbouring Wells (see chapter four). An under-utilised asset meant pressure: 'Francis 
Maude had Annunziata (PPC) in after she was selected and told her to try and persuade 
us to flog the office'. 63 Whilst the officer team was generally comfortable with disposal, it 
faced much opposition. The chairman was despairing: 'I'm still suffering from moving the 
organisation from Wincanton because there are a number of die-hards, including some 
vice-presidents and ex-chairmen of the association who want to move us back to the good 
old days of being in Wincanton ... the hidden message (from the centre) 
is that we should 
be spending our money on campaigning ... we, the officers, wanted to sell the property 
and use the money for campaigning, but a large number in the executive were concerned 
that CCHQ would grab hold of our money and we would never see it again ... "over our 
dead body" would CCHQ have our money, so we've come to a compromise that for the 
time being we could rent out 2 Market Place ... I've agreed with the regional director that 
this would not be seen by Lord Ashcroft and the target campaign team that we have got a 
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capital asset and not using it for campaigning' 64 This was a practical solution to avoid 
loss of active volunteers: 'I well understand his (Maude's) point of view, but he would ... 
talk about having a riot on your hands ... if we tried to sell the Wincanton office, it would 
generate a huge amount of angst ... we couldn't sell it at the moment and I'm not sure that 
we should ... I would rather let it as a commercial exercise to generate income for the 
association on-going ... it's short-sighted ... we're not holding the property to be property 
holders ... it's to generate income to fight future elections ... if you cash in your chips, it 
would gradually dribble away and the motivation to raise money would be much less 
because everybody would look at the balance sheet and see £200,000 in cash sitting there 
and say why should we have our coffee morning next week' 65 
A further dimension was the competitive importance of a constituency office. Activists in 
those possessing one stressed the benefits of a physical presence. However, professionals 
presented a rational counter-argument: 'having an office and a focal point doesn't get 
more leaflets on the streets, it only provides a face'. 66 Moreover: 'it's irrelevant and 
always has been because people care more about their candidate being local and how 
much work he does ... they don't care where the office is ... they do care 
if we put a 
leaflet through the door telling what we're doing' 67 In addition: 'the trouble is what gets 
lost at the bottom end is people's focus on why they are doing it ... they're not raising 
money or knocking on doors so there can be an office or a secretary ... unless that 
is 
actually winning us votes, it's a complete waste of time ... we're gradually getting that 
across' 68 These arguments were strengthened by the poor state of properties in some 
constituencies: 'if you look around the country and see some of the ghastly buildings 
which have got Conservative signs outside, hanging off, looking derelict because they've 
got no money' 69 That in Somerton and Frome was in a fair condition, but: 'you have to 
ask how 'salubrious' is the property ... there's no parking space, it's right 
in the heart of 
town, the town's not a very attractive town by standards round about'. 70 
However, properties were typically controlled by local trustees, who would prevent sale. 
To some activists, they were symbolic of local autonomy: 'ownership of property gives us 
a strength ... if we sold it and put the money into political funding, it would cause upset 
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... there are four trustees and we would not allow the building to be sold for that 
purpose'. ' Professional frustration resulted: 'we're there to fight elections, we're not a 
property company ... the trustees of these portfolios of property see it as holding on to a 
bit of power and that's why they're reluctant to give up on them ... I suspect it is a symbol 
of their autonomy ... Liverpool has a lot of property and what good is it doing? 
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Monetary and property assets were seen as an important condition for retaining local 
autonomy: 'it is very much part of the Conservative philosophy that we are independent 
associations ... we can only be advised by Central Office, not told what to do ... it 
doesn't quite work like that, but money gives us the ability to say no, plus there's nothing 
Central Office can do if we do say no'. 73 This was supported by: 'our financial strength 
isn't massive, but as regards leaving us alone, that's probably correct', 74 and 'financial 
strength ... I'm fairly sure that is right'. 75 Therefore: 'if you've got money in the bank, 
you're not having to scrape and do anything to them', 76 and in stark terms, independence: 
'depends on how much money they've got basically, if they haven't got much, they can't 
do much at all' 77 Other officers differed in emphasis, believing strongly that local 
autonomy was the only way that it could work, otherwise people would walk away: 
'wealthier constituencies can do more than less wealthy ones, but whether it's a wealthy 
or a less wealthy constituency, if the people doing it aren't bothered, money isn't going to 
make it that necessary ... it's a people situation, it's the voluntary, I can't see how it can 
be any different'. 78 There was much central dependence on the localities: 'they probably 
do rely quite heavily, but that reliance is local ... they don't rely on the local contribution 
to the centre, but without the local funds they have a problem'. 79 However, there was no 
evidence of this dependence transferring into influence: 'it hasn't given us much influence 
at all ... the lack of a parliamentary MP has lost the influence completely'-so Even for 
Cheltenham: 'as a group, I wouldn't say influence, but we're probably listened to slightly 
more'. 8' The group though: 'ironically does enable greater independence because we are 
able to do what we want, because there's an infrastructure and back-up'. 82 
Superficially, there was a strong asset base locally, but the distribution was skewed and 
much was tied up in property assets. Despite continuing pressure and persuasion 
attempts, the centre could not bring about wholesale disposals, to its obvious frustration. 
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Local autonomy thus hampered the broader recovery aim and meant failure in the centre's 
attempts to align national and local interests. As such, it exuded financial parochialism, 
so that the availability of liquid funds for campaigning depended upon individual 
association fundraising capability. 
Local Fundraising Capability 
Local competitiveness depended on the fundraising capability of the associations. This 
embraced subscription income, activities and contributions from bodies such as Patrons' 
Clubs. Critically, it required perseverance and leadership. 
1. Subscriptions 
Membership subscriptions were the basic income source. In 2005, the minimum was £15, 
though many associations accepted £25 for joint membership. From the constituency 
sample, the individual mean was £20.09 (2004 = £20.24), with safe seats recording 
£23.58. Activists generally viewed the increase to £25 positively, especially as there had 
been no change for eight years and it was still less than Labour (£36) and the Liberal 
Democrats (E42). The primary concern locally was for the elderly. Somerton and Frome's 
average was £23, but the chairman was anxious to retain everyone for their overall 
contribution. Of the few dissidents, an activist argued: 'the minimum subscription was a 
retrograde step because before you had somebody who's prepared to deliver literature, 
vote ... now you haven't got them because they are not members ... they 
don't have to 
deliver your literature and you lose touch with them'. 83 This raised the question of the 
purpose of membership: money or people contact. Even at this basic level, loss of 
members in this way would have implications for community involvement in Putnam's 
(1993) terms. Falling membership levels undermined subscription income, thereby 
putting pressure on fundraising activity. 
2. Fundraising Activity 
Local Conservative associations were deemed synonymous with fundraising. Ball noted 
that along with financial benefits, it provided a 'sense of purpose', improved 'confidence 
and cohesiveness' and aided recruitment by maintaining a 'visible and active profile' 
147 
(1994b: 290). Whiteley et al found that for many, 'membership of the party principally 
means giving money and not much else' (1994: 77,164). Fundraising and donations 
contributed the largest proportion of income, as shown in Table 3.10. There was greater 
activity in seats the party needed to win; the lower percentage in Conservative safe seats 
owed much to investment income. 
However, in common with approaches to membership recruitment, there was a lack of 
innovation in local fundraising. When viewed against the variety of fundraising ideas 
offered by CCHQ (Conservative Party 2007), the local menu was fairly restricted. 
Activities ranged in price from quiz evenings, coffee mornings, strawberry teas, sausage 
and mash suppers, pig roast, themed afternoons, drinks parties and garden parties, to the 
more expensive annual dinner and functions with high-profile political speakers such as 
Hague, Letwin, and Widdecombe. Southern constituencies had much more success in 
attracting them than northern ones; for the former, such visits were an expectation, for the 
latter, they were a bonus. Derby particularly, suffered in this respect. Many associations 
also ran coffee and luncheon clubs, and the perennial 200 club where 200 people, not 
necessarily all members, paid a subscription to a monthly prize draw; they often formed 
part of the leaflet delivery network. 84 56% of the sample identified at least one of these 
clubs. Finally, appeals, termed 'fighting fund' at election time, were solicited from a 
network of local contacts, both individual and corporate, and were often linked to specific 
events. Nevertheless, from Table 3.10 it can be calculated that omitting opposition safe 
seats, the average fundraising per member in 2005 was merely £33.10. At just over 
double the then £15 subscription, this could be interpreted as poor, but with only 20% of 
the membership socially active, and many aged, this could be harsh. Associations might 
also raise just enough to meet their needs. Importantly, the label 'social organisation' 
could no longer be attached to local parties. Indeed, some politically motivated members 
actually avoided such activity, one officer commenting: 'it's a shock to people when they 
go into politics and find that they have to get involved in fundraising'. 8S 
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Table 3.10. Conservative Constituency Fundraising 2004-2005 
A. Fundraising Activity and Donations as a Percentage of Constituency Income 
Type of Seat 2005 2004 
Fund. Don. Total Fund. Don. Total 
Conservative Safe 35.5 20.2 55.7 41.9 13.8 55.7 
Marginal Held/Target 35.2 33.1 68.3 42.9 17.6 60.5 
Opposition Comfortable 33.5 32.4 65.9 42.1 19.1 61.2 
Opposition Safe 25.6 28.9 54.5 38.0 22.4 60.4 
B. Average Fundraising per Member (£) 
Type of Seat 2005 2004 
Conservative Safe 32.0 34.6 
Marginal Held/Target 34.5 34.4 
Opposition Comfortable 32.8 32.3 
Opposition Safe 25.1 34.1 
Fund: Fundraising. 
Don: Donations 
Source: Based upon Conservative constituency association accounts; Electoral 
Commission. 
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A common solution to the fundraising problem was target setting, but the evidence was 
inconsistent. In High Peak: 'fundraising is so important and so easily neglected because it 
isn't the most popular job ... to meet the central £5 levy (see below), branches have 
£51.72 per member targets (including £15 subscription), which equals the expenses of the 
association plus £5,000 to ensure a profit'; the result was improvement, with one poor 
failure. 6 There were awards for attainment, but some dismissed them as irrelevant: 'we 
are all in the same boat and they have the potential to cause divisions between 
members'. 87 Derby's branches were set fundraising quotas of just £10 per member. It was 
stressed that these were targets to aim for, and not compulsory. 88 The association also 
relied upon contributions from councillors to bolster its finances, currently at 3% of 
expenses, though the move from £25 was controversial. 89 Somerton and Frome produced 
a branch quota ladder, detailing total contribution, itemised by subscriptions and events, 
but listed them in performance terms against target rather than the highest achievers. 90 
3. Fundraising Shortfall 
Professionals expressed concern at the deterioration in local fundraising: 'it's a mantra 
I've been preaching to associations ... there's been a big decline in the number of social 
events ... 20 years ago there were many, now it's a few ... this 
is important as local 
government has become hugely more political' 91 An area officer concurred: 'they don't 
make enough effort, they don't really plan ... but there aren't as many activists as 
there 
used to be, so when constituencies are being asked to plan their election campaigns well 
in advance, fundraising goes by the board, but you need the money to campaign ... you 
get loads of suggestions to them and it will be always no, done that, tried that ... they 
don't really want to do it ... people look to cancel events if the money 
doesn't come in 
quickly ... it's just that negative, negative attitude'. 
92 Support for Whiteley et al's (1994) 
de-cnergisation thesis was evident. 
Political and organisational explanations were advanced for the shortfall. Politically 
orientated events, such as golf days, were cancelled due to lack of support; the absence of 
an MP often cited as the reason. 93 The localities emulated the national situation: 'there is 
a need to concentrate more on the business community, but they do not want to be seen to 
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be political these days'. 4 Routine events such as coffee mornings also suffered without 
an MP, as there was an expectation of his attendance. Similarly: 'the loss of councillors 
had an impact, as we cannot easily then go to business for a donation ... why would they 
want to', 95 The political explanation thus linked fundraising to local interests, suggesting 
influence seeking. However, associations now also had to compete not just with charities, 
but with bodies raising funds for community projects such as playing fields, previously 
funded by government. 96 Problems with the national funding strategy, such as 'cash-for- 
peerages', further hindered local efforts. 7 
Age was the fundamental organisational problem: 'the wards are finding it difficult 
because of the malaise of the older generation ... to come up with new ideas is 
difficult', 98 and 'it's hard work ... it's becoming more difficult as it's not easy to raise the 
price of events'. 99 In Somerton and Frome, an officer complained: 'everything is geared 
towards the elderly, there's a lot of rich pensioners here'. 1°° Another though, was amazed 
that some opened their houses to 500 people; in Derby, such residencies were no longer 
available. 101 Moreover, a race night was withdrawn because it did not appeal to the 
elderly and the association annual dinner due to lack of support after the 2005 election 
defeat. 102 Consequently: 'there's a lack of fundraising innovation in Somerton and Frome 
compared to London ... the same people recycling at events, not attracting new people or 
younger people, but it's very difficult to break the mould'. 103 Staleness was a problem: 'to 
an extent, we have been very complacent in asking the same people for the same money 
and after so many years, you can't keep doing it ... you have to 
find new blood, new 
interest ... fundraising events tend to have been organised by the same people for the 
same people ... you are not going to have a disco for a bunch of geriatrics ... so, as an 
association, we have tried different types of events, moving away from coffee mornings 
and scones to a Thai night'. 104 An area officer agreed: 'fundraising tends to be historically 
driven ... what they did before ... " the Autumn Fair, a big fundraising event run 
by a 
branch or the association ... there's a tendency not to change it and do something 
different ... when you've invested the organisational time and effort, it's easier to repeat 
than do something different ... but we don't set targets from area'. 
105 
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Importantly, the purpose of membership was questioned. In Druckerian terms, some saw 
it purely as fundraising, which should be ruthlessly pursued. This was highlighted by 
their approach to events: 'the expensive dinner ... if you lose 20 people, you still make 
money'. 106 Moreover: 'the association does not have enough expectations of what it can 
achieve ... officers were under the impression that people will not pay much for tickets, 
but if events were made special enough at £40-50 a ticket plus sponsorship, they would 
enable a movement away from the £3 garden party'. 107 CCHQ reinforced this outlook: 
'maximising your profits should be the number one priority on any large event' 
(Conservative Party 2006b: 3); member socialisation and acquisition were not priorities. 
A number of activists though, disagreed: 'in the past, it was literally membership, pay 
your money and that's it ... there's always been a strong emphasis, too much, on holding 
an event, you've got to make money out of it ... we're here to make money ... you can't 
afford to keep asking people for money, you have to give something back, people having 
a good time, not necessarily always make it a strictly political fundraising event ... 
people like to socialise as well, get together politically'. 108 Hence: 'a £50 dinner organised 
by the higher echelons who come from a good job or money ... two people £100 plus 
drinks, coffee, raffle, transport ... they often don't pitch it right ... a mistake 
because the 
whole idea is not just about fundraising, it's about getting people together, the political 
discussion, the socialising ... it's hard to make money, but they get greedy, a meal 
for 
£17.50, they charge £25, so they try to make £7.50 out of everybody'. 109 Achieving a 
balance was vital: 'keeping the social going is important, the right balance for young and 
old, a mix of £30 and £2.50 events'. 110 There was evidence that the "£50 dinner" 
segregated members: 'I could describe the Conservatives as a two-tier party ... people 
like me don't go to these events ... pressure has been put on me and I have to say no, 
I 
haven't got as much money as you ... these people are not really understanding ... 
it's a 
huge problem'. " An area officer was practical: 'we had Oliver Letwin for a day ,.. 
different functions ... he charges a reasonable amount for a buffet supper and 
he met 
many people ... William Hague, well worth it, but can the man in the street afford it ... 
you have to look at where you are raising money ... each constituency will raise money 
differently because they are so different ... does the cost upset people, no they just accept 
it ... I don't go to the £75 conference dinner'. 
112 
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The monetary focus, and indeed the relative unpopularity of fundraising, did not 
adversely affect membership and political activity: 'we didn't find people leaving for that 
reason ... there are enough political activities to get involved in'. ' 13 Moreover: 'we do a 
newsletter every month, so they are kept up to date ... people realise that without money, 
we're sunk, but we try and make sure it's political as much as the money because some 
people can give more than others ... you don't want people to feel that because they can't 
give much money, they're not as important as somebody who can ... you have to be very 
careful there'. ' 14 However, concern was expressed over recruitment: 'there's a very great 
danger that they only want us for one thing ... they're always in the "ear-hole" for money 
... they wouldn't leave, but they might not be willing to recommend their friends to join 
... people don't become active because they are lethargic ... you need to take people for 
what they can give'. 115 Nevertheless a senior officer suggested: 'a politically astute 
person, if he didn't move on quickly to become a candidate, local councillor or didn't take 
some active role on the political side, would have nothing of interest in the average 
fundraising event, apart from meeting a few people who might be there for other reasons 
... politically, it's as dull as dishwater ... they (the Liberal Democrats) are more political 
... to most of the officers who are politically minded, going to these events, which we do 
to show our faces, it can get very tedious ... it's a concomitant necessity of my role'. 
' 16 
A further organisational impediment was an ingrained financial parochialism manifested 
in the ownership of local funds: 'the purpose of fundraising is not to give people jobs, but 
to win elections ... I did find it difficult when wards wouldn't give the association the 
money because they said "we need the money" ... they don't need the money ... none of 
them should have bank accounts ... all the money they raise should go straight into the 
association, but they won't do that ... if you did instigate it, they would stop fundraising 
... but it's not their money, it's the association's money ... they think it's theirs ... there's a 
huge problem and it's not just here, it's everywhere ... it's really difficult to get money out 
of them'. 117 This was reinforced by: 'there's a tendency for wards to try and keep the 
money for themselves ... they need to take a more constituency wide view ... it is 
changing now ... people wanted it just spent in their own ward rather than in a pooled 
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fighting fund ... frictions because people say they worked hard to collect the funds to 
give to someone else ... we all need to be working as a team ... it needs to be spent on us 
moving forward'. ' 18 The motivational aspect though, was strong: 'it's more rewarding for 
people if they go out and raise money because they know it's being spent locally'. 119 
Parochialism though, clearly hindered local effectiveness. The evidence revealed that the 
party did not just face difficulties in aligning national and local interests, but also 
interests within the constituency parties themselves. 
Finally, regular central appeals to members also undermined local efforts. Frustration 
resulted because they were seen as 'tapping' into local money: 'we get deluged ... central 
mailing may go out at the same time as a local appeal, so there's a doubling up and it 
upsets our members ... though, it is difficult to co-ordinate. 
120 Such missives typically 
asked for donations rather than ideas or active help; for example, a David Cameron 
appeal: 'I am asking you to help the party. The most practical way to do this is by making 
a financial contribution to our work. Anything that you feel you can afford from £10 to 
£10,000 will be put to good use'. 121 In addition, the centre introduced a £1,000 weekly 
and £5,000 quarterly draw, operated in a similar manner to the local 200 clubs, thereby 
threatening the latter. 122 Many associations already partook in two national draws. They 
received 80% of the income (Conservative Party 2006c), but after the 2005 election this 
was reduced to 75%, without consultation. 12' Annoyance with such practices was 
articulated: 'Central Office advice on fundraising is unfortunately one for you and two for 
me ... the summer draw and Christmas draw, we are allowed to keep 75% which is 
alright, but we have had circulars sent out to people within the constituency saying 
support the Conservative Party, send a cheque to Central Office ... no, it's our money, we 
can raise it ourselves, we are happy doing that ... we had a circular that 
if we needed any 
assistance approaching wealthy members of the community, Central Office would send 
somebody and we could retain 40% ... no, we're quite capable of doing that ourselves ... 
so there's a definite resistance there from the association to Central Office, it has a nasty 
habit of being patronising and greedy'. 124 The centre saw members at least partially in 
monetary terms, but it could equally be inferred that whilst it was encouraging localities 
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to raise more money, it was simultaneously de-vitalising them. It rendered any attempt to 
align national and local interests more difficult. 
4. Patrons' Clubs 
The centre was also influential in promoting local Patrons' Clubs. They were an 
additional source of finance and were the local equivalent of national donor clubs. 
Additional titles included Westminster Club, Churchill Club or Business Forum. Some 
associations afforded them branch status, but most kept them separate. The purpose was 
to attract 'new money' from wealthy people in the constituency, who may not. be 
members. An aristocrat, major business figure or celebrity was suggested as the 
figurehead, but clubs should be made 'unashamedly exclusive' and members' businesses 
should be used for shadow cabinet tours (Conservative Party 2008). The business link 
was emphasised locally: 'it's a Patrons' Club for business people in essence ... an active 
way of getting into industry'. 125 In Somerton and Frome, the importance of allowing 
Patrons to participate in the candidate selection process and to know the PPC or MP 
personally was accentuated. 126 History therefore, revealed their fickleness. The 
Cheltenham club was vibrant under Thatcher, but dwindled with party fortunes. High 
Peak: 'had a successful Patrons' Club until we lost Charles Hendry (MP) ... obviously, 
with such a landslide away from the Conservative Party, business was not interested in 
Patrons' Clubs because basically they expect help of some kind, quite reasonably, to 
come from it'. 127 Fundamentally: 'it's about getting their voices heard'. 128 Political links 
were now more sensitive: 'they want to be seen in the right place and they might need the 
MP later ... it's vested interests, not necessarily their politics ... a lot of companies will 
not now nail their colours to a mast'. 129 Part of the attraction was a dinner at the House of 
Commons, with the party leader or other senior figure in attendance, a practice now 
outlawed following charges of abuse of parliamentary facilities, an inquiry by the 
parliamentary standards commissioner and a reprimand. 130 Influence was thus associated 
with access to local and national politicians, rather than the functioning of the 
association, - but it would exceed that of ordinary members. Nevertheless, by attaching 
such importance to them, the centre was clearly accommodating the link between 
donations and interests. 
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In 2005, there were believed to be slightly more than 100 Patrons' Clubs. 13' The current 
sample identified 46.7% of constituencies possessing one. Discounting the very weak, the 
total number was likely to be 170-180; although not all were thought to be productive. 
There was little data in constituencies' annual reports on participants. Somerton and 
Frome had 25, High Peak 30. Officers felt that between 20 and 40 were preferable, as 
exclusivity needed to be maintained to ensure meaningful access to senior politicians. 
Information on their financial contribution was also patchy. They alluded to substantial 
extra funds accruing from the £250 subscription fee (£100 in High Peak): 175 clubs at 
say £200 average, with 25 members each realises £875,000. In addition, Patrons provided 
donations and cash from their functions, worth probably at least a similar amount, 
bringing the net contribution close to £1.75m. Officers also noted the qualitative benefits: 
'it motivates people who are our key voters, key supporters'. 132 Moreover, Patrons: 
'provide a different viewpoint on the association's activities because by the nature that 
they are in a position to donate more money to the party, they tend to be higher powered 
people in business and so on'. 133 Contacts and business experience were important; for 
example, help with venues for fundraising and an offer of media assistance to the PPC of 
Somerton and Frome. t34 Patrons were thus a form of community development for the 
Conservative Party, in a similar way to supporter networks. However, the viability of 
Patrons' Clubs was questioned. Margins could be very thin and success required good 
political speakers on a consistent basis, which could cost money. 135 
Tether suggested that Patrons constituted 'an elite inside some Conservative associations' 
(1991b: 291-2). However, this was not the case: they were located on the periphery of 
local parties, divorced from ordinary members. There was also little evidence that 
members felt discriminated against. Instead, Patrons were accepted as an integral part of 
Conservatism: 'why shouldn't they get extra ... it's part of the Conservative 
Party's 
philosophy that if you pay more for something, you get more, in a similar manner to 
health provision and education'. 136 Politically: 'if one of the benefits of being a Patron is 
to get more access to visiting MPs, then that's what they are paying for ... 
it's up to the 
visiting guy to meet as many people as he can ... you won't get me to support equality. 
137 
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Practically: 'it undoubtedly does discriminate, but then the market place discriminates 
against anyone who cannot afford anything ... they being wealthy run in circles of people 
who have influence ... they know what raises money and they expect a high quality 
speaker ... so they get what they want, which is access to senior politicians'. 
138 
Importantly, it was: 'nice to give people that want to make a contribution extra access to 
events and to people ... but equally, they don't buy influence locally'. 
139 Indeed: 'most 
ordinary members are not aware of the Patrons' Club and it doesn't pervade'. 140 It was 
kept separate from association functions and 'as long as there are alternative outlets for 
members to also meet senior politicians', 14' it worked well. Dissenters though, maintained 
that Patrons received 'the more discerning events politically'. 142 Concern was also 
expressed about the damaging image of perceived elitism and status portrayed by some 
Patrons; this was felt to possibly deter some younger members. 143 Nevertheless, it was 
the preservation of the link to business that was stressed, along with their contribution. 
Patrons could assist the party's revival locally. It was the task of local leadership to 
facilitate this. 
5. Leadership Co-ordination 
Local leadership was highlighted as essential for fundraising generally, especially in 
target seats where the permanent campaign meant limited volunteer time: 'it's the person 
running it and thinking of different ways of raising those funds ... getting people to 
focus, one person to run the 200 club, one the country fair'. 144 A former chairman noted: 
'I was good at raising money ... I concentrated on local wealthy individuals ... the 
association was in a strong position when I left office ... now 
it's slipping, they have not 
raised any donations in the past year'. 145 Close monitoring was required: 'we have drifted 
over the last three or four years ... it has been run on a very ad hoc 
basis at the 
constituency level, left to the personal preferences of the officer responsible who will run 
one type of event and not another ... (the agent) advises a lot and I'm vocal to ensure 
many events are run in the windows planned for them ... you need to 
keep badgering 
people ... the incumbent only runs events that make money, I say run as many as you 
can'. 146 Fundraising required a certain type of individual. It was: 'often the same people 
who raise money for charity, people who generally get involved ... the people I 
deal with 
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on a political level are generally the people who work for Lifeboats or whatever ... 
they're all involved, they're the same people raising money'. 147 However, the numbers of 
them were dwindling. Putnam's (1993) thesis on the decline of social capital was again 
apposite. Consequently, an area officer stressed: 'it links to community work, community 
politics ... you need a good figurehead and team ... a lack of an agent is a problem ... I 
have been advocating consistently for more full-time paid agents ... it needs to be 
enjoyable ... people need to have a good time to raise money'. 
148 
The absence of an agent was lamented in the northern constituencies. A funding trap was 
apparent as no agent meant reduced activity, but reduced activity meant no agent. For 
example regarding the national draws: 'all you need is to send the tickets to members and 
pledgers and use the return tickets to see if they want to become members ... it just needs 
somebody to sort it out ... this is where we are suffering from a lack of agents'. 
149 In 
addition: 'there doesn't seem to be the initiative or interest for the big constituency events 
now ... if we had an agent, we would be motivated into doing more, because he would do 
the donkey work'. 150 This was confirmed by an agent who saw his 'role to suggest 
fundraising activities, to raise more income and reduce expenditure and suggest how they 
can make more from an event, plus a hands-on role in constituency events' . 
's' Derby 
might get an agent: 'by some pump priming from Central Office, but the association 
would have to match it ... at the moment, nothing is happening ... a few coffee mornings 
... they don't do much ... there may be one or two a year in four branches, very little else 
... it makes affording an agent difficult ... you can move mountains with an agent, as 
members can be co-ordinated ... there is a shortage of fundraisers in the constituency, 
less and less people to do it'. 152. The implication was that the PPC had to organise some 
events to raise campaign funds, which questioned the definition of her role. Looking 
forward: 'with the merger, three constituencies, fundraising will increase, so it's more 
likely that we will get an agent, but if we employ now, it would impact on leaflets and not 
all agents are good'. ' 53 Constituency accounts seldom revealed the status of staff 
employed, so accurate data could not be obtained. CCHQ recommended an agent salary 
range of £20,560-38,084 in 2005, suggesting a successful agent would earn somewhere in 
the middle of this band (Conservative Party 2005c). 154 Competent individuals would have 
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to be dedicated to the cause to accept such a salary. A declining membership base would 
also hinder local affordability, and hence their earnings. 
Overall, there was a fundraising deficit at the local level. Local capability was lacking, 
summed up by: 'diminishing returns with diminishing members'. 'SS Financially, local 
associations could not play a full part in the party's recovery. If the centre still perceived 
fundraising as a mechanism for deflecting members' attention from policy matters, it 
would be disappointed at the evidence. The presence of strong local leadership was 
therefore, critical to maintain financial buoyancy and to develop outside agencies such as 
Patrons' Clubs. A weaker financial position would make associations more susceptible to 
central influence, by reducing the capacity to sustain local autonomy. Moreover, it had 
implications for Johnston and Pattie's work, which used constituency expenditure as a 
measure of local campaign intensity. 
Central Encroachment into Local Finance 
The financial position of both the national and local parties revealed in this chapter led 
the centre, through the constitution, to continually encroach on the constituencies in terms 
of both their contribution requirements and expenditure. 
1. Local Contribution 
The local contribution to the centre was relatively minor. Until 2000, the constituency 
quota scheme was the sole intra-party transfer mechanism. Established in 1948, Lord 
Woolton 'was determined to make the party spend and not hoard ... he deliberately 
resolved to overspend on publicity, propaganda ... and thus force the local party 
organisation to raise the necessary funds'. 156 Quotas were determined centrally for each 
association as a function of the number of Conservative voters at the previous general 
election, set against those of the most successful opposing candidate. However, Pattie and 
Johnston (1996) found that not only did many associations fail to meet their targets, 
frequently by a substantial margin, but also a good number sent nothing; defaulters often 
being in strong Conservative seats. An analysis of central statistics for 2004 revealed 
almost 94% of the overall target reached, but this masked discrepancies. Only the Greater 
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London and Southern region exceeded its target and much of the income received 
comprised interest credits from constituency loans to the centre. Consequently, it 
received just £540,000 in new money. There was no consistency in the targets, some 
being set very high and others a token amount, including some Conservative-held seats. 
Moreover, the paltry contributions of some rich localities suggested deliberate 
avoidance. 157 Recognising inflexibility, the rules were replaced in 2000 by affordability, 
but little changed. Some high turnover constituencies did not pay because of agent and 
office costs, others saw a high target, could not pay it, so paid nothing at all, and some of 
the weak, seeing rich ones not giving much, became annoyed and sent less. '58 
Voluntary payments were a source of central irritation. Fresh Future thus initiated a 
redistribution of subscription fees (Conservative Party 1998a: 27-8). Associations were 
initially charged a £200 affiliation fee and £1 per member levy; from 2004 they were 
combined into £1.50 per capita, but with quotas remaining in place. These were 
subsequently renamed 'campaign subscriptions', couched in terms of funding the central 
marketing team, the area campaign network and target seat strategies. Nevertheless, the 
critical point was the stipulation to constituencies that the £1.50 'formalises your 
membership of the Conservative Party' (Conservative Party 2005b: 1); the implication 
being that membership benefits such as conference attendance and voting rights in party 
ballots would be withdrawn if the invoice was unpaid. Annual dialogue and agreement of 
targets with area officers replaced central imposition, though a minimum £100 was set. 
Consultation however, could be a letter from regional office with an arbitrarily set 
amount and a comment: 'if we do not hear from you to the contrary, then we assume it is 
okay'; the association was then put under pressure to achieve it. 159 The approach, which 
set regional officials an overall target, was managerially astute. They determined 
individual constituency amounts based upon their understanding of local areas, but being 
keen to achieve advancement in the party, they would work to ensure their quota was 
fulfilled. 160 Local payments though, remained low. 
The formal relationship underpinned further change. From January 2007, the member 
levy was increased to £5 and was linked to local servicing. Associations that had 
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previously contributed significant amounts were expected to continue; the new scheme 
would not work if they used the revision to make reductions. 
161 Campaign subscriptions 
though, were retained for European elections; Derby for example, was asked for £3,000 
towards the 2009 campaign. 162 A constituency association consultation survey was 
undertaken. From the 290 responses, almost half opted for the £25 minimum subscription 
and 90% selected £5 as the tariff to the centre, but only two choices were offered: £5 and 
£10.163 Justifying the increases, Maude argued that constituencies forwarded a mere 
£900,000 per year, whereas CCHQ spending to support them was in the region of £1.5m, 
so that'we clearly give in terms of value more to the constituencies than they pay to us'; 
many associations, some of whom were sitting on cash mountains, were contributing 
nothing. 'T4 The current situation, he argued, was 'inefficient and unsustainable'. 
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However, this measured constituency value purely in monetary terms, rather than their 
full contribution, and hence was disparaging. If the membership figure of 247,000 
remained constant, the £5 levy would raise £1.235m. The more generous constituencies 
would not make up the difference. 
The local response to change was acquiescence, albeit with some dissent. The outcome of 
the acrimonious debate in Somerton and Frome was concessions for senior citizens, 
benefit recipients and those in full-time education, whose rate remained at £15.166 High 
Peak chose to retain £15 for all as a motivational tool to give the membership 'a feeling of 
ownership that we could defy Central Office ... it's encouraged them to carry on 
donating 
and attending events'. 167 The centre took a relaxed view of these initiatives, as long the £5 
was adhered to. There was though, some support for the increase: 'it's perfectly 
acceptable, leaving aside that our opponents do the same, it's only reasonable for people 
who want to benefit from party membership to make a financial contribution to it ... 
Central Office needs substantial resources to fight a general election and do the things a 
modern political party has to ... we can raise the extra funds we need'. 
168 Furthermore: 'if 
you leave things to the voluntary and they're not doing well, then they're not going to pay 
anything ... so they (levy and increases) had to come in ... over the years, associations 
have done their own thing, they didn't answer to Central Office ... we are now the 
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Conservative Party and working together, but there are some old-fashioned ones who 
don't want to be told a damn thing ... we've got to get away from that'. 
'69 
Officers were confident they could raise the extra funds, but the increase hardened their 
stance towards further contributions. It undermined constituency goodwill: 'I wouldn't 
advocate paying extra money to the centre ... I would want to use the money to campaign 
locally and support our candidate'. 170 Affordability and putting local interests first were 
apposite: 'it has effectively taken £3.50 for each member out of the association, which we 
have to replace by additional fundraising ... we are working and we'll replace it, but there 
is no reason why we should be putting any more to support them, when they have 
national donations, national members and national fundraising campaigns ... there 
is a 
place for that, but they cannot have it both ways ... if we were awash with cash, it might 
be different ... we've enough to do what we want, but we don't have any surpluses'. 
'71 
Moreover: 'suddenly asking for £5 per head affiliation fee instead of £l. 50 is a bit heavy 
... it doesn't threaten our independence, it does threaten the financial stability ... they ask 
for a campaign amount as well, this hasn't been paid recently ... it would be a 
bad thing 
to suggest that we should give more than our fair share ... every penny raised goes 
towards paying the group quota and it just about makes ends meet ... the central party not 
only gets the affiliation fee, but very importantly, a lot of money goes to central funds in 
the summer draw and Christmas draw, and if you haven't got a strong energetic and 
willing association who will get those tickets out, then the central party will not get the 
benefit it needs ... it brings in hundreds of thousands of pounds annually, that's very 
important'. 172 Formalism annoyed another officer: 'we've always paid a sum of money 
every year ... it's now much more of a laid down rule by Central Office that you will pay 
this much ... that's not the way it should go ... there's the running cost of our organisation 
and if we don't have enough to give them the £5 ... you'll hide members 
if they're not 
careful ... after all, what do they get, a vote now and again, but not very often ... a vote 
on the leadership ... half of them are not interested in it anyway'. 
173 Acquiescence with 
irritation was a fair summary of the position of many activists. 
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There was also further evidence of patronisation. For local contributions, CCHQ awarded 
annual certificates of excellence and five-year plaques. In addition, the treasurer's 
reception at the party conference served as aback-slapping' event for the faithful. Here, it 
was traditional for large cheques from wealthy associations to be presented and long-term 
awards over 10 years received, accompanied by big cheers. 174 Examples included 
Runnymeade and Weybridge 55 years, Horsham 40, Sheffield Heeley 20 (Conservative 
Party 2006d: 12). A CCHQ official highlighted a local party which had not defaulted in 
40 years, missed three years due to new local leadership views, but at the next change 
asked to make up the difference in order to reaffirm their loyalty. '75 Most officers though, 
had either not heard of the certificates or else concurred that: 'it's irrelevant ... they are 
never mentioned ... it just lies on the table', 
176 or more starkly: 'we've got our own 
wallpaper'. 177 CCHQ also allocated associations to five divisions, headed by a Premier 
Division for payments over £10,000 per annum. Premier associations received the use of 
treasurers' VIP facilities at conference, two invitations to treasurers' department events, 
an annual premier league dinner for association chairmen (formerly at the House of 
Commons) and long term awards at conference; the winner also received two rooms at 
the main conference hotel. 178 Those placed in other divisions received lesser benefits, but 
as these were at the discretion of regional officials, usually meant nothing. Importantly, 
many local officers were not aware of them. 179 For the election year 2005,28 associations 
(including two federations) featured in the Premier Division, five more than the previous 
year. The mean payment was £17,774, the Cities of London and Westminster being the 
highest at £38,114 (Conservative Party 2006d: 12). The local chairmen automatically 
received the benefits, giving personal incentives to push fundraising. It was also another 
indication of the centre's approach of focusing on the local leadership. Most officers 
however, treated the divisionalisation in the same manner as the certificates of 
excellence. Younger members were unimpressed: 'I was shocked because unfortunately it 
just smacked of the Conservative Party and the negative vibe ... if you raised 
£10,000 
you were in the premier league and you get to go to the conference for free, you get this, 
that and the other ... every so often, I see something like that and it's not right'. 
180 
Certificates of excellence and financial divisionalisation were clear examples of the 
patronising management style to which members were subjected. 
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A similar conclusion could be applied to the constituency loan scheme. Associations 
were induced to deposit money at CCHQ by interest credited originally against campaign 
subscriptions, but later the levy; 18' although the loans were unsecured (Ashcroft 2005: 
226). From the constituency sample, 40.8% provided a loan to CCHQ in 2005, in the 
range £1,430-62,500, with a mean of £17,667 (standard deviation £13,106); the non- 
sample Esher and Walton association lent £262,000. However, resultant influence was 
discounted by officers. Instead, for Derby who had a significant loan from a legacy: 
'we're having trouble getting some of the money back ... it's a loan they don't want to 
repay', one officer having to personally pay for leaflets in the interim. 182 In Somerton and 
Frome similarly, a local officer was forced to pay 200 Club prizes out of his own pocket 
until CCHQ could afford to return the loan six months later. Much acrimony resulted, the 
constituency being treated with disdain. 183 They withdrew the money. The loan scheme 
was also modified in the centre's favour. 184 
In monetary terms, local transfers to the centre were of little importance either to the 
party's recovery or to undermining local autonomy. Instead, it was the new formal 
relationship that was significant; it enabled the centre to impose contribution changes at 
will, although it had to be mindful of the impact on the motivation of volunteers. The 
evidence suggested that it had already sacrificed some goodwill. 
2. Expenditure Influence 
PPERA led the centre to monitor the localities more closely. However, officers concurred 
that this was to ensure compliance with the law, rather than for political reasons. Indeed, 
a positive view was taken: 'we have to provide accounts ... that's a very 
healthy thing'. 185 
Moreover: 'I have to send in my reports on our finances, on our political make-up and 
membership every year ... so there's a degree of monitoring and there should be'. 
186 
CCHQ did not intervene, but neither did it provide financial training. Activists insisted 
that central managers had no influence over their expenditure: 'we seem to be given pretty 
much freedom of action to do what we want ... we're expected to organise our own 
affairs, our own finances, which I like'. '87 Critically, if they tried to influence: 'we 
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wouldn't do it ... we might take helpful hints 
from them, but we wouldn't take any 
direction')88 This was because: 'it's more rewarding for people to go out and raise money 
if they know the way it's being spent and there's absolutely very little direction on how 
you spend your money ... if the centre gave us money, we would probably take 
direction, 
but not for our own money'. 189 Some though, linked this to performance: 'as long as you 
can show that you are improving and doing the job properly ... if not, that 
is where the 
area chairman comes in and the area agent (regional director) ... they will have a word 
before it goes to Central Office'. 140 Nevertheless, that the localities were content to supply 
financial and other information to the centre was in stark contrast to the secrecy of the 
pre-Fresh Future era. 
The key issue was the prioritising of expenditure. One local officer related: 'they think all 
money raised should be spent on campaigning ... but this requires an organisation, 
it 
requires support, so it's a difference of emphasis ... we are theoretically all 
heading in the 
same direction ... if we have to spend £200 on a new tombola to 
do our monthly 200 club 
draw, that might be seen as frivolous expenditure, but it helps the fundraising, which 
helps the campaigning'. ' 91 Regarding the professionals: 'regional directors don't sway any 
great influence, but they do guide to a degree ... they'll say you should 
be spending a 
certain percentage of your income on election campaigning ... it's good ... 
it's a touch of 
security and at the same time you know that you are heading in the right direction and 
you refocus slightly ... they realise that it's a voluntary organisation'. 
192 An official 
added: 'campaign directors, their role is to get target seats campaigning ... they 
have to 
spend money, so they are there to influence ... in those associations where we 
have 
worked with them and gained their trust, we have made headway ... they realise that 
if 
you spend the money wisely it pays dividends ... but a lot of associations sit on nice 
amounts of money for a rainy day ... well, 
it's been pouring down for the past ten years, 
they are beginning to realise that'. 193 Indeed, a campaign professional asserted that even 
'in membership and fundraising campaigns, we won't support them anymore, even in 
target seats, unless they are prepared to sign up to the things they are supposed to do'. 194 
Despite local protestations to the contrary therefore, professionals were increasingly 
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involved in directing local expenditure. Benchmarking and spending parameters were the 
preferred means, but supported status was available for the recalcitrant. 
The target seat scheme established by Michael Ashcroft underlined the centre's assertive 
financial strategy. He had been appointed deputy chairman with this responsibility soon 
after David Cameron's accession to the leadership. This provided him with the power to 
stipulate how the target seats campaign was to be managed; local associations were 
obliged to follow his guidelines. 195 Money was allotted for specific tasks aimed at 
communicating the party's message: 'we have to provide them with a business plan of 
how we are going to operate our campaign and they put that into financial assistance after 
Ashcroft has evaluated it'. 196 Grant size was subject to a financial audit of the 
constituency and a range of criteria relating to electorate size, household numbers, 
pledges collected, postal voters, deliverers and actual leaflets delivered, member numbers 
and fundraising. 197 Hence, greater formalism was apparent: 'we've had to give a statement 
of how we're going to run ourselves and run the election ... we've been a target seat 
before and got no help ... this time we will get a huge amount ... that is conditional on us 
running our affairs carefully and not wasting money'. 198 For progressive officers: 'it needs 
central co-ordination on how money's allocated ... it's based on real plans, on the 
monitoring of those plans to make sure you are actually doing it ... Ashcroft 
has seen 
evidence we spend it in the right ways and it makes a difference'. 199 It was also seen as a 
two-way process: 'it is a dialogue ... what they have been open to is perhaps trying 
something different, a bit risky, because if it works they've got a model that can be put 
across all target seats'. 00 Assistance did not extend to help for fundraising or other 
purposes and the money awarded: 'cannot be spent on people or equipment, only on 
campaigning ... we spent ours on a leaflet and telephone canvassing ... the regional agent 
authorises it ... we spend the money and then we get it reimbursed'. 
201 Central influence, 
through regional professionals, ultimately ranged from subtle to more direct, subject to 
perceptions of individual constituency performance. 
Ashcroft's approach potentially threatened local independence. Officers though, 
vehemently discounted any problem. His money was received enthusiastically; some 
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indeed, were desperate for it. In Cheltenham, activists were able to cover the town with 
45,000 leaflets. However, there was a danger that his finance would become a substitute 
for local fundraising rather than a supplement. The ageing membership and the dislike of 
fundraising by many underlined this: 'I fear we're not going to be very successful in 
raising money ... we might get some Lord Ashcroft money as a result, but that's got to be 
to the detriment of the party as a whole ... the more constituencies that are self-sufficient 
the better it must be for the centre'. 202 Moreover, in Somerton and Frome, despite the 
stipulated purpose of their grant, a number of executive council members questioned why 
it could not be spent as the association desired, for example on council election posters 
and leaflets; much patience was needed by the management team. 203 
It was unlikely that the centre will ever receive a substantial monetary contribution from 
the localities; collectively they forwarded less than 10% of their annual turnover. 
Therefore, its strategy was to direct local expenditure towards campaign-related activity. 
This was typically undertaken in an advisory manner; although supported status was now 
available for the errant. The Ashcroft finance initiative reinforced the centre's stance; this 
was aligned to the campaign team concept (see chapter four). 
Conclusion 
The Conservative Party's approach to financial management, and hence its recovery, was 
founded on the belief that money wins elections, so that a competitive advantage both 
nationally and locally was essential. The leadership deemed that this required a holistic 
effort. William Hague ensured the signature of the National Union chairman was on the 
Fresh Future document, so that the voluntary party would share the financial burden; 
member representation on the board could be similarly interpreted. However, for the 
purpose of tightening up local finance, reform has only been partially successful; there 
has not been a full alignment of national and local interests. The centre has only been 
able to acquire a token amount of local funds to shore up its massive deficits. Critically, it 
has been unable to effect massive sales of local properties. Consequently, its desire to 
redistribute local resources to satisfy electoral needs has been impeded. Financial 
parochialism at the constituency level, and indeed at branch level, remains a significant 
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problem in the Conservative Party. However, the key change was the new formal 
relationship. This enabled the imposition of central levies as well as continuing campaign 
subscriptions. The need to retain member commitment meant that thus far these have not 
been onerous; although some local goodwill has been lost. Nevertheless, the new 
relationship has permitted central encroachment into local expenditure, through the 
setting of campaign parameters. The Ashcroft target seat scheme similarly demanded 
this. Organisationally, the centre's approach focused upon the local leadership. It was its 
task to co-ordinate local fundraising, particularly the development of outside supporter 
networks and Patrons' Clubs, and expenditure priorities. Overall however, it can be stated 
that the solution to the party's recovery remains sub-optimal financially. 
This was exacerbated by a weaker local fundraising capability at a time when the cost of 
campaigning was increasing. Whilst local parties continued to raise significant sums, they 
could no longer be perceived as social organisations; many activists indeed, did not enjoy 
fundraising. Decline reflected an ageing membership and a reliance on the same people 
and types of event, but the lack of an MP was significant, demonstrating the salience of 
the political dimension and hence local interests. Financial capability though, was 
revealed as a primary, but not the only, factor contributing to the maintenance of local 
autonomy. Localities jealously guarded the right to raise and spend funds as they saw fit. 
Despite the abolition of the legal separation of the party components, activists still 
distinguished between national and local finance; national deficit financing was its 
problem. It was thus easy to discern why there was resistance to property sales and that 
they were regarded by many as symbols of local autonomy. Much of the localities' near 
£100m assets were tied up in properties. To the centre, these were unproductive and an 
organisational rigidity to be removed. Financial separation in this way reflected the 
parallel structures identified in the previous chapter and hence undermined leadership 
attempts to align national and local interests. Nevertheless, local autonomy has been 
eroded in expenditure terms. Moreover, the provision of Ashcroft finance not only 
required local parties to act with financial responsibility, but also depended upon property 
sales or at least their being used for income generation. Despite activist utterances to the 
contrary, wealthy donors impacted upon their status. However, as chapter four will show, 
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his money went to local campaign teams who were separated from the association 
mainstream, enabling officers to still claim autonomy in expenditure. Ultimately, it was 
in the centre's interests to have financially self-sufficient parties for campaign purposes. 
Local autonomy was hence preserved, albeit in diluted form. 
The financial dichotomy discussed above has implications for the party evolution 
literature. Local parties exerted no influence over national finance, but equally the centre 
has not achieved full control locally. The lack of alignment undermined the electoral- 
professional stance and political marketing generally. In order to respond to changes in 
the political environment, central professionals were unable to effectively co-ordinate 
local resources. The progress made over expenditure, and as chapter four will show in 
improving efficiency, was offset by the property issue and hoarding money. As a result, 
Carty's (2004) franchise concept was also inadequate as the centre does not retain overall 
responsibility for finance: activists, the franchisees, would not permit it and the centre 
needs their continuing commitment. Hence financially, local parties have not been 
marginalised in the sense that Kirchheimer (1966), Panebianco (1988) and indeed, Katz 
and Mair (1995) intimated. Funding was not wholly by interest groups and the state. 
Despite the likely extension of state funding in Britain, local finance will continue to play 
a key role. On Panebianco's mass bureaucratic to electoral-professional continuum, 
finance remained a zone of uncertainty in which neither centre nor periphery enjoyed full 
control. 
However, the decline in local fundraising capability needs to be seen in the context of 
greater persuasive campaigning locally (Denver and Hands 1997). There was evidence of 
de-energisation (Whiteley et at 1994) in the mundane tasks of membership and 
fundraising. The Ashcroft finance was hence a necessity for many associations. The 
centre's approach in view of this trend was to emphasise local leadership and to ensure 
that it actively pursued development of supporters and Patrons. This strategy marked a 
revision of the local cadre in Duverger's (1959) terms. It meant a renewed emphasis on 
the quality of local leaders in order to secure the necessary resources for campaigning. 
Importantly, it also meant that the centre was separating out the types of members and 
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focusing on the politically productive ones. This process will be further discussed in 
chapter four. 
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Chapter Four 
The Local Conservative Party Campaign Capability 
Denver and Hands distinguished between 'persuasive' and 'mobilising' campaigning. The 
former was traditionally the preserve of the national party and the latter the localities. 
However, they observed increasing attention to persuasion at the local level (1997: 308). 
Justification for central involvement in local campaigns followed from this, as well as 
initiatives to improve resource distribution. Michael Ashcroft was charged with overall 
co-ordination of the target seats strategy, opinion research, field campaigning activities 
and the work of regional and area campaign directors; this was supported by extensive 
financial input. ' Nevertheless, Whiteley and Seyd argued that actual campaigning 
remained a local function: 'while some features of election campaigning will be the same, 
regardless of the locality, there are enough variations in campaigning efforts, styles and 
intensities across the country to make it necessary to describe the election in terms of a 
set of different campaigns' (2003: 638). This chapter will assess the centre's capacity to 
direct local campaigns in the critical target seats. As the local purpose is defined in 
campaign terms, this has implications for local autonomy. New evidence which supports 
the importance of local campaigns will first be presented. From this basis, section two 
will consider the steps taken by the centre to achieve greater local co-ordination. 
Continuing local autonomy would become a function of the ability of local parties to add 
campaign value; this will be examined in sections three and four. The result was clear 
campaign weaknesses, leading to a conclusion that the centre had to become involved 
locally. One implication of this was structural change to group constituencies together; 
this will be addressed in section five. Overall, to improve electoral performance, local 
autonomy had to be dismantled, but it has persevered in a modified form. 
The Importance of Local Campaigns 
Chapter one identified two trends which suggested campaign polarisation. Firstly, it was 
widely reported that general election campaigns have become 'presidentialised' (Kellner 
1997; Butler and Kavanagh 2002; Kavanagh and Butler 2005). Hastings forecasted 
continuation. Few voters discerned Conservative policy positions and made judgements 
solely on leader perceptions; this was understood by the Cameron team. A former 
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director of marketing encapsulated the thinking: 'the brand of the Conservative Party is 
95 per cent defined by the man in charge ... the other 5 per cent 
is the look and feel of the 
party'. 3 Secondly however, there was much evidence of the renewed importance of local 
campaigns (Denver et at 2002; Johnston and Pattie 2003: Whiteley and Seyd 2003). This 
dichotomy will be examined here. 
1. Presidentialisation 
The presidential scenario was acknowledged locally, but there was strong evidence that 
the local effort should not be dismissed: 'we have been going that way for a long time ... 
Thatcher was such a strong personality, very high profile, her whole attitude, very 
autocratic, that was her style ... Blair seemed more presidential ... national politics 
is 
getting more and more important, but you don't disregard what is happening at the 
grassroots'. 4 There was a fear that: 'if you move towards a more presidential style of 
government, which Blair has been doing, the electorate turn against ... they've tried to 
short circuit parliament, they've marginalised even the roles of senior cabinet ministers ... 
all power's been driven into the centre and when that happens you lose contact between 
government and people ... in our culture that's fatal' .5 Others were supportive: 
'the 
borough recycling and everything ties in nicely with national, so when people read 
leaflets, the two becomes one ... they don't see it as the Conservative Party, but as David 
Cameron's Conservative Party ... they like the idea of a leader, the president that 
communicates, the prime minister ... it's always been leaders, it's not, it's groups, the 
whole system, but people like to focus on one person, it's a comfort ... a good 
leader that 
people warm to is very positive ... successful periods of politics have always had strong 
leadership'. 6 Nevertheless, when'David Cameron's Conservatives' appeared on the Ealing 
Southall by-election ballot paper in July 2007, it caused upset; many stressed they were 
members of the Conservative Party .7 
The outlook was transfused into electioneering: 'Blair has presidentialised the role of 
prime minister, so you have to counter that with someone who can be seen as presidential 
... you would then have a presidential-type or personality-led campaign ... we have to 
fight the incumbents ... if it's their style, then we have to at least demonstrate our 
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capability to match that'. 8 Hence: 'the country is, you could argue the party is in its 
selection of David Cameron as our leader ... we have to go the way we 
have to go and 
that's what we've done'. 9 In stark terms: 'we keep hammering Cameron-Brown ... 
whether we like it or not, it's with us ... that's the premise on which we're 
fighting the 
general election ... we've got the new brand'. 
10 There was some unease: 'policies are what 
we should be leading on, but I suspect because of the contrasting figures ... by 2009, 
Brown is likely to be absolutely mired in what he created himself and Cameron should be 
able to exploit it'. 11 Overall: 'in a general election, the work has to be done locally, but 
our efforts will be puny by comparison ... the relationship between people and the 
Conservatives is the perception of the national party, of David Cameron and his people 
which will determine which way the vote goes and move the floating voters'. 12 Few 
activists doubted presidential ism, but they did not see campaigns so holistically. 
2. Local Contribution 
Qualitative support was added here to the resurgence of local campaigning literature. 
Activists indicated three reasons why a strong local effort was needed to compliment 
presidentialism. Firstly, electoral politics required a local presence: 'without a strong local 
presence and people willing to make a difference locally, we can't expect people to vote 
Conservative nationally ... people vote on national issues, what David Cameron and 
Gordon Brown say and what they've seen on TV, but a good chunk of voters will be more 
persuaded to vote a certain way if there's a strong local effort being made ... that 
increases confidence in the Conservative Party'. 13 To an official: 'the local effort is 
secondary ... when people go into the polling station, they're not thinking am I voting for 
Andrew Bingham or Tom Levitt, but would I prefer David Cameron as prime minister or 
... 
in that respect it's presidential, but there's no doubt a popular local candidate and a 
good local campaign can buck the national swing ... there are people who think you 
don't 
have to run a local campaign because it is presidential, that's rubbish ... where the 
electorate doesn't hear from the Conservative Party, they will think Cameron is irrelevant, 
they don't do anything around here ... it (local campaign) goes towards influencing what 
they think of the leader'. 14 This reflected the 'spiral of silence' thesis, where those who 
were active appeared stronger than they really were, whilst others who remained silent 
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appeared weaker (Noelle-Neumann 1980: 4-5). To this argument, a local officer added: 
'the reduction in community spirit means that people look at things from a national point 
of view, they don't tend to think of local people and local things ... but it can't all be done 
through national campaigning because there are people who aren't looking ... you 
have to 
raise the flag in front of them and you can only do that locally'. 15 This was underlined by: 
'you cannot guarantee that we are going to get to everybody through that (television) 
screen ... that is what (the centre) thinks ... it's the letterbox, the knock on the door ... 
workers on the ground must still go in tandem'. 16 Indeed, Kavanagh and Butler 
acknowledged that in 2005, less than half of voters saw the party leaders on newscasts; 
only a fifth though, had any doorstep contact (2005: 168). 
Secondly, a strong local effort was needed to combat opposition strategic ground 
offensives, particularly of the Liberal Democrats; this required local investment in a local 
candidate. An agent argued: 'they're electing the president, so they want the party leader 
to be a credible alternative ... but if the organisation on the ground, if the candidate 
is a 
weakness, that can affect the result ... any candidate who thinks things will 
just happen 
on a national swing hasn't been watching the variations in the election results for the last 
15 years ... in Cheltenham, Somerton and Frome, North Devon and every other Liberal 
Democrat seat, they will not be punished in the same way as the Labour Party appear to 
be on the road to being for being in government ... you very much need 
local and the 
local candidate, because if you are perceived as being an outsider, particularly in a 
Liberal seat, they will crucify you'. 17 Hence: 'in the High Peak, we have invested in our 
parliamentary candidate ... he will have been in post for four years in 2009, and 
fought 
the last election, so he has a high profile which is probably why he did so well at the local 
elections'. 18 Diversity was emphasised: 'the statisticians always say that a local candidate 
only takes a small 'personal vote ... but David Cameron is not having as much effect 
in 
the north as the south ... a good local candidate in a target seat who gets a lot of publicity 
and who gets out and about, can swing the vote ... a good constituency 
MP and an 
excellent campaign can hold onto a seat ... if we were to rely on a presidential effect, we 
wouldn't win a lot of seats up here'. 19 Moreover: 'in the modem world, television is where 
elections are fought ... but local candidates getting themselves round and known ... if 
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voters look at a name and they've shaken that person's hand, and another they haven't 
met, I'll guarantee if there's a waiver the cross will go to who they've spoken to or shaken 
hands with. 
Thirdly, electoral fragmentation required sharper competitiveness through the candidate 
assimilating local issues and communicating a localised message. A local officer stressed: 
'voters will get the majority of their headline information via the national media ... a 
national campaign is incredibly important, but a lot of the ground work is put in by 
associations ... hence, a flexible national-local co-ordination ... we can't 
have the 
national campaign divorced from the local campaign, giving high-level messages without 
local campaigns putting those messages into how it will translate for people locally ... for 
Cameron to say we'll put more money into the NHS and we'll do it this way, without that 
being translated into what it means for local people ... money can save that unit locally, 
we can build a unit there ... it's that co-ordination ... the electorate has become more 
fragmented and you've got to tailor your message to that fragmentation' 2' Competitively: 
'you have to look at individual areas ... the Liberal Democrats say all things to all people 
... their whole approach is to take local issues, forget national issues because they can say 
anything on national issues ... local issues is what they concentrate on and they're what 
we need to concentrate on'. 22 Another officer agreed: 'the electorate can be fickle ... there 
is no doubt that local issues can get people going ... it's one of the things the 
Liberal 
Democrats have had great success in, doing a single issue to death raises awareness and 
gets them votes ... we're not very good at it, when we are, which we are occasionally, 
it 
tends to be usefuli23 Hence, it was asserted: 'for the Liberal Democrats to have the 
support they have in Derby North, it has to be based on local issues and what they are 
doing locally ... if you ignore that in a general election campaign, you would probably 
be 
onto a thumping'. 24 Overall therefore, for maintaining a local presence, enhancing local 
competitiveness through a local candidate and putting a local interpretation on political 
issues, activists remained convinced of the value of local campaigning. The evidence also 
pointed to a need for an alignment of national and local campaigns. A corollary however, 
was that localism was often viewed specifically as the local candidate. For the centre, this 
meant that local campaigns should be professionally co-ordinated. 
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Campaign Co-ordination 
The revival of the local arena as an important campaign front led to the centre taking 
steps to enhance its influence over local campaign strategies, structures and systems. 
1. Campaign Strategy 
The local general election strategy was determined centrally and communicated down. 
An agent stated: 'in target seats, Central Office works out the strategy and allows local 
agents and activists to implement it, make tactical decisions, tailor it to the local 
community based on their local knowledge' 25 A professional confirmed: 'the outline of 
the strategy is done nationally, with me putting that across to the local associations ... 
people are not going to make policy up locally ... we try to take as much off 
local 
associations as possible, in templates and leaflets ... if they want to do a newsletter, they 
just do the typing ... that is a way of ensuring our house style, the blue and green, the tree 
logo... in the past it's taken some associations 10 years to change over'. 26 This was 
politically significant, as it enabled professionals to reinforce the brand and set the policy 
parameters in electoral communications. It also showed the purposeful de-skilling of 
local activists. Practically, direction meant: 'we'd gather the key figures together, the 
chairmen and deputy political especially ... we'd say what is going to be their strategy, 
messages, seats to target and they would fall in, but sometimes in a little way ... we 
would hear from the top people in the campaign department and they'd be spelling out 
what they wanted the constituencies to do and we'd also get written information'. 27 
Strategically therefore, activists were reduced to a subordinate role; although local 
autonomy meant that convincing some was difficult. 
Broader mechanisms were also employed to enable the centre to stamp its authority on 
the campaign. In his role as deputy chairman with responsibility for target seats, Michael 
Ashcroft established the framework, stipulating the assistance localities could expect to 
receive: campaigning advice, campaign director support, access to the battleground 
research programme, campaign support from Conservative-held seats and financial 
support. 28 Moreover, the party organised an annual "TakeYourSeats" conference, run by 
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central professionals, which brought together candidates, agents, association chairmen 
and council leaders in target seats. Themes discussed included 'funding your campaign', 
'handling the media' and becoming 'community champions'. 9 Local officers described 
this as helpful. 30 The same people were further invited to regional campaign meetings to 
add reinforcement. 
There was a general acceptance of the centre's right to determine the local campaign 
strategy. Contentment and local autonomy were reflected in the capacity to adapt the 
central thrust to fit local conditions: 'they set the overall campaign for us ... the 
newspapers were set in a certain way, we filled them with news ... the main advertising 
is done centrally, the main push, the associations cannot dictate policy ... because they 
are dictating policy, they are controlling the election campaign ... we put our slant on 
what they tell us'. 31 In addition: 'for a general election, there has to be some co- 
ordination, the glue needs to be there 
, 
nationally, even though we need to run very 
different strategies in Derby North and Mid Derbyshire ... you wouldn't want to 
contradict anything David Cameron's pushing or the party nationally because the issues 
that people will be going to vote on will be national and we would be silly not to tie in 
with them ... so it's a compromise, a working relationship, Central office attempting to 
understand the demographics and issues at stake, and local to be open minded enough to 
take on board the ideas and general strategy ... whether we agree with 
it all, you have to 
go along with it because the last thing you want is contradictions'. 32 Practically therefore: 
'you have dialogue with an area campaign director to plot what you are doing locally to 
ensure it ties in nationally ... you're given a template to work to ... there may 
be a bit of 
tailoring, it's not Central Office saying here's the Cheltenham campaign'. 33 Hence: 'we 
tweaked it to local issues ... the closure of the Battledown Children's Centre which was 
changed subsequently ... we were able to put those nuances into the campaign and we 
specifically got shadow ministers to come down on them'. 34 Strategically, local officers 
acquiesced to central control of the campaign. 
However, in 2005 this approach brought frustration for activists in Liberal Democrat 
contested seats. In Cheltenham: 'Central Office has been far too slow to realise the threat 
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from the Liberal Democrats and to act upon it ... we've been telling them for years, 
but 
every time it's about how we fight Labour, we don't fight Labour ... they are beginning to 
change it ... the Liberal Democrats are a stronger party and a lot of us are fighting them 
... they think because they can fight Labour, it will automatically 
do, and it wolf V. 35 
Officers in Somerton and Frome echoed this sentiment, arguing strongly that this narrow 
focus cost the party a number of potential gains. Neglect was manifested in front bench 
visits, designed to encourage voters and incentivise activists: 'we were a target seat, but 
had hardly any calibre shadow cabinet members coming into the constituency to support 
our candidate ... the chairman felt let down by that'. 
36 Moreover: 'we'd get short notice 
and they'd suddenly appear ... somebody would be going to Wincanton for half and 
hour 
with half a day's notice ... how could you get a crowd or press coverage to see him ... so 
his time was wasted and so was ours'. 37 A further strategic affect was highlighted in 
trying to contend with the Liberal Democrats' campaign style: 'as long as nobody does 
anything about Yeovil, they are able at each election not to spend much time canvassing 
there and send all their councillors into our area ... we used to 
have the seat ... build up 
Yeovil and they will be forced back to defend it'. 38 
These problems illustrated not just central control of the campaign, but also provided 
further evidence of the tendency to ignore the views of local officers. Critically they 
reflected the separation of formulation and implementation of campaign strategy; the 
centre was responsible for the former, the localities the latter. Politically, they showed a 
lack of alignment of national and local campaign interests, and the potential for local 
anger based upon campaign neglect. 
2. Campaign Structure 
The concept of separation fed into campaign structure. In this, the centre's influence over 
campaign strategy was cemented through the establishment of local campaign teams 
headed by trained candidates. This permitted closer scrutiny of local performance, as they 
were individually accountable to the candidates' department. An area officer related: 'it's 
down to each PPC to form a team ... you can get a forceful candidate in one, who's 
getting the press coverage, and another who is not ... it works through the candidates, 
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who are under review from Central Office at all times ... they're given targets ... they 
have to put in a report on what is being done ... three East Midlands constituencies 
recently had visits, one got top marks and one they're going back to have a look at ... the 
constituencies have to make sure they're street seen, they've communicated with the 
public'. 39 A professional added: 'in target seats, the strategy is controlled from the top 
through the PPC in a monthly campaign meeting and local put their slant on it ... I deal 
with candidates rather than chairmen because our campaigning strategy is much more 
focused on the candidate ... I will speak to Andrew Bingham (PPC) half a dozen times a 
week, I may not speak to the chairman more than once a month ... if they've got an 
association problem which isn't connected with campaigning, they telephone the regional 
director ... I usually go to campaign team meetings, whereas I won't go to the association 
executive or anything like that ... money from Central Office doesn't go to the 
association ... they send what they've done to me with the bill and it gets paid ... one of 
the candidates wants letterheads, we've got a draft on the computer, we put in her 
photograph and say that's going to cost you £500 against your money ... nobody else 
in 
her association is involved'. 0 Conceptually, an agent asserted that the campaign team 
was: 'still evolving ... I wouldn't use the word control, but certainly target seats are 
helped to achieve their political goals, partly because its focused only on winning at the 
general election, partly because the regional director attends those meetings and partly 
because of Lord Ashcroft funding which focuses attention on campaigning projects ... 
the last two general elections, target seats have been asked to set them up and my 
experience is that they work well as long as the right people serve on them ... they form a 
good communication with the centre ... in 2001, it provided recommended agendas, with 
tasks for each of the directors on that committee, so it was even more formulaic ... of 
course, a lot of target seats then and now didn't have somebody like myself to provide 
that, and so in Somerton and Frome, they might have more difficulty in focusing on what 
really mattered '. 41 
Central capacity to direct local campaigns was further indicated by the composition and 
management of the campaign team, and its separation from the association. Each member 
had a specific role, co-ordinating for example: canvassing, delivery networks, pledges, 
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postal votes, posters and so on. Activist participation was a function of individual skills 
and dedication; the candidate could look elsewhere. Either he or a professional usually 
chaired the meeting. A professional noted: 'sometimes there is something nasty to be said 
and it's better I say it rather than the candidate ... Andrew Bingham chairs the 
High Peak 
one, whereas in North West Leicestershire I chair it because it's a new candidate ... (the 
agenda) is set by me or the candidate ... candidates set up the campaign teams and not 
the association officers ... in many cases, they're deliberately not the officers ... the 
officers have their role in running the association, the campaign teams have theirs in 
winning the next general election ... in one constituency I 
didn't know anybody, there 
were businessmen who offered help and somebody from a branch committee, but not the 
chairman because they thought he would be no good ... campaign teams are 
hand picked 
by the candidates'. 2 In Cheltenham, the team largely comprised the association officers, 
reflecting the progressive nature of the constituency; there was though, an agent in 
attendance. By contrast, High Peak, which lacked an agent, illustrated the broader 
approach: 'they shouldn't necessarily just be people from the association ... Andrew 
has a 
couple of candidates from parliamentary seats bordering High Peak because he wants 
their expertise, how they did things in 2005, there's someone from Sheffield, the 
chairman's on it ... most of them are quite active in the association ... 
he's got people 
with different skills and he wants them to take on different aspects of the campaign ... 
they are encouraged to run teams separately from the association ... the 
ACD is the link 
with Central Office, that's how it's co-ordinated, a two-way thing through him'. 
43 The 
separation of the campaign team from the association was confirmed by its absence from 
the minutes of executive council meetings for any of the constituencies. 
Leadership by the candidate was stressed: 'they want the candidates now to be leaders of 
the campaign, whereas in the old days they just followed like a lap dog and you told them 
what to do'. 4 In Somerton and Frome: 'Annunziata and the agent were tasked by CCHQ 
with putting together a campaign plan, which lists objectives, suggested campaigning 
projects, how these will be funded and what the likely shortfall will be'. 5 They were 
assisted by the regional director, the plan being subsequently presented to the chairman 
for agreement. 6 For a regional professional: 'some campaign teams have worked 
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brilliantly, others have been absolutely useless ... it comes down to leadership and the 
calibre of the people involved ... what has changed 
in the last 10-20 years is the 
expectation of the candidates themselves to provide leadership has gone up hugely ... the 
one single factor why we regained Weston-Super-Mare was John Penrose because he was 
a good candidate and because he led the team himself. 47 Similarly, in Derby North: 
'Richard Aitken-Davies put himself about, was in the paper and it paid off in that he cut 
the majority of the Labour candidate, but it would not have been done without his hard 
work ... he had the backing of the office, but he was such a good candidate, him and his 
wife could have run the whole thing without any support'. 48 Leadership was further 
indicated by: 'campaign skills should be with the candidate and agent ... campaign teams 
if set up with guidance from regional officers can be very effective ... but they are only 
as good as the candidate ... we had a candidate in South Derbyshire who was idle ... we 
could have won if he had worked in the areas asked ... campaign teams did work 
but 
without the candidate ... a candidate should be working from now until when a general 
election is called, working in the Labour areas, knocking on doors'. 49 Localism was again 
viewed from the candidate perspective. This was being ratcheted up, Ashcroft asserting: 
'my team will deliver a highly focused campaign working with our candidates from the 
day they are selected ... the best way to professionalise local campaigning is to select 
high quality candidates, to provide them with the best quality training and support, and 
then let them drive local campaigns'. 50 In Mid Derbyshire for example, the candidate was 
instrumental in obtaining an Ashcroft grant, was involved in the Uganda social action 
project at Cameron's invitation and led the quest for greater press coverage. s' Overall, it 
was clear that through both the candidates and the campaign teams, Ashcroft and his 
appointees were managing the roll out of the campaign strategy at the local level in the 
target seats. 
The campaign team concept reinforced the separation of formulation and implementation 
of strategy; it was the centre's means of ensuring that it was adhered to. The switch to 
candidate leadership effectively curtailed local autonomy in campaigning; although 
separation meant that activists could save face by claiming autonomy over other local 
functions. The employment of outsiders on the team suggested a lack of a full set of 
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campaign skills locally. It would also be potentially de-motivating to those activists not 
invited onto it. Nevertheless, the approach suggested a new type of local cadre, set 
alongside the association. 
3. Campaign Systems 
A candidate-led and accountable campaign rendered it easier for the centre to measure 
constituency performance than when it was under local control. Performance indicators, 
based upon the Ashcroft criteria identified in chapter three, were developed; it was to him 
that progress reports were sent. 52 The result was: 'some are willing and open, and to do 
what Central Office would like them to, some need persuading, others won't be and 
therefore you have to üse other methods (smiles) ... we have a general set (of criteria) 
that's the same for every association, decided jointly with Central Office, the campaign 
directors put in suggestions ... you've got to have a national standard, but if they don't 
reach it, it isn't necessarily bad, they may be doing things another way ... it's difficult to 
increase your canvassing in a target seat if there's only three people canvassing, so it's 
down to me to see how we can help'. 53 Hence, an agent related: 'we are left to get on and 
do what we need to win, with the proviso that we are being checked that we are 
performing in certain areas ... I'll be in contact with (the ACD) weekly, just a chat, get an 
up-date, but it's not formal, has this been done, has that been done, because you cannot 
micro-manage in that way'. 54 For officer teams, it meant that performance was linked to 
the PPC and the campaign team, rather than the association. That separation was 
meaningful: 'unfortunately, the strategy, and how the PPC approaches it, is divorced from 
the association, so the ACD comes ... at the strategy meeting, we go over the plans, 
what's going on, what have we done, that's performance based, that's directed from 
CCHQ and it's fed through by the region and the ACD ... the ACD gives advice on 
how 
we're doing and what's the big plan, what are your comparisons like with benchmarked 
seats elsewhere ... it's a different level ... I don't get approached as an association officer 
to say how are we doing on that' 55 The campaign team concept thus strengthened the 
performance culture alluded to in chapter two. However, the removal of responsibility 
clearly irritated those officers who were able and committed to making a valuable 
contribution. 
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Performance monitoring of the campaign team was not reciprocal. There was no 
mechanism to audit central co-ordination performance. Judgement was instead typically 
exercised over implementation issues such as campaign guidelines and literature 
distribution, rather than overall process. Here, evidence from the 2005 election was 
varied: to some there was improvement, but to others it was lamentable. In Cheltenham, 
performance was: 'fairly good ... the communication's better than it used to be ... even 
though they tried, as they've always done, to give support on literature packs, they made 
it sensibly flexible enough where it didn't need to be done that way ... it gives greater 
support when it is required'. 56 Moreover, the centre: 'was not involved as such, but they 
sent papers of how to do it and there were seminars, advice and encouragement ... you 
had a list (of tasks) ... it was physically impossible to do the lot with the numbers we had 
... but it gave us an idea of what we should be doing ... they sent in people, but 
it was a 
bit hit and miss. 57 However, another officer added: 'I could say what co-ordination, 
there's very little at a general election ... campaign strategy stuff coming through and 
outline timetables of when things are supposed to happen, but apart from that there's 
nothing, which I'm fairly happy with because you have to run your own campaign locally 
... the centre aren't going to help'. 
58 
Campaign material was the source of much anger and frustration in Somerton and Frome: 
'so many things went wrong ... posters never came or they got them wrong, or when 
it 
rained they fell off ... we bought them from the centre because we wanted to act as a 
team and it was less expensive ... we also went with their recommendations 
for posting 
pledge letters, but our second one got lost somewhere ... it should have gone out a week 
before the election, about half of them went out a week before and the other half after the 
election ... we paid for this, we did everything we were asked to do when we were asked 
to do it ... a complete shambles, it really was appalling the things that went on in the 
centre ... people in the constituency warned me, they'd been through it in previous 
elections ... it was chaotic ... I've found this so many times dealing with Central Office 
... it's not true of everybody, but the general impression is always "it's those bloody 
activists out there, we're the professionals ... what a damn nuisance they are, try to get rid 
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of them" ... the impression you get the whole time of an organisation that really doesn't 
know what it's doing'. 59 Furthermore: 'the other parties, including UKIP, got their stuff 
into people's houses before we did, and that was entirely down to CCHQ ... we were a 
target seat which would mean lots of help ... we got none, financial or otherwise, so 
quality, performance, input, co-ordination, it just didn't happen ... the (South West) 
office confined themselves to asking lots of irritating questions at busier times of the 
campaign'. 0A local official though, suggested: 'I can understand Somerton and Frome 
because certain staff at the centre can be London-centric ... if it's not happening 
in 
London, it's not happening ... it's the middle in almost every general election ... five days 
before polling day, a constituency which is 70 miles long ... to distribute to your 
branches and get them delivered, it's going to take at least three days ... they don't 
understand that you can get it out quicker in Putney than in Penrith and the Border'. 61 
This was though, an illustration of the perceived relative insignificance of local people 
and their efforts. 
Systems problems were hence regarded as managerial, rather than strategic. An officer 
commented: 'it wasn't well co-ordinated ... the ability to supply printed material at the 
correct time, several inabilities to do things correctly ... the people who 
do the 
masterpieces, (the young professionals) think they know best, they don't always ... the 
provision of information and their speed of reaction ... leaflet printing they 
do for us and 
computers, blue chip and its replacement, they are having problems, they don't seem to 
have any project management ... that is the co-ordination problem'. 
2 The lack of two- 
way communication was also reinforced: 'changing policy in the middle ... as a result, a 
lot of new material came out half way through the campaign when everything's been 
printed, everything's out with the deliverers, the timetable's in place ... you should 
establish your national campaign in terms of what you are delivering on the ground and 
the message in advance and stick to it ... other nuances you put through national press 
conferences, deal with it at that level, but do not expect the troops on the ground to do a 
90 degree change simply because someone is panicking in Central Office that the 
message is wrong because it is too late at that point ... when Central 
Office panics, it 
seems they don't understand the practical implications of what they are asking the 
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constituencies to do'. 3 Ultimately, local systems evaluation represented operational 
concerns. Nevertheless, the problems showed the impact of local campaigns on electoral 
turnout and outcomes, as shown consistently by Denver and Hands, Johnston and Pattie, 
and Seyd and Whiteley, would have been enhanced with better co-ordination. The 
evidence also revealed that the patronising management style, alluded to in chapter two, 
fed through to campaigning. 
The key to campaign co-ordination was separation. There was separation of formulation 
and implementation of strategy, of the campaign team from the association mainstream 
and of literature design. PPC leadership was accepted because it was his campaign, and a 
broadening of the participant base to harness outside skills likewise. These developments 
were recognised as the means to electoral success. Local frustration was instead directed 
at the centre's capacity to deliver on its promises. Importantly, it was clear that national 
and local campaign interests were not fully aligned. The localities acknowledged their 
role in a general election campaign was implementation only. For campaigning therefore, 
local autonomy did not mean political autonomy. Instead, it meant standard association 
activities such as membership and fundraising, and the organisation of campaign 
activities. Here, autonomy would reflect the extent to which they could add value. 
Added Value 1: Basic Campaign Activities 
From the above discussion, it can be discerned that the centre was simplifying the local 
campaign function. A weakening of local capability and hence a capacity to sustain local 
autonomy was inferred. This will first be examined through Denver and Hands's 
categories of local campaigning: candidate introduction, canvassing and polling day 
mobilisation, and promotion through leafleting (1997: 306). 
Candidate Introduction 
The local role in candidate introduction has withered. Public meetings have declined so 
that at the 2001 election, Butler and Kavanagh reported door-to-door canvassing as the 
primary point of contact for candidates, some also pursuing walkabouts in town centres 
(2002: 217). As noted, local campaigning was now candidate-led, many being selected 
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early. An officer hence stated: 'you can do a lot of the ground work ... the PPC was 
selected last year and he's going out meeting people, you can't do that in three weeks ... 
you'd be struggling to meet 500 people ... you can meet 5-10,000 people in the time 
between being selected and the election is announced ... then put the cream on the cake 
during the election' 64 That the onus was on the candidate to make himself known was 
further indicated by the lack of local media capability. Chapter two noted variable quality 
of websites. However, it was in the local press where the problem was acute: 'we're not 
strong enough in our access to local media ... it is culturally not in favour of us ... 
campaigning is hardly ever mentioned ... even Annunziata's selection was more or 
less 
ignored ... I put it on our website, complete with photograph, and nobody picked it up'. 
65 
Moreover: 'we have to address how we get our political viewpoints across ... our new 
candidate has issued 15 press releases, none of which have appeared' 66 It was further 
agreed: 'we're not good at marketing ourselves ... we could do with a full-time marketing 
director to cover things like media, poster campaigns, local radio ... we're getting that 
from the current candidate, which we didn't have in the previous one, but it's a tall order 
for him to carry it on his shoulders'. 67 
2. Canvassing 
Activists were a means of enhancing impersonal media messages through personal 
contact (Scarrow 1996: 147), but with 70,000 voters per constituency, this would require 
sizeable manpower no longer available with an ageing membership. Canvassing was. also 
a skilled activity requiring knowledge and dedication. 68 However, there was a natural 
Conservative aversion to it: 'very few members are comfortable with door knocking and 
discussing with anybody, but they will deliver ... canvassing, if you are prepared to 
do it, 
you tend to go where it's needed ... people will only want to canvass where they 
feel they 
are likely to get it right, they may not know. the local issues outside of their own area' 69 
This was further aligned to the character of activists. One officer drew: 'a distinction 
between Conservatives with their own lives to lead, but who've got other focuses and 
Labour where you've got far more motivated activists whose life is about union structure 
... you're getting slightly towards the religion in the way they believe in it with a level of 
fanaticism which you don't get from Conservatives ... we've got far more 
independently 
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minded people'. 70 This extended Drucker's (1979) analysis of the Conservative 
disposition. There was though, intense partisanship. Many showed genuine hatred for 
Labour and were convinced that it had devastated the country. Moreover, canvass sheets 
still indicated Labour by 'S' for socialists. ' Nevertheless, an agent stressed: 'canvassing 
has never been a very popular undertaking by any activist ... there are less people willing 
to canvass because people are sharper on the door, they don't like to be bothered, there's 
more pressure because it's sales, so if you don't have the money to do more mail 
canvassing, your, ability to get the information out is affected ... it is fine now we're 
popular again, people are fairly nice on the door even if they don't like you, but it has 
been difficult'. 2 
A lack of canvassers raised the dilemma whether to pursue critical mass to demonstrate 
presence in a specific area or to spread out thinly across the constituency, but also 
questioned the activity's value: 'canvassing is rewarding and interesting, but it doesn't do 
much, it's time consuming, it looks good that you're all out on the streets ... mob-handed 
is less efficient, but it looks better . 73 The solution in Derby was: 'at the last election, we 
couldn't do mass coverage, so we went to certain streets in every area and had a good 
reception ... always two or three streets away ... "spots of infection" strategy 
because of 
the limited manpower ... it matters for local morale to get round the whole area ... people 
in areas where they say no politician comes here, are pleased to see you'. 74 The aim was 
to create an impression that the party was 'active, alive and had some vitality' at the local 
level 75 Moreover: 'it's important that we are seen, so it ceases to be an elitist identity'. 76 
Furthermore: 'it definitely matters because most people would prefer to speak to 
somebody face to face than getting a telephone call or a face on the television or even a 
letter ... showing your face, being able to talk to people improves matters 
tremendously'. 77 Nevertheless, the inescapable conclusion was a very weak Conservative 
canvass capability. 
This led the centre to increase its telephone capacity. It provided reach into flats and 
institutions, but was hampered by number unavailability. There were mixed views from 
activists. In 2005: 'telephone canvassing was an absolute fiasco, it didn't work then, it 
193 
doesn't work now ... they did it from Coleshill and gave us the results, which were poor 
... they even called our PPC ... it irritates the electorate terribly'. 
8 Moreover: 'people got 
"cheesed-off' because they'd already postal voted and they were rung up again ... you 
don't know whether people have sent them in ... it didn't seem very co-ordinated ... 
Central Office should listen more to local people ... we should be able to say we've 
done 
a leaflet drop in X and can you do a telephone hit in that area to back it up'. 79 Some 
however, praised the telephone campaign: 'it's a tough world out there, we have to be 
practical ... the call centre during the 2005 election was very valuable'. 
S0 Here though, 
there was further evidence of a lack of national and local campaign alignment. 
Canvassing weakness affected get-out-the-vote capability. There was concern because: 'at 
the grass roots level you have your vote and the vote is what it is all about ... the more 
activists you have, the better the turnout will be'. 8' A professional added: 'we have a 
greater understanding than previously of the importance of local campaigning ... it's 
about finding out who your supporters are and making sure they vote ... that is 
increasingly important, lower turnout elections, differential turnout, it's getting more 
people to the poll ... it's all about people, we will have a good organisation where we 
have the right people to lead and encourage it ... the problem 
is when they become very 
dependent on a small number'. 82 Overall, there was a clear political deficit in face-to-face 
communication in the Conservative Party. This has further implications for the local 
campaign work of Denver and Hands, Johnston and Pattie, and Seyd and Whitelely. 
Competent local leadership could improve canvass performance, but practically leafleting 
was viewed as the primary competitive weapon. 
3. Leafleting 
For many activists, local capability equated to the production and delivery of campaign 
literature. Central encroachment into the former was alluded to, earlier. It was politically 
motivated, a professional asserting: 'most local associations still say they're independent, 
even if they're not (laughs) ... the party has chosen to make life much easier to toe the 
line ... the easiest way to produce branch newsletters is through the computer ... it's 
things like that where it's so much easier to do it the right way ... you 
find the odd 
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"stroppy" person who'd sooner spend two hours doing it just because it isn't Central 
Office, but those are getting few and far between now'. 83 Regional campaign centres 
reinforced this: 'in the Conservative campaign centre, the artwork is there so you only 
have to put in your own words, you don't have to design the leaflet, the layout is there ... 
but we need professional staff on the ground, trained agents can monitor, pull back and 
control ... now, in whatever constituency, people will recognise a Conservative leaflet, a 
Conservative brand ... some might call it indoctrination, it is, but it's necessary because 
you've got to have that brand coming across very strongly ... the media is not based in a 
single constituency, it is 24/7 and a much wider base, we've got to have that standard'. 84 
An area officer added: 'the professionals say to constituencies you need to develop this 
ward and will you put out a leaflet, they know the issues and the campaign centre 
produces a good effective leaflet ... we need good design because a lot of constituencies 
put out rubbish'. 85 In a conference speech to activists, party chairman Caroline Spelman 
suggested the campaign centres were there 'to give you the "support" you need'; 86 the 
evidence though, pointed to greater control. Local disputes over leaflet content and 
wording were common. 87 There was a tension between central branding and policy co- 
ordination, and -activist political motivation in which the professionals were imposing 
their will. Activist de-politicising would have implications for the party's ability to attract 
quality members. 
Delivery capability meant maximisation of coverage. In Somerton and Frome, two-thirds 
was deemed acceptable, which given its size, could be construed as creditable. However, 
the strategically important town of Frome, where the Liberal Democrat MP was 
strongest, recorded 'abysmal' levels of activity. Similar gaps were reported in other 
associations, with some areas having little or none. The issue was critical. At Cheadle in 
2005, the centre bombarded the association with leaflets, CDs and posters, but there were 
insufficient activists to cope and co-ordination was poor. 88 It now desired complete 
constituency coverage once a year and target wards quarterly. 9 However, a demand for a 
further intensification of this was putting delivery networks and thus voluntarism under 
strain. 90 In Cheltenham, the agent noted: 'the number one priority is to increase our ability 
to deliver leaflets', and 'in a marginal seat, 500,1000 votes, your organisation really is 
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absolutely key because if you did an honest assessment of the last time we put out a 
leaflet in this village and that town, you'd be shocked by some of the results ... people's 
desire or willingness to become committed has changed ... the key to changing that 
organisational weakness is to say "we want you to deliver 100 leaflets in this road once 
every two months" so the commitment is small ... that will not give us 100% coverage, 
but if we get near 70-80% we'd have done very well ... we need local leadership to push 
... on the margins it's how that organisation gives you that extra per cent'. 
91 Hence, an 
officer stressed: 'it's "bums on seats", it's activists ... another 30 active people and we'd 
be able to wipe the place clean, we would have Conservatives in every (local) seat ... 
that's why mutual aid between Cotswold, Tewkesbury and ourselves, which we are 
planning over the next three years, is going to be vitally important'. 92 In Derby, the 
problem was encapsulated: 'it's sporadic, some areas are stronger than others ... it's not a 
lack of skills, it's not a lack of members, it's a lack of able members because a lot are 
older and have neither the ability nor the inclination to do the things we need, it's a 
disparity in the age profile'. 3 Another officer though, demurred: 'it's in the 
implementation ... we're good at talking about it, too many talking shops, not enough 
action seen'. 94 
Leafleting was believed by volunteers and professionals alike to be the optimal way of 
communicating the party's message locally, but concern was expressed over relative 
performance. The Liberal Democrats particularly: 'have been very good over the last 20 
years working the constituency and the wards ... we've found through trial and effort that 
if we get a piece of literature through the doors every two months our vote increases, 
paper with our name and an issue gets brand recognition and it overcomes some of the 
cynicism that we only see you at election times ... even if simply potholes, a 
letter saying 
we've noted it and will do something about it ... to show there is an on-going presence'. 
95 
Moreover: 'plenty of paper, holes in the road, it does strike a chord, there's no doubt 
they've got in using this ... they do it very cleverly ward by ward ... when 
it comes to 
manpower and what we can deliver, we are fairly much on a par, but they have used their 
imagination, their intelligence, they've got a lot of enthusiastic supporters ... we tend to 
be reactive, the Liberals are proactive and they run a good campaign'. 96 In Somerton and 
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Frome: 'it's hard work ... it would take me three days in my car to letterbox stuff ... nine 
times out of ten somebody's going to bin it, but if you don't give them something, a lot 
will say they had a Liberal leaflet but not one of ours'. 97 However, there was a cultural 
barrier: 'it's a long haul against the Liberal Democrats ... people don't realise how much 
work you've got to do on the ground to beat them ... you've got to out Lib Dem the 
Lib 
Dems and once you start doing it they get disheartened ... but you need commitment and 
heart, you've got to get out and do it week by week ... a lot of our older members don't 
see it that way because they are used to national campaigning rather than local 
campaigning' 98 An area officer agreed: 'parts of a constituency are unlikely to return a 
Conservative councillor, but there will be Conservative voters there ... they need to be 
engaged, canvassed, supported, given the literature and not forgotten ... that takes a 
disproportionate amount of effort in comparison to walking down a leafy avenue in a 
richer part of town ... nonetheless, it has to be done, you have to put the effort in to get 
the vote out ... if you have insufficient activists, then the less Conservative parts are 
likely to drop off ... there is absolutely no chance that you can do without politically 
active members to deliver the paper ... I get hundreds of e-mails and don't 
bother to read 
them ... you're still going to need people on the ground, the ability to persuade and to 
campaign would still need local contact ... they have to be volunteers ... then you still 
have to move at the pace of consensus' 99 However, if a greater proportion of these 
volunteers were non-members, this pace could be quickened. 
Modern constituency campaigning in target seats required energy; in this the 
Conservative Party was lacking, so more emphasis was placed upon the engagement of 
outside help. Agents reported: 'there's more I'd like to do if we had greater human 
resources ... it means we have to look beyond the people we've got to get our 
communication across, spending money for instance in certain parts of the constituency 
to deliver leaflets, using the postal service ... we're always striving to strengthen the 
political, the campaigning organisation, but ever was thus'. 1°° Moreover: 'the lesson we're 
just beginning to learn is that it's not just members that are prepared to do the work for 
you, the Liberals were prepared to do this a lot earlier ... you can't do 
it in the 
membership, they've always understood the need for involving other people'. 101 This 
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meant increasing supporter networks, co-ordinated by local leadership, a task which 
entailed much effort. One officer stated: 'I have a delivery network of 32 people, some 
may do 15 streets, some less, some more ... you've got to take from people what they are 
willing to give, however small it is'. 102 In Somerton and Frome, it was also controversial: 
'last time we had support from the Countryside supporters who did an excellent job 
putting up signs for us ... I am hoping for support from them for future campaigns'. 
103 
In other ways the local Conservative organisation was not attuned to realities of modern 
politics. For example: 'the night before the election, they (Liberal Democrats) put out a 
leaflet with a whole pile of "porkies" about our cabinet which was quite appalling ... the 
trouble is that Conservatives are inclined to be too nice'. 104 Moreover in Cheadle, local 
Conservatives were uncomfortable in responding to the removal of banners and taking 
credit for Conservative initiatives. 105 This added to the relative shortfall in candidate 
introduction, canvassing and leafleting, leading to a conclusion that in the basic campaign 
activities local capability did not fully fulfil the party's needs. This position was 
exacerbated by activity parochialism. 
4. Activity Parochialism 
Local performance was undermined by members declining to campaign beyond their own 
vicinity. Conceptually: 'parochialism is a state of mind ... very hard to get rid of, you 
have places where people won't step out of their wards to deliver leaflets in the adjoining 
street because it's in a different ward, you get that everywhere, you get it at constituency 
level, you've just got to work to break it down'. 106 Attitudes could be ingrained: 'there are 
many examples where you wouldn't get people coming from one constituency to help in 
another with target wards because they just don't work together, they have a history of 
not liking each other ... it can hinder the campaign'. 
107 The phenomenon was strongest in 
rural areas: 'a lot of people identify the party with their little local patch or village ... I 
come from an urban constituency three miles across, a London borough, and nobody had 
that attitude ... they would happily drive two miles ... drive two miles 
here and you're 
still in the same village ... it's not parochialism, it's merely that I volunteered to help here 
and here happens to be a very small place. 108 Critically, parochial tendencies rendered 
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activist co-ordination and hence electoral targeting strategies difficult: 'it's a struggle ... 
the region rings up and asks for volunteers to go to target areas, but people haven't the 
time or the inclination ... there's so much work to be done locally that unless you are a 
real activist like people who do politics for a living or councillors who feel strongly about 
it ... they don't tend to want to go into other areas unless they want the other areas to 
come back to us ... it's not a significant problem, but one we've got to overcome'. 
109 
Fundamentally, the issue was: 'a few of us put our efforts into wards elsewhere, but not 
everyone ... until we get the average age coming down from 65 to 35 ... it will take a 
long time to get there'. ' 10 
Local leadership was essential to reducing parochial tendencies: A professional noted: 'it 
comes down entirely to the calibre and nature of the people involved ... in South 
Gloucestershire, we made spectacular steps forward and defeated a Liberal council ... 
one of the keys was getting people from safe wards to move into the swing wards, but it 
requires leadership from the top of the association, the ability to think strategically and to 
execute a strategy once it's determined, it's not something you can do overnight ... 
it's 
often more difficult when you already have sitting councillors because they do become 
very parochial'. "" Nationally, Cameron established a Volunteer Task Force to assemble 
committed campaigners willing to contribute at least one week a year to fight by- 
elections. 112 There was some replication locally. In Cheltenham: 'we formed a central 
flying squad of people within the constituency who were generally younger and nimbler 
... they would be deployed in areas where the organisation was not as strong and that 
worked quite well ... with our members the spirit is willing, the flesh is weak, but 
generally we're getting there ... it's been getting better probably because we went through 
a doldrums period and that is behind us'. 113 Similarly in Derby: 'we're fighting it, it's 
becoming less, we're beginning to break the barriers down ... at the 
last election there 
was more willingness for people to move into different areas, they understand the need to 
do that'. ' 14 Importantly, parochialism was becoming 'less of an issue at a general election 
because every vote is of equal value'. ' 15 
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Overall, local campaign capability was considered better, but area officers and 
professionals alluded to variation: 'in Cheltenham, they're geared up for an election 
whenever, but it varies throughout the country ... some places are 
in a dismal state'. 116 
Capability was: 'massively diverse and doesn't directly correlate to the size of 
membership or the amount of money they have ... some small associations are very good 
at campaigning ... but our local campaigning capability 
is improving ... a lot 
is to do 
with local government'. 117 Nevertheless, professional involvement was essential. The 
evidence revealed a political deficit locally in the basic campaign activities. The centre 
though, had a political motivation to achieve greater control of local operations in order 
to achieve greater campaign alignment. Its approach was to ensure that local people no 
longer had to think for themselves. In addition to professional advice, there was a mass of 
instruction documents covering every aspect of campaigning and constituency 
management. "" Hence, there was both a de-skilling and a de-politicisation of local 
activists occurring. The tasks that activists were now involved in were now largely 
mundane. The centre measured local capability in terms of leadership and human 
numbers rather than skills. Local autonomy was thus diluted in campaign terms; its 
strength would depend on specific value adding activities. 
Added Value 2: Distinguishing Capabilities 
A core distinguishing attribute was tacit local knowledge. This was accumulated 
particularly by the councillor base. However, there was a deficiency in the application of 
knowledge in the more advanced campaign issues such as tactical voting and electoral 
boundary reviews. 
1. Local Knowledge 
Local knowledge was not replicable by the centre. This reflected local, as well as 
regional, diversity. A professional agreed: 'the best job for the party is done locally 
because they know the local situation and the population, or they should do ... a 
constituency like High Peak has its own climate, what will work there won't work in the 
centre of Nottingham ... it's that 
involvement ... we do a national press release, send 
it to 
them for changing to make it their flyer'. 119 As noted earlier, candidate assimilation was 
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the ultimate goal: 'each constituency has different areas and the PPC has to be very clever 
to adapt to the different ways ... he gets in because 
he works the local knowledge ... 
works with local people in the local wards'. 120 Moreover: 'the value of the local party is 
put back into your candidate ... when Annunziata comes 
here, I don't want her to speak 
on health ... we've got a new hospital ... we want 
her to pick up on the roads, transport 
... a lot of people 
in Frome work for the MOD and they're struggling ... to get 
her 
speaking with the right balance, the management and the election committee will guide ... 
if we can identify UKIP supporters, she will visit them. 121 
In addition to candidate assimilation, local knowledge ensured the preservation of local 
issues on the national political agenda. In Somerton and Frome: it's 'how to feed back 
what people think locally because there are always special considerations in any locality, 
... rising sea 
levels, abattoir closure, transport issues, and their local impact ... it is vital 
because people have a sense of belonging to their own community, it's what matters to 
them, even though we live in a more mobile world and people have less roots, there's 
always going to be room for that ... if the Conservative Party is seen as a party of 
London 
traders with big bonuses, then there is a role locally to suggest otherwise'. 122 Another 
officer added that the localities: 'give a fresh perspective, fresh insight ... it's not a party 
with a metropolitan outlook ... how do you get a broad church view if you only take a 
one-eyed look at things ... it's a question of bottom up. 
123 Competitively therefore: 'it's 
different from the model that CCHQ would see ... you cannot have a 
"one size fits all" 
policy for how each constituency should run ... you have to look at each area and 
have a 
unique strategy which should be made up by the people on the ground because they fully 
understand the situation ... whether you are fighting Labour or the Liberal Democrats or 
both ... in the south, you could put out leaflets that mirror what David Cameron says and 
you'd be very successful, but the further north you go, the more difficult it gets to do that 
... there 
is a divide there'. 124 Empathy with the electorate's concerns could only be 
achieved locally. The presence of councillors underpinned it. 
2. Councillor Base 
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Much of the local knowledge resided in councillor groups. Hence, the recovery in local 
government representation was critical to the revival of local campaign capability. Falling 
councillor numbers in the 1990s had meant'a major attrition of the party's local electoral 
base' (Railings and Thrasher 1997: 120). In Derby: 'everything dropped away, it had been 
since 1992 as councillors disappeared ... it's all down to the quality of councillors and 
officers ... it's the councillors who 
do the campaigning by and large ... we went 
down to 
three from 22 ... you lose a huge campaigning base of people who are 
interested in 
politics because your councillors are your troops on the ground and they bring friends and 
family to campaign with you, and keep the branches going ... we'd lost councillors 
because they were complacent ... you are not there as of right, you've got to work 
hard at 
it and the councillors are realising that now'. 125 In Cheltenham, the councillor loss was 
debilitating: 'every time we went out on the streets, we were frightened because some 
idiot had put his foot in it in parliament ... it was a knock-on effect ... morale was 
low, it 
was cruel ... we had people who were extremely strong, very active and were 
determined 
to turn things round'. 126 Similarly in High Peak: 'as we lost public sympathy, it made 
campaigners less willing to go out, people became ashamed to be Conservatives as we 
lost more councillors and became more insular, which was a protective move because 
people were simply being rude to us on the doorstep ... now we're seeing a recovery ... 
good local councillors will make people more sympathetic to vote for you nationally, 
councillors who can't be bothered and you won't make a vast amount'. 127 
Councillors formed an important link to an MP, the presence of which. strengthened 
campaign capability further. Local erosion thus accelerated following defeat: 'after we 
lost the MP in 1997, things turned quickly, people drifted away ... 
it's the kudos of 
having an MP ... it was the perception of not having a presence'. 
128 Moreover: 'when 
Labour took power, activity dropped off, people lost interest because generally they felt 
there was no purpose to be trying to be active'. 129 To an agent: 'it affects you because of 
local knowledge ... however good you are as an agent or however good your officer team 
is, you need local contacts, local information your candidate needs, -so that's the critical 
local organisational base gone ... you should never underestimate how much people 
regard the MP as being very important ... if you've lost that, you've 
lost that great 
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connection ... get a seat back and the phone doesn't stop 
because everyone wants the MP 
to come along to this and that'. 130 Consequently, the presence of an MP strengthened 
local autonomy, and vice-versa. This was particularly apparent where there were 
experienced MPs: 'in a lot of these strong Conservative seats, where the MPs have been 
there "donkeys years" and they hold the power, but once they retire, it might become a 
little less autonomous... Macclesfield and Congleton'. 131 
3. Advanced Campaign Activities 
Increased councillor numbers improved local campaign capability, but had little impact 
on more advanced activities such as tactical voting and electoral boundary reviews. 
Whiteley suggested that in 1997, 'tactical voting and differential swings in the marginals 
are evidence of the effect of local campaigns on the vote' (1997: 353). In Somerton and 
Frome: 'last time there were about 1400 people voting UKIP ... tactical voting was crazy 
because they didn't want Europe and yet they made sure the Liberal Democrats got back 
in'. 132 Activists however, viewed this as a national problem: 'very difficult, people are 
more skilled at it now ... you can't influence it'. 
133 Moreover: 'we've not always been 
good at it ... in Cheltenham, there's a lot of Labour people that vote tactically Liberal 
Democrat to keep us out because the Labour vote is depressed, it rarely changes at a 
general election ... for the first time, Cameron has parked his tanks on the Liberal 
lawn 
which is entirely right for winning seats like this and he will start to bring back people 
who have voted Liberal Democrat'. 134 From the Conservative perspective at least, 
Whiteley's conclusion was undermined. Local views revealed not just deficient expertise 
but also a failure to accommodate leadership needs; a neglect of activist training 
reinforced this state. 
Local expertise was further lacking in countering opposition tactics in electoral boundary 
reviews. Railings and Thrasher (1994) noted that parties could influence Boundary 
Commission decisions through counter proposals based on interpretations of 'local ties'. 
Conservative weakness was shown by for example: 'they made representation to the 
Boundary Commission ... whether it turned out any good for us ... we get 
Mid 
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Derbyshire, but it has definitely made Derby North vulnerable ... it's the same with South 
Derbyshire ... they've taken a good area and put that 
into Derby South which is a 
weak'. 135 Local expertise was at the individual level: 'I know about seats in the North 
West ... someone can mention a ward and 
I can tell you how critical it is, which gives me 
more of an insight than many others have'. 136 Other councillors also alluded to an 
extensive individual experience. 137 Nevertheless, the strategic importance of the 
boundary process saw it brought under central co-ordination, through the regions: 'I have 
represented the party at a number of boundary enquiries ... there 
is a national co- 
ordinator, but in the West Country we worked very closely and once we knew the dates 
of the hearing in a county, we would call a meeting of the local association chairmen, the 
local council group leaders, the area officers and so on who had expert, substantial 
knowledge ... we would create a 'straw man' model and then invite people to tell us 
where we've got it right and wrong ... not only would we involve them at that 
level, but 
we would also encourage them to make written submissions to the Boundaries 
Commission'. 138 For the local input, an agent commented: 'it depends on the local 
chairmen and whether they've got any background in local government ... it 
is my role to 
advise and be responsible for putting the party's best interests forward in boundary 
reviews, closely working with CCHQ and its representatives'. 139 Activists were 
acquiescent with central co-ordination: 'we didn't do very well, even though we had a 
coherent strategy, it's the first time we had ... before it's been left to local people, 
but this 
was much better to have somebody who saw it all through ... every county 
he went to, he 
made a big difference ... I gave evidence with one or two other people and 
him from the 
centre went, round and talked to the key people in each constituency and put it all 
together, but he sounded it off quite a few of us because he didn't have the intimate local 
knowledge'. 140 Ultimately, local people on their own were not sufficiently adept at 
addressing issues that had significant electoral implications. On this basis local autonomy 
had to be diluted. 
There was thus some justification for the centre trying to find competent local leadership 
to co-ordinate local knowledge and those activities that could be undertaken effectively. 
Nevertheless, despite good intentions, leadership expertise was sometimes lacking. For 
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example, a former chairman related: 'I learned on the hoof ... Clive Allen (PPC) 
had been 
through an election previously but wasn't an experienced old hand ... we both worked 
hard, but we could have done with some guidance ... the area agent 
I tried to involve, but 
he was running around ... the regional office 
didn't help us, they didn't have time'. 141 
Hence, there could be several dimensions to weak local campaign capability, 
necessitating professional intervention. However, the de-skilling and de-politicising 
exercise conducted by the centre exacerbated this. Local weakness though, led to 
structural change, designed to improve campaign performance. 
Local Structural Change 
In order to improve local campaign capability, the centre has been aggressively pursuing 
constituency grouping. However, the outcome was a more flexible approach than it 
originally envisaged, such that the issue was significant for intra-party relationships. 
Implementation of grouping ultimately reflected constituency strength. 
1. Constituency Grouping 
Grouping was advocated by A 21"' Century Party to generate economies of scale, to 
enable efficient utilisation of property assets, and hence to increase campaign resources. 
200-300 local parties were foreseen, operating from modem equipped offices with trained 
staff. Association mergers were the preferred mode. The new entity would 
controversially be called the X Conservative Party; the word 'Association' would be 
dropped. Importantly, more agents could be engaged (Conservative Party 2005a: 6-7). 142 
This was emphasised by a regional officer: 'key staff are funded from the centre, 
additional staff have to be funded from associations ... groupings are to 
increase 
efficiency and get agents'. 143 As such, it reversed a long-held desire for central 
employment of agents; the precarious financial position of the national party was 
apposite. Professionals were keen to articulate the benefits of grouping: 'it's critical to do 
it ... we 
don't have the high membership that we used to ... therefore, there are 
less funds 
and things cost more money ... if all you are doing is maintaining the constituency office 
which is never staffed, you're mad ... it stops us duplicating things and allows us to put 
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resources into actually speaking to the public'. 144 In this context, the centre's capacity to 
compel associations to group together was a test of their continuing autonomy. 
2. Flexible Structures 
The four constituencies in this study illustrated why flexible structures were inevitable. In 
the stronger associations, measured by people and finance, local agreement was essential. 
2.1 High Peak 
High Peak remained a single entity because: 'it wouldn't be practical ... it's a constant 
problem that we are in the East Midlands, but in a geographical sense we have far more 
in common with the North West ... it wouldn't be very easy to twin up with the right 
people, the local links are to Manchester rather than to Derby or Nottingham'. 145 Hence, a 
professional added: 'it's horses for courses ... the London boroughs could easily be one 
association, but you wouldn't necessarily want to put two of them together ... in 
Nottingham, you've got the city council, so it makes sense for the three of them to have 
one association ... although this office is for Broxtowe, Bassetlaw and Gedling, they run 
their associations separately ... at election time, one organisation can't run four different 
elections, it just wouldn't work ... there are lots of places where you can get associations 
working together, there are other places where you can get them to merge ... in High 
Peak, it's pointless getting them to merge or to join with anybody and if they're doing a 
good job then leave them alone ... there isn't one answer, it's judgement of people like me 
which works best on the ground'. 146 
2.2. Derby 
Derby was a merger of two associations, with a third added, driven by necessity: 'when 
we (Derby North) lost our MP, it was decided we should merge with Derby South, then 
Mid Derbyshire came on board ... without that there wouldn't be an office ... we couldn't 
afford to run it because all our good areas went to Mid Derbyshire ... getting a bigger 
office and having more associations together is better financially'. 147 Moreover without 
change, activity: 'would have died even more, so it was from a benevolent point of view 
that we went down that route ... no-one has ownership of any area, it helps to see the 
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bigger picture, whereas before they become very navel gazed ... so it's going to prove 
quite useful'. 148 
However, the Derby experience highlighted structural parochialism: 'Derby South and 
North tried before, but it badly fell apart ... Derby North had a large legacy and an agent, 
Derby South didn't have a great deal to offer in potential wins, so there was an argument 
that we are disseminating our money for not a lot of gain, except for appearing united ... 
if I was a member of Mid Derbyshire, I'm not sure how happy I would be'. 149 This was 
also because: 'the new association's made up roughly 70% of Derby and it felt like the 
extra bits were added to it ... members and councillors felt like a Derby city take-over 
and there was a lot of animosity, but we're all on the same side fighting for the same 
cause'. 150 Scope was an additional concern: 'the bigger you become, the more unwieldy 
you become ... Mid Derbyshire is spread over three local authorities - Amber Valley, 
Erewash and Derby City - so you've got lots of conflicting loyalties ... we need 
compromise as we've got an association based upon the parliamentary structure, which is 
only partly related to the local authority structure ... you've got to have strong leadership 
to make that work ... we have, but the moment you get somebody whose not, you can see 
people almost declaring "UDI" and going off and doing things because they will be 
wanting to sort out their local concerns'. 151 For an area officer, leadership was crucial: 
'you've got to have a strong person to control it, who's got the contacts with Central 
Office and who's efficient to raise the money, work community politics ... you've got to 
have constituencies that can work together ... Derby, three constituencies, there's no way 
you'll get them to work together, that's a headache ... they haven't got an agent, which 
is 
a problem ... it takes a full-time professional with the backing of Central Office to make 
it work'. 152 Despite the merger, there was little confidence locally in being able to win the 
now three way marginal of Derby North. Derby thus provided a good example of where 
structural parochialism, underpinned by local politics, rendered campaign alignment 
between national and local parties difficult. 
2.3. Somerton and Frome 
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Somerton and Frome was also hindered by structural parochialism, which brought intense 
conflict. This was linked to the property issue discussed in chapter three. It entered into a 
joint-working arrangement with neighbouring Wells to reduce duplication by sharing an 
office and agent, so as to increase money for campaigning activities. Both constituencies 
retained their independence. 153 Cameron's endorsement of grouping was a trigger for 
action. 154 The attraction of access to an MP was additionally cited: 'he can legitimately 
fund things for communications with constituents, they have an extremely capable office 
... I chair the 
joint-working party between the two associations ... apart from the 
resource benefits, we have better staff coverage ... the acid test is the election, if you win 
there are no faults with the machinery, but if you lose there's always a scapegoat and it's 
often the office ... access to a sitting MP enables us to lobby shadow cabinet ministers, 
which is harder to do yourself ... the joint dinner with William Hague wouldn't have 
happened, which is the lesson we've learned about co-operation'. '55 
Strong leadership was vital to manage the protracted squabbling. For the chairman, joint 
working: 'was supported by the vast majority of the executive as an essential part of us 
continuing being an effective association, with the ability to win at the next election ... it 
wasn't without pain ... the old guard, they call themselves "the old and the bold", want us 
to review our joint working and to insist who is on the joint-working parties ... so they 
can move back to Wincanton and have a full-time agent and we say fine, how are you 
going to afford to do that'. 156 Their motion to the AGM was couched in terms of winning 
the election. It tried to halt progress towards joint working, pending a review followed by 
a special general meeting, thereby undermining the officer team. Doubt was expressed 
whether a successful campaign against the Liberal Democrats could be originated from 
outside and there was belief that they would make political capital out of the office 
closure. This was discounted on the grounds that campaign and membership activity 
occurred in the branches, and not the constituency office. 157 The motion failed: 'some of 
the real old stagers hate the thought that we've always had an office in Wincanton, they 
liked to pop in and talk to the secretary, have a cup of coffee, leave their shopping, use it 
as a social centre, but I don't believe it got us one more vote ... 75% of the executive 
voted for it ... at the AGM they were defeated more heavily by 85% ... some still want to 
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turn the clock back and re-open the Wincanton office ... I hope it never happens'. 
158 
Hence for the officers: 'we said to the executive council that we will review how the 
arrangements are going ... they are going well, the review will say there's no way of 
going back ... there's still a groundswell of people who want to go back to Wincanton 
because Wells takes the first grab and we're second fiddle ... it isn't true'. 
159 To another 
progressive officer: 'if you have older, intransigent, members who'd been chairman and 
the rest, and who'd worked wonderfully hard for the constituency ... their views are not 
necessarily those of people who have joined more recently ... to "the old and the bold", 
we are losing our constituency, but of course we're not, it's still Somerton and Frome and 
we do all the things in it ... it is only the office which is involved'. 
160 
The strength of opposition in Somerton and Frome was contrasted with the new candidate 
selection procedure: 'that's not the resigning aspect, it's the move from Wincanton that's 
the resignation aspect ... "the old and the bold" will say that I'm for selling 2 Market 
Place and I said "no" because the executive has agreed the process that we go through 
and I'm sticking with what it says ... I will not try and undermine it ... that's what "the 
old and the bold" are trying to do, undermine what I'm doing and what the Conservative 
Party is trying to do nationally as well'. 161 On the same comparison, a professional added: 
'bizarre, and it's absolutely not fit for purpose, you compare it to the Gloucestershire 
establishment and even Wells, which inside is an efficient working operation ... so 
bizarre, bizarre, bizarre ... the problem is they're just lines on a map, they had an office in 
Wincanton and they were all arguing that it should be in Frome ... it's ridiculous ... if it 
was a case of should we pull the troops out of Iraq or out of the office in Wells'. 
Moreover, on the stance taken by "the old and the bold": 'they would vehemently deny it, 
but it's almost a Luddite approach ... I am espousing the merits of localism and you 
might say surely grouping is absolutely the opposite of that, but not at all ... grouping has 
enabled us to reinvigorate ourselves locally ... Forest of Dean in 1999 couldn't afford to 
campaign ... we only contested five seats on the council, now we have 31 councillors, so 
don't tell me grouping stops you performing at the local level ... I devote quite a lot time 
to grouping, it is a key activity ... the constituencies that make up the shire of Somerset, I 
would have all of them operating out of one state of the art office, somewhere off the MS 
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between Bridgwater and Taunton, just as Gloucestershire are doing ... do we want them 
to buy new curtains for the meeting room when they can't afford to print an In Touch 
newsletter, no ... if trying to persuade them of the error of their ways is perceived as 
interfering, then I plead guilty because my job is to try and lead them in the direction of 
political success and one of the lessons we learnt from the Liberal Democrats over the 
years is that you don't need a fantastically snazzy office to win a parliamentary seat'. 162 
Somerton and Frome therefore, showed a clear lack of campaign alignment between the 
centre and parts of the association; the professional's frustration was a stark illustration of 
this. Persistent local autonomy is thwarting his aim. 
2.4. Cheltenham 
Cheltenham's approach was more progressive. Importantly, it reflected the belief that the 
optimum structural model combined efficiency gains with the projection of local identity. 
The association was part of a looser grouping of six north Gloucestershire constituencies 
which retained their individual identities, and which were supported by a single office 
containing three agents. The group espoused mutual aid, Cotswold, the wealthiest and 
with a large membership, assisting the weaker constituencies. 163 The aim was to achieve 
a full complement of MPs; currently, there were three. Competitively: 'Cheltenham has 
never been a rich association, Gloucester similarly ... the Liberal Democrat operation 
in 
Cheltenham has a town presence and an MP's resources ... we had to come up with 
something to enable us to battle with them on at least a par ... as much as you rely on 
your volunteers, it is not the same as a resourced operation ... we would not have got 
there on our own'. 164 Furthermore: 'for the county council elections, one piece of standard 
literature goes across all six constituencies with a localised page relating to that ward and 
that council candidate ... when there were six independent constituencies, we were each 
doing our own literature, it all looked different ... now, you'll get one consistent message, 
the brand is being reinforced'. 165 Local identity was more effectively promoted under a 
flexible grouping arrangement. 
The four constituencies revealed different approaches to grouping. Local autonomy 
meant that it was not practical for the centre to impose its preferred merger solution 
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across the country. Flexibility was a requirement to keep active members involved. Even 
then, the Somerton and Frome experience saw pockets of intense structural parochialism 
from a rump of older members. This meant that the outcome has fallen short of the 
centre's desire to achieve full campaign alignment between national and local interests. 
3. Implementing Change 
The grouping solution was essentially related to constituency strength. A campaign 
department memorandum authorised regional directors to 'work to strengthen the party 
organisation by promoting grouping and mergers'. 166 For this purpose, differing 
leadership styles were observed, ranging from strong-arm tactics to traditional moral 
persuasion: 'I have the power to impose structures on associations ... federations where 
the Conservative Party is very weak, such as Leigh and Wigan, but in central Lancashire 
a loose grouping would be better'. 167 Moreover: 'we've got rid of constituencies in 
Manchester because we had a serious situation, the vote was declining rapidly for years 
and it was in the hands of people who were doing the party no good ... the party will 
merge constituencies more and more, so they're gradually going to lose their autonomy 
... the party chairman wants target constituencies to employ agents and share facilities, so 
a lot of pressure is put on the officers of target seats'. 168 By contrast: 'there is a 
groundswell of resistance in a variety of places ... there's no doubt these things will 
come, but because of the tradition of local autonomy you can only persuade and 
endeavour ... there are a couple of associations in Somerset where we are gently 
increasing the level of persuasion without getting anywhere near blackmail ... "wouldn't 
it be better, you could do so much more" ... we're hoping they see the moral case rather 
than feel they are having their arms twisted ... it is my job to try and make 
it happen 
because it will give us a more suitable campaign base, but the actual form of the grouping 
is down to the various associations. 169 
The stronger associations could exercise judgement on the form of grouping adopted, but 
only this. Localism, reflected particularly by candidate selection, was a key factor. Thus: 
'in some places, it may make sense to federate ... it makes no sense here (Cheltenham) ... 
it goes back to why don't you merge a branch, you don't because people have quite a 
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pride in their own area ... if you want to make it an amorphous, you're not creating more 
talent, you are creating less'. 170 For a professional: 'merger becomes inexorably linked to 
the idea of take-over and loss of identity ... Swindon have merged the two associations 
because they make up one clearly defined geographical town, Swindon North didn't feel 
they were being taken over by Swindon South and vice-versa ... in Cornwall, even the 
idea would have been a disaster, because they would have said what's us in Torpoint got 
in common with them down in Truro, but of course what they have in common is 
Cornwall and Conservative ... so, I certainly favour grouping rather that mergers ... the 
single most jealously guarded right of any local Conservative association, and it's another 
argument against merger because of the signals it sends, is the right to select your own 
candidate ... anything that erodes the perceived authority of local associations could 
quickly turn into disaster'. 171 
For the centre, the principle of grouping was non-negotiable. It was the structural solution 
for stronger local campaigning organisations. In this, it will prevail, in spite of the 
parochialism seen in Somerton and Frome. The moral case' was accepted by most officers 
as essential for electoral progress. Nevertheless, local autonomy in the stronger 
associations ensured that flexibility was pursued, even if full alignment of national and 
local campaign interests was not realised. Importantly, the preservation of local identity 
was a driver, and was accepted at least by regional professionals. Overall, grouping was a 
further illustration that the centre controlled the strategy, local the implementation. 
Conclusion 
Qualitative evidence was presented to support the survey data of Johnston and Pattie, 
Denver and Hands, and Seyd and Whiteley on the importance of local campaigns. It 
stressed the maintenance of local presence, improving local competitiveness through a 
local candidate and local interpretation of political issues. This dimension was now 
recognised by the Conservative Party leadership who, correctly seeing local campaign 
weaknesses, proactively sought to wrest control of the local campaign strategy. Several 
organisational mechanisms were revealed to assist the party's recovery. Firstly, and 
critically, there was the establishment of the local campaign team, under the leadership of 
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a centrally trained candidate. This enabled direct transfusion of the national campaign 
strategy, more effective campaign monitoring and control, and the engagement of outside 
expertise. Secondly, the centre employed technology to issue campaign guidelines and 
control of literature templates. This initiative was supported by professionally-managed 
regional campaign centres, to ensure the reinforcement of the Conservative brand, as 
conceived by the centre. Thirdly, the increasing importance of persuasive campaigning 
locally (Denver and Hands 1997) induced central involvement in activities that were 
previously the local preserve. These included the electoral boundaries review and 
telephone canvassing to counter local deficiencies. Finally, the centre has aggressively 
embarked on a programme of constituency grouping to achieve campaign efficiencies 
and increase its agent portfolio. All of these initiatives were designed to produce a greater 
alignment between national and local campaign interests and improve performance, but 
progress has been varied; in each case, there was an important local dimension. 
Campaign team performance ultimately reflected its composition, in terms of both 
candidate and local skills and commitment. Moreover, there was much evidence of local 
literature disputes, related to both content and distribution co-ordination. Telephone 
canvassing was badly co-ordinated and generally not liked. Finally, the centre was 
obliged to accept grouping arrangements that were more flexible than it desired. The 
projection of local identity was the aim, but the outcome often related to individual 
constituencies rather than a combination. It can thus be concluded that the organisational 
response to defeat, in terms of campaigning, has fallen short of the leadership's ideal. 
Local autonomy accounted for some of this shortfall. For the leadership, progress 
required its dismantling, but for the purpose of activist motivation, its preservation in a 
different form. The evidence from this chapter revealed this. Firstly, the campaign team 
concept enabled the separation of formulation and implementation of strategy consistent 
with the formal strategic planning model (Andrews 1980). Local parties were now 
responsible for implementation only; they could make adjustments to suit local 
characteristics, but not alter the central thrust. Secondly, that the campaign team itself 
was separated from the association mainstream reinforced this change; although it 
permitted activists to claim continuing autonomy over membership and fundraising. 
213 
Ultimately though, they accepted the centre's right to organise the campaign, as being the 
best approach to ensuring success. Thirdly, the advent of grouping meant that many 
constituency parties either merged or became part of a larger network. The result for 
them was a degree of shared autonomy, but the fact that the grouping concept was non- 
negotiable - only the type was subject to agreement - meant that local autonomy was 
diluted. Nevertheless, they retained some independence. In campaigning it was a function 
of their ability to add value. Here, the evidence pointed to a political deficit driven by two 
inter-related processes. Firstly, a natural reduction in local capability, underpinned by an 
ageing membership combined with technological change. There was a shortfall in the 
basic activities of candidate introduction, canvassing and leaflet distribution; for the 
latter, external supporter networks became increasingly essential. Moreover, activists 
lacked media and marketing expertise, and demonstrated inabilities in advanced activities 
such as tactical voting. Secondly, a purposeful reduction in capability, manifested in the 
de-skilling and de-politicisation of activists, undermined the local position further; 
technology was again the key to change. This would likely have an impact on the party's 
ability to attract competent local officers in the future. The overall capability deficit was 
only partially offset by the local knowledge accumulated, especially by councillor 
groups. Progressive associations, such as Cheltenham, though, could achieve extensive 
membership of campaign teams and exert a good degree of independence. Because of the 
renewed importance of local campaigns, activists had to retain a substantial input into 
them, and hence some autonomy. The conclusion however, was that owing to the 
capability shortfalls, central professionals had to become involved. 
The modified form of local autonomy warrants interpretation with respect to the 
literature. Firstly, equating the control of campaign strategy with policy meant a re- 
affirmation of McKenzie's stance that final authority rests with the leadership. PPC 
leadership of campaign teams and initiatives such as template design represented nuanced 
approaches to re-emphasising oligarchy. However, the continuing local input meant that 
this was not absolute. Secondly, the evidence seemingly underlined the electoral- 
professional model, with its centralisation of campaigns. Top-down planning, campaign 
teams, campaign guidelines and constituency grouping were all consistent with the 
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tightening of the organisation for the better resource utilisation and discipline associated 
with political marketing. The local role conceived in delivery terms was also consonant 
with Carry's (2004) franchise model. Finally, the twin processes of de-skilling and de- 
politicisation of activists were a natural development of not just Panebianco and Carty, 
but also Kirchheimer, and Katz and Mair. However, the evidence again suggested that 
such a conclusion would overstate the reality. Local parties were not co-ordinated in the 
manner of an army that electoral-professional and political marketing pure forms 
required. Moreover, constituency diversity meant there could be no 'one-size-fits-all' 
approach to the campaign; activists indeed, strove to ensure that local interests remained 
on the political agenda. The annoyance caused by a central decision to neglect the Liberal 
Democrat-held seats also showed the folly of a centralised approach. In particular 
however, parochial tendencies, both structural and activity, indicated that local activists 
would not wholly succumb to central direction. These have the potential to drain the 
organisation, but local insistence over grouping brought benefits. Here, Harrop's (1990) 
interpretation of political marketing was apposite. The need to project a local identity to 
cement a positive local image and to understand local needs and wants was deemed to 
require continuing strength in individual constituencies; local people took more pride in 
their own area than a greater one. Hence, Philp's (2006) interpretation of the political 
brand as voter instinctive feel was reinforced by strong local entities. There was a need to 
be actively seen locally; otherwise the party would be deemed to be irrelevant in Noelle- 
Neumann's (1980) spiral of silence terms. Knowledge and experience provided the local 
parties with some control of Panebianco's competency zone of uncertainty, thereby 
negating the pure form of the electoral-professional model. Local autonomy had been 
reshaped, but the result was a more messy structure than the centre would have wanted. 
The advent of campaign teams and the engagement of outside expertise and supporters 
brought a loosening of local boundaries. Structurally, these developments fundamentally 
undermined Carty's franchise concept, revealing also a strengthening of hierarchical 
relations. Instead, what has emerged is a revised cadre structure with the campaign team, 
containing the appropriate internal and external expertise, operating alongside the 
association officer team. This approximated more closely to Epstein than to Duverger. 
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However, it has evolved for different reasons to Epstein's electoral peaks. The permanent 
campaign meant a need for continuing voter reach locally, so that organisationally, 
skilled local officers were still valued by professionals to co-ordinate the necessary 
expertise and the local effort; volunteers were not receptive to professional direction. The 
developments discussed in this chapter have indicated nuanced power and management 
structures in the Conservative Party to achieve progress. Candidate selection reveals a 
further manifestation of this and will be discussed in chapter five. 
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Chapter Five 
The Local Conservative Party Parliamentary Candidate Selection Process 
Local parties havealways enjoyed a significant role in parliamentary candidate selection. 
As noted in chapter one, Schattschneider argued that 'the nature of the nominating 
procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner 
of the party' (1942: 64). Gallagher though, countered that no one group can achieve 
ownership or, total control; candidate selection instead 'signifies how power is distributed 
rather than deciding it ... the nature of the nominating procedure reflects the nature of the 
party more than it determines it' (1988: 277). The Conservative Party reflected this. Local 
associations have been perennially jealous of their autonomy over candidate selection, 
rebuffing all attempts at interference (Ranney 1965: 271). Innovation in candidate 
selection came primarily from Labour, with initiatives such as mandatory reselection and 
all-women shortlists; the Conservative Party by contrast had merely tinkered with 
existing rules (Bradbury et al 2000; Criddle 2002,2005). However, the reforms 
introduced by Conservative leader, David Cameron, in January 2006 directly challenged 
the local tradition. He recognised that the party's recovery required voters to perceive that 
the party had changed. For candidate selection this meant a substantial increase in the 
number of women and ethnic minority candidates in winnable seats. Local autonomy was 
a potential impediment to this. This chapter will examine the impact of change. It will 
commence with an outline of the selection process. Section two will address the reform 
programme. Evidence from the constituencies will be presented in section three. Section 
four will add further relevant aspects concerning the persistence of local autonomy. The 
conclusion will then provide an overall assessment. This found that the strategic role of 
local parties, and hence their autonomy has been diluted. It has been replaced by a more 
formal, but at the same time looser, approach in which outside expertise has been 
engaged. 
The Conservative Candidate Selection Process 
The Conservative Party candidate selection process can be distinguished by the 
'professional' personnel management practices at the national level and the more visible 
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'democratic' procedures locally: visible with respect to the media and the public. The 
national process was evolutionary in line with changing political circumstances. Fresh 
Future standardised the procedure to reflect ability and achievement, and to ensure equal 
opportunity (Conservative Party 1998a: 19). Individuals were interviewed by a regional 
director, who assessed their background, aptitude, suitability and future plans. This would 
lead either to an invitation to apply or to a recommendation for further training and time 
to acquire more political experience in a local setting. Applicants submitted personal 
data, occupational experience, party history and a statement of why they would make a 
good MP. Three references were required, including the local association chairman; an 
MP, councillor or peer; and an occupational referee. The candidates department at CCHQ 
then performed the necessary checks. ' 
Confirmation of suitability led to an invitation to a half-day Parliamentary Assessment 
Board. Its introduction had 'legitimised the authority of Central Office in controlling the 
pool of eligible applicants' (Maor 1997: 127-8). It enabled the centre to increase 'quality 
control' over candidates (Rush 1994: 5). The format was the 2002 Dykes and Silvester 
competency model for a Conservative MP. 2 This included psychometric profiling, a 
group exercise, role-play, an in-tray exercise, a one-to-one meeting and a public speaking 
exercise. Prospects attended in groups of eight, each being assessed against seven criteria: 
communication skills, intellect, relating to people, campaigning skills, leading and 
motivating, resilience and drive, and political conviction; scores were noted for each. The 
in-tray exercise for example, addressed different scenarios such as an MP's case work, 
and the public speaking test required consideration of a current issue. Political knowledge 
was at the level of core beliefs and values, and an understanding of national and 
international current affairs. A person's views on Europe for example, were not solicited, 
although there was intent to weed out those with extreme views. The approach was more 
to demonstrate political competence and acceptance of collective responsibility. 
Feedback was given on competency gaps and training needs. Successful candidates were 
admitted to the Approved List eligible to apply for constituency vacancies, though some 
were placed on regional lists and others allocated to specific seats only. The five 
assessors included two MPs and senior voluntary members; CCHQ staff could attend, but 
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it was the assessors who made the final decision. 3 The system aimed to find people who 
could add value to the House of Commons, but who were also capable of leading the 
local campaign, as stressed in chapter four. 
At the local level, associations were expected to conform to the process prescribed by the 
centre, but the fundamentals had not changed in decades. Candidates were evaluated by a 
selection committee appointed by the executive council. This comprised officers, 
representatives from the branches and specialist committees, and co-opted members. 
Around 20 would be interviewed, from which about six would form the shortlist to go 
before the executive council. This was the critical stage; under-represented minorities 
tended to fail here (Criddle 1994: 159). The shortlist interview involved a short speech 
and question session. Earlier reform had brought a requirement for at least two candidates 
to advance to the special general meeting of the full constituency membership (Kelly 
1999: 223). A speech and questions from the floor was again the format, with a secret 
ballot to decide the outcome. 
Candidate Reform 
Candidate inclusiveness was a key issue focused upon by Cameron to convince voters 
that the party had changed. Fresh Future provided the authority and a priority list of 
candidates combined with local procedural change were the mechanisms to achieve it. 
1. Inclusiveness 
The traditional local selection concept of meritocracy had left the party looking stale. The 
Commission on Candidate Selection stressed that party procedures, linked to the decline 
in member numbers and their socio-economic background, were responsible for 
producing a constricted base of candidates (Riddell 2003: 5). Paxman thus observed that 
selection committees were 'atypical', so that 'in an increasingly diverse country, the 
Conservative Party was saddled with a bunch of people in parliament who looked and 
sounded much the same' (2002: 76). Inclusiveness became politically sensitive. An 
apparent unwillingness to select women, black and ethnic minority candidates for 
winnable seats, a trend highlighted by the media, presented the centre with a rationale to 
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acquire more strategic control over the local candidate process. In 2005, just 19% of 
candidates and 9% of MPs were women; the figures for black and ethnic minorities were 
7% and zero respectively (Criddlc 2005). For women, the scat distribution was 14 
incumbent MPs, 11 contesting marginals and 93 in unwinnable scats where the majority 
was 10% or more (Campbell and Lovenduski 2005: 844). Lovenduski asserted that a 
change of party culture was needed to address the lack of ethos for women (1997: 712). 
For Sagger, the black and ethnic minority problem was part of a wider concern about the 
party's willingness to promote a more inclusive brand of Conservatism (2001: 196). 
Layton-Henry had noted an intra-party tacit consensus on the kind of person who would 
make a suitable MP, but if this became strained, formal procedures would probably be 
introduced to reassert central control (1976: 401-2). Reform reflected his view, being 
designed to align local priorities with national strategic interests. 
The inclusiveness problem had both supply and demand dimensions. For the supply of 
women, Norris and Lovenduski highlighted the time and money needed to acquire 
political experience and build contacts, and a need to assist those not employed in 
brokerage-related jobs (1993: 396402). Conservativeilome added support, claiming that 
those employed in the public and voluntary sectors would be deterred. In 2005,60% of 
MPs and 152 other candidates attended public school. Occupationally, 38% of MPs came 
from professional or armed services, 38% business and 17% graduated from politics or 
journalism (Criddlc 2005: 164-5): sectors where women were deficient. Demand 
reflected the notion that in first-past-the-post electoral systems, parties tended to look for 
the perceived best single candidate rather than a more 'balanced ticket' achievable under 
proportional ones; women suffered accordingly (Curtice and Steed 2000: 194). This was 
underscored by a Fawcett Society report (Shepherd-Robinson and Lovenduski 2002). 
Britain's political parties were 'institutionally sexist'; they did not want women. The lack 
of high-quality women reflected low demand because few would try. It conceived three 
strategies: rhetoric by senior politicians towards members; positive action including 
training, voluntary targets, shortlist guarantees and encouragement to come forward; and 
positive discrimination, making selection mandatory. The latter was enshrined in the Sex 
Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, which permitted positive discrimination 
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measures in favour of women, but without compulsion. Labour reintroduced all-women 
shortlists for the 2005 election; under Blair, officials were willing to USC the party 
machine to achieve the 'right type of candidates' (Shaw 2001: 50). However, a notable 
defeat at Blaenau Gwent, where a former party official prevailed showed the potential for 
a backlash .5 This selection also 
illustrated the use of positive discrimination to try to 
block local 'heirs-apparent', usually men (Criddle 2005: 152). Conservative attitudes to 
women remained mixed, caught between the traditional family role and the need to attract 
women voters and party activists (Campbell et al 2006: 19). Change though, was driven 
by the electoral imperative. Women were reportedly 'less satisfied with government, less 
likely to support the Conservatives and more disaffected by politics' (Campbell and 
Lovenduski 2005: 839). 
2. The Cameron Response 
On becoming leader, Cameron immediately articulated his aim: 'we need to change in 
order to win ... we need to change the scandalous under-representation of women 
in the 
Conservative Party and we will do that. 6 Ne later added: '[ now have a clear mandate ... I 
plan to change the face of the Conservative Party by changing the faces of the 
Conservative Party ... it's about political effectiveness ... to create effective policy, we 
must involve those who are affected by it ... my plan for positive action is based on clear 
principles: "guaranteeing" more women and ethnic minorities are selected in winnable 
scats, ensuring that someone's potential to be a good MP is the only factor that counts in 
being selected a parliamentary candidate, and preserving the autonomy that 
constituencies have to select the candidate that is best for them'. ' Candidate equality was 
integral to moving the party back to the centre ground of British politics, but local 
autonomy would be conceived in different terms. 
Cameron's ability to succeed could be traced to Fresh Future. Responsibility for 
candidates was assumed by a sub-committee of the board, whose remit was to identify a 
broad spectrum of suitable, high quality, candidates. A partnership with the localities Was 
envisaged in which, on the surface, their autonomy was reaffirmed. However, this was 
immediately weakened by a requirement to select solely from the nationally approved 
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list; the right to choose an unapproved local person was removed (Conservative Party 
1998a: 19). Two further provisions had hidden implications for candidate selection. An 
Ethics and Integrity Committee was empowered to censure and remove any recalcitrant 
MP or candidate; local obstinacy over incumbent Ml's, such as Neil Hamilton in 1997, 
was thus compromised. 8 Its potential to be used against perceived rebels was not 
immediately understood locally (Kelly 1999: 223). Secondly, there was the threat of 
supported status, manifested in the critical wording "other exceptional circumstances" 
(Conservative Party 1998b: 11). Initially, the area executive, but now the regional level 
would intervene and, with the association officers, draw up a shortlist for the selection of 
the PPC. 9 Overall, Fresh Future was sufficiently imprecise to permit the leadership to 
make changes to the rules as it deemed appropriate. 
3. The Priority List of Candidates 
Cameron accepted the demand thesis regarding local selection, as it fitted his political 
aims. His strategy afforded little attention to broader socio-economic supply, but control 
of it was essential to his guarantee. Campbell ct at (2006) articulated an intra-party 
struggle to achieve greater equality, orchestrated by the Women2Win pressure group. 
This reaped success. Of the eight people who comprised the new candidate sub- 
committee, four were women and included former party chairman, Theresa May MP, and 
the influential Shireen Ritchie and Lady Fiona Hodgson, chairs of Womcn2Win and 
Conservative Women's Organisation respectively. Just two had links to the voluntary 
party. 10 This committee chose the new 'priority list' ofcandidates, which imitated Andrew 
Lanslcy's paper, Do the Right Thing (2002). This had recommended an 'A-list' of 100 
talented candidates containing equal numbers of men and women and some ethnic 
minorities; associations in winnable scats would be encouraged to select them)' The 
difference with Cameron was that these constituencies would be expected to select from 
it, although exceptionally, local candidates could be considered. This initiative was 
augmented by a headhunting and mentoring programme. Cameron appealed to women 
and ethnic minority people, who shared Conservative values and his passion to change 
Britain to apply, promising a welcome and the necessary support-12 However, previous 
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experience indicated that success could not be promised, as the ultimate decision 
continued to rest with the constituencies (Richardson 2006: 62). 
At the launch of the priority list, the 50% women and 10% ethnic minority was all that 
CCHQ promoted; other forms of candidate diversity were dismissed and financial 
exclusion ignored. 13 Research by The Times found just six of the priority list employed in 
the public services, most having chosen traditional careers for becoming a Conservative 
MP: business, law and political research. The implication was that obtaining the votes of 
public sector workers would be rendered more difficult. 14 To Conscrvativcllome, the 
party was not moving beyond 'face deep diversity'. Representativeness would not be 
increased 'if we swap southern male barristers for southern female bankers; real diversity 
will depend upon active recruitment of candidates from the north and those who have 
been homemakers or have worked in the public and poverty-fighting scctors'. 15 The 
strategy inferred that the electorate viewed inclusiveness, as being more important than 
elitism; the former was visual, the latter less so. Moreover, Cameron's tackling of local 
demand suggested that exercising his authority over the perceived reactionary activists 
was integral to his leadership approach. 
This was reflected in the local response. Activists concurred with Cameron's aim, but not 
universally with the method. The desperation to win was set against the need to preserve 
meritocracy: 'it's part of Cameron's message that he's trying to get out to the electorate 
that the party has genuinely changed ... it doesn't help members and enthusiasts in the 
party, but it might help our image with people who stopped voting or to show that we arc 
a more inclusive party, so politically it's fair'. 16 In addition: 'the biggest benefit the 
priority list has done is generate interest and highlight the fact that the party is looking for 
good people'. '? Cameron's determination was recognised, as politically: 'you've got to be 
tough to do that, but it was necessary ... he had to move on, to appeal to a wider cross- 
section of people'. 18 Tradition however, remained powerful: 'I'm happy for David 
Cameron and Central Office to say we're going to use a list basis ... you can't get on this 
unless you've been through a national selection process, so you have the right calibre of 
people coming forward ... but you can't tell people on that list "you can't apply 
for that 
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scat because of X reasons, " you should be able to apply for any scat and we have to treat 
them on merit'. 19 Qualified criticism was also offered: 'if you create an A-list of 
candidates, particularly from a group of people none of whom have loyally supported the 
party for a long time, it might be divisive ... some candidates arc more 
high flyers than 
others ... some I know on the A-list are not totally convinced when they appear 
before a 
selection panel it's a plus because it may have the opposite effect ... if you arc good 
enough and you arc perceived well, whether you are on the list or not, it will show 
through ... they've tried to present associations with a 
high calibre of candidate which is 
perfectly reasonable ... but fundamentally I'm not worried about that as 
long as the 
decision still rests with the association. 20 This latter point would emerge as a key face 
saver locally. 
The manner of implementation caused particular upset. It reflected Cameron's leadership 
strategy for creating a positive image with the electorate. However, imposition without 
consultation also indicated the centre's patronising style: 'it's the way it has been done that 
is creating resentment, it is really counter-productive ... it was the arrogant way they said 
you will do it this way ... you should take people along with you. 
2' Moreover: 'I am 
happy with Cameron's approach, but I would have liked to have seen more care in 
implementation, more encouragement ... people will do something if they understand the 
benefits and they can sec purpose, if they can't they resist it22 Similarly: 'it's a good idea 
if it highlights people with necessary skills for today's society ... we have to move away 
from middle-aged, middle-class, white, male definitely ... if you bring in someone in his 
30s, a director of this, head of a committee towards green development, we would like to 
highlight him, fine ... if you bring that person forward and say you will vote for him, no 
... what's the point of having an association if you're going to do that ... don't dictate 
because associations arc associations, they will probably reject'. 23 The centre clearly 
believed traditional persuasion would fail. 
The filling of quotas brought further irritation, as this would undermine the localities' 
ability to select the right candidate for them: 'the perception is that people arc forced into 
selecting people to tick the box ... the right thing is to encourage people to get 
involved 
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and then naturally it will filter through that more people have been selected from all these 
different backgrounds'. 4 However, evidence in chapter two suggested this was unlikely 
to happen. A politically acute view was: 'it was wrong to set quotas for women and 
minority groups ... John Taylor, a black man, stood 
here and people were saying why 
doesn't he stand in Gloucester where there's more of his own kind and my answer was 
that he isn't here to represent any particular section of society, he's here to represent the 
people of Cheltenham ... now we have an argument used that we want more people 
representative of different sections of society, that was an argument used by racists in the 
past, I object to that ... we want more women in, but how we get them is another matter 
... Central Office should be focusing on how to encourage associations to attract 
members from a wider range of backgrounds so that they would be more representative, 
not to impose candidates on us that they've decided are alright ... we want somebody that 
the local members want ... otherwise, what's the point of being a member ... one of the 
major decisions you'll ever have to make is choosing your candidate to fight an election 
... there has been resistance, I'm probably one of the most vociferous, but probably 50% 
object to it. The problem was linked to localism, conceived in broader terms reflecting 
local people and characteristics: 'it raised a lot of hackles ... last time, we had a 
completely female short list for the final based upon merit ... I can see why David 
Cameron wants to do it ... but this is where CCIIQ thinks it can impose and dictate, when 
they can't because all they do is annoy local people ... you get a candidate who suits lots 
of ticked boxes up at CCHQ, who doesn't suit the local conditions ... candidates imposed 
from CCIIQ by one way or another arc not going to win locally ... they stick out like sore 
thumbs'. 6 This perspective was strengthened by: 'the A-list was not a roaring success ... 
there should be more women, and in the right locality there should be more ethnic 
candidates, but not just across the board, because hopefully each constituency knows 
what is suitable to them ... there were a lot of good candidates by-passed. 
32 
Localism was also associated with candidate origin: 'when candidates arc wheeled up 
from London-to a rural constituency, they're not necessarily on the same wavelength ... 
in that context, locality is important'. 27 Similarly: 'I don't object to the A"list in principle 
... however, the requirement to only have candidates from the A"list on association 
230 
shortlists is wrong ... it excludes the ability 
for local people to represent their local area 
... when you are fighting the Liberal Democrats, 
it really is the key that there is this local 
bias' 28 It was clear that a number of officers were not aware of the option to include local 
candidates. Moreover, an area officer asserted: 'there's a constituency where a local 
candidate is doing far better than the ones off the so-called A-list ... certain members or 
the A-list came to the selection committee that I wouldn't even consider as council 
candidates, never mind as parliamentary candidates ... I've seen it in two or three areas 
... appearance, policy knowledge, presentation ... some are not capable of answering 
questions on the doorstep. 29 
A further dimension to localism was the leadership's apparent disinclination to seek 
candidates with experience in local politics: 'the A-list conjures up the wrong impression 
... there 
needs to be a premier league of candidates, but from the general public, and a lot 
of members too, there is a perception that A-list candidates jump the queue ... you 
have 
very hard-working people that may have proved themselves over many years that would 
feel aggrieved that somebody perceived as a celebrity or well-known for other than 
political reasons could walk in and suddenly become an MP'. 3° Outsider entry caused 
particular upset. Notably, the imposition of Tony Lit for the Ealing Southall by-election 
adversely affected local morale. Shortly before, he attended a Labour Party fundraising 
dinner where his company donated £4,800.31 However, a professional argued: 'there's 
been controversy because lie's not even a member of the party, but the lesson was that 
sometimes speed is of the essence and therefore the ability to react pragmatically to 
situations is important ... but it is still essentially a pretty democratic process' 
32 Most 
members believed there should be a minimum period of membership before being 
permitted candidature; 33 the party constitution stipulated a three-months qualification 
period for member voting in candidate selection (Conservative Party 1998b: 27). 
Nevertheless, Maude was critical of those who claimed that such people were not true 
Conservatives and should not get preferential treatment. Position on the priority list did 
not depend on service, but on the best candidatcs. 34 i fence, it reflected the centre's 
immediate political strategy. The localities were unable to influence the composition of 
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the list. Overall, it brought mixed emotions. Those opposed were resigned to central 
imposition of change, but feared the consequences. 
4. Local Reform 
To complement the priority list, radical alterations to local procedures were announced in 
April 2006; Cameron was no respecter of tradition. The selection committee would 
involve a 10-minute presentation, followed by 15-20 minutes of questions, some of which 
would be set in advance. At least three, but ideally four-six candidates would be 
interviewed by the executive. Associations were additionally obliged to conduct a 
community consultation process and/or hold a primary. Community representatives 
would interview and score candidates on a range of skills, giving an overall impression of 
suitability. This would feed into the executive, helping them to produce a shortlist of two- 
four for the final special general meeting of members, or in the case of a primary, party 
supporters also. Here, the set speech was abolished; each candidate being interviewed 
separately by an independent moderator, preferably a journalist, community leader or 
professional. This would be followed by questions from the floor, permitting an 
exploration of the previous answers given by candidates. Voting would finally take place 
by secret ballot 35 
In the promised review after three months, 22 selections had resulted in seven women 
and two black and ethnic minority men. 36 Cameron's response in August 2006, probably 
pre-planned and backed by the threat of further action, was: '%Nc need to go further and we 
need to go faster ... no one inside or outside the party should have the slightest doubt 
about how seriously I take this issue'. The priority list was expanded to 150, including 
nearly 60% women. Target constituencies with less than 300 members would be expected 
to employ an open primary. Others could do likewise, but where this was not used, the 
full membership would select a shortlist of four through a 'big event; at least two must be 
women. The final selection would then be made by the executive council after rigorous 
and professional job interviews. Finally, any association opting for an all-women short- 
list could use the existing arrangements 37 This was now the sole method whereby 
ordinary members retained the final decision; a clear challenge to local party democracy, 
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and ultimately to autonomy. Statistically, these guidelines came closest to delivering 
Cameron's objective. The proportion of women peaked at 38.1% in mid-December and 
they were doing well in marginal seats; it was `A-list' men who were doing badly? 
Given that it was still possible for all candidates selected to be white and male, the view 
from the top of the party was positive 39 
It was surprising therefore, that Cameron's January 2007 review brought a retraction. 
Conservative-held and target seats could now choose from the full approved list, but at 
each stage of the process at least 50% of candidates should be women. Associations were 
still obliged to use either a primary or big event 40 The rules on women were tightened, as 
associations using a primary had not been obliged to have a gender balance, or indeed 
any women. Primaries were also believed to favour local white men, often councillors. 41 
The equality shortlist was designed to assist local people, Cameron being anxious to 
enhance the party's electoral prospects in the North; the priority list was deemed too 
London-centric. 42 Key northern marginal scats were receiving few applications from the 
priority list 43 The change was described by White as 'necessarily a face-saving 
compromise for both sides, ' noting Women2Win's acceptance; it had dismayed those 
activists who were uncomfortable with multiculturalism and who valued their 
independence. 44 Locally, an area officer asserted: 'there was a lot of disagreement over 
who was on the A-list and whether they were really up to it and ill-feeling about so many 
women ... it's quietened down, but then they've done a U-turn really'. 
S The problem of 
satisfying a quota was again stressed, but there was some local disappointment, one 
officer noting: 'it's essential that the leader continues trying to redress the imbalance of 
gender and ethnic origin ... it may halt the progress that's been made actually in trying to 
broaden the Conservative Party. Subsequent statistics suggested his fears were 
justified. By March 2007, the proportion of women had fallen to 33.6%; at one point 
there were 17 male selections in a row. 47 The centre would point to demand problems for 
this retrenchment. However, it would be natural for able men previously held back to be 
selected. Cameron had achieved his objective of getting more women, black and ethnic 
minority candidates into winnable scats, but local autonomy had ensured that progress 
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was slower than desired. The next section will provide evidence from the tour 
constituencies in the study. 
Constituency Progress 
lach association's selection process contained interesting nuances, which illustrated the 
" centre's determination to achieve progress on its terms; there was also external political 
manoeuvring. Primaries will be examined separately, as they elicited specific issues. 
Finally, the extent of local resistance will be discussed. 
1. High Peak 
Before Cameron's accession to the leadership, some constituencies managed to fast-track 
their previous losing candidates; High Peak was one such, the beneficiary being local 
councillor Andrew Bingham. 8 His reselection was the Conservative equivalent of 
Labour heirs-apparent, but with a nepotism dimension. 49 Thus, it provided good evidence 
of why Cameron was keen for change: 'a panel was formed ... officers, councillors, the 
people heading the main groups in the constituency ... the chairman headed the selection 
and the panel was formed by invitation from him ... he did it by speaking to the branches 
... it wasn't formalised in any way'. 
50 There was involvement by the ACD and several 
prominent people in the community. The process was expedited. The then chairman 
argued: 'I can understand wanting to get more ladies and ethnic people into candidature, 
but they've gone overboard in restricting it so heavily that people are being put off, the 
Andrew type of person that's just got no chance ... I am very much in favour of a local 
being a candidate ... there was resistance inevitably from those who didn't think Andrew 
was going to be capable of doing the job and a number were wary of the speed with 
which he was resclcctcd ... there was a very big feeling within that we wanted him 
straight back and in talking to Central Office, it was agreed ... Theresa May tried to stop 
it at one stage and I got very annoyed with her ... we were able to 
deflect that through 
our area agent (ACD) ... he and I put pressure on her, so she let it through ... this 
business of having people from the general public in, primaries, We managed to avoid it 
... I'm glad we did'. 
$' ACD involvement was important. Another officer was cautious: 
'when Andrew was selected, there was a determination within the association to select a 
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local candidate and quite a lot of pressure was put on people to do that ... 
it wasn't so 
prudent ... one or two friends of ... 
Andrew was not involved directly ... but one or two 
people were sort of ... it's a good thing to 
have a local candidate, but the calibre of the 
candidate is important as well' S2 Nevertheless, the association could not have proceeded 
without central agreement. 
2. Derby 
Derby North had not completed its process at the time of the study. Hence, the evidence 
came from the new constituency of Mid-Derbyshire. It was an early selection under the 
first procedures. It opted for final selection by special general meeting, attended by about 
100 members. Local councillor and priority list candidate, Pauline Latham, prevailed in a 
seemingly smooth process, which followed Cameron's instructions. Essentially: 'we had 
30-40 apply because it seemed a safe Conservative seat and we had a lot of good 
candidates ... we try and involve a couple of people from each branch ... certainly, there 
wasn't any direction about who they should and shouldn't pick ... it was all done 
fairly'. 53 
Moreover: 'they liked the change, they took on board the message ... they liked the input 
from the community people, though I question how they got them ... the big speech 
is 
brilliant providing you are a brilliant tub thumping campaigner, but if you don't do that 
and most women don't, which is why they've changed it ... Matthew Parris (moderator) 
was quite a hard political interview ... he was structured, hard but fair, there were no 
hobby horse questions ... intricate planning applications, how can any candidate answer 
that even if you live in the area ... it's a much fairer, much better process ... the people 
who participated as candidates mostly liked it ... the members enjoyed it because it was 
different and it shows more skills because being interviewed on radio or television is 
what MPs do. Topics were both national and local, but Parris's assessment was that 
members were looking for a solid track record of local political work; all three final 
candidates were from the region . 
53 Localism, conceived as both origin and an 
understanding of local issues, was the key success factor: the experience here is that 
whilst people are mindful of what goes on nationally, they arc more conscious of what 
grasp they have of local issues and whether tliey live here or not ... they resent candidates 
being parachuted in from outside the area and the evidence is that where you've got local 
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candidates that know the area, they do better'. 
6 The centre's conception of localism as its 
trained candidate was therefore contrary to the local interpretation. 
The controversial aspect occurred prior to the Parris interviews. A CCIIQ video was 
shown that 'virtually instructed selection meetings to choose a woman. ' tie believed this 
irritated the audience and disadvantaged the women s7 One activist agreed: 'if it hadn't 
been for the fact that they knew the winning candidate, some would have voted against 
her on principle because they didn't like the filmi S8 Others saw it differently: I was very 
surprised to see the video, I hadn't been warned ... it was saying 
basically that you've got 
to pick a woman ... that was the subliminal message coming out ... 
it immediately put 
the man at a disadvantage ... it's important to encourage more women, ethnic minorities 
and people with disabilities to come forward, but it should not be rammed down your 
throat ... most people felt the same way ... there were two women and a man, the man 
went out on the first ballot ... it just makes you wonder ... 
it's not David Cameron's place 
to dictate'. 59 Another agreed: 'the questions favoured the women and then there was the 
playing of certain music and the video about selecting women ... I don't approve of that 
at all . 60 Neither Cheltenham nor Somcrton and Fromc later employed the video, implying 
that CCIIQ had learned that its patronising approach, at least in this, had backfired. 
3. Somerton and Frome 
Both Somcrton and Fromc, and Cheltenham selected their candidates under the second 
set of guidelines. Both held primaries for the final selection and both selected priority list 
candidates, Annunziata Rees-Mogg and Mark Cootc respectively. Somerton and Frome 
was important politically because, like High Peak, there were moves to fast-track its 
previous candidate; here though, the centre stealthily ensured there would be no repeat 
outcome, happily exploiting local division. Consultation was lacking: 'we had an 
excellent candidate in Clive Allen ... if you don't win Frome, you can 
forget it, but 
Central Office rung up nobody in this part of the county to ask if he performed well ... 
they rung people in south Somerset who were unhappy with Clive because he didn't 
spend so much time down there ... they didn't ring our chairman, they 
didn't ring any of 
us who worked with him'. 61 The then chairman added: 't was very upset ... they claimed 
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to have consulted widely, but my successor was the only person who had a call from the 
centre and nobody else, neither of my deputy chairmen ... they made the decision 
without reference to us ... yet they allowed one or two other associations to 
fast-track 
their losing candidates ... I imagine the chairman of the candidates' committee made 
the 
decision ... I made strong representations to party chairman 
Liam Fox and eventually 
received a phone call from someone who was very apologetic, but it didn't help'. 
2 
The decision aroused further intrigue. In the new process, Clive Allen was invited for 
interview, but his presence split the association: 'there was a movement afoot to make 
sure he didn't get beyond the first hurdle ... the "keep Clive out campaign" was a 
local 
one ... I'm sure there was some collusion beforehand because the feeling was that 
if he 
got in front of the membership, they liked him so much he probably would have been re- 
selected' 63 Conflict ensued over the selection committee: 'the people who weren't on the 
selection committee accused the officers of a fix and said so publicly ... it caused 
dissent' 64 The new chairman stressed: 'I always said if Clive was not fast-tracked, then he 
should be given an opportunity to be interviewed ... he was amongst the 12 candidates 
that we selected prior to the executive, but he didn't get through ... I then get lobbied by 
"the old and the bold" because who selected those who were on the interviewing panel ... 
I put that through the executive who didn't agree the whole number ... I was then allowed 
to go back and seek the views of the branches, they nominated people for the selection 
committee, who then selected the selection committee'. 5I iowevcr, this was contested: 
'the selection committee was too south Somerset biased and it took a lot of work to keep 
people in line up here ... the selection committee was appointed by the chairman and he 
comes from south Somerset ... I've been told by a pro-Clive person that he had a bad one 
... but 
Annunziata is a very good replacement and she's more Eurosccptic than Clive and 
that might be what we need at this stage' 66 Another officer added: 'there was a lot of "is 
Clive on the list", because there was quite a big following ... what 
killed him off was that 
they asked him what he had being doing since the last election to help the constituency 
and he said "nothing" ... if he was intending to rc-apply, 
he should have been 
participating' 67 The dispute was clearly allowed to fester, resulting in potential damage to 
local campaigning capability. The centre's lack of consultation and abrupt decision- 
237 
making indicated it was solely concerned with its strategic candidate priority; it exploited 
local divisions accordingly. It would be a local leadership responsibility to conciliate 
activists. There was no explicit evidence that the refusal to sell the Wincanton property 
influenced the centre's stance, but it was inferred; locally, candidate selection, joint 
working and the future of the Wincanton office were all linked politically. Unlike Iligh 
Peak, there was no supporting input from a regional professional. 
The Somerton and Frome selection revealed several levers to achieve the centre's aims. 
Firstly, it could compel constituencies to amend their procedures during their process, in 
line with Cameron's alterations to the guidelines. This brought operational difficulties: 
'we were a target seat and wanted to select within the earlier tranches because that's when 
the best candidates come forward ... because it was a change in the process, "the old and 
the bold" again were critical ... it changed midway ... we had long discussions with the 
agent because I didn't want another executive to go through this new process, because we 
would then destabilise it and it would undermine everything ... so, we stuck to the 
timetable and as closely as we could to the originally agreed process ... the open primary 
was the only sticky bit because we had said the membership would have the final say ... 
which we did because the members at the primary had different coloured voting cards, as 
opposed to the 40 who originally were not members, but had registered as being 
supporters of the Conservative Party ... only 12 turned up ... so it worked very well, but I 
could understand others' frustration ... it caused us grief ... we only started this joint- 
working in May and then to have the whole process trying to be changed ... I could just 
see our membership revolting to the hilt'. 68 The original process had rejected the primary 
in favour of a community panel of four non-party members, consistent with the April 
2006 guidelines 69 
Other mechanisms were geared specifically to enhancing professionalism locally. There 
was a subtle change in the extent of involvement by local personnel. The 'paper silt' 
where applications were reviewed to produce the initial shortlist was now conducted 
solely by the three senior association officers, rather than the selection committee; it only 
appeared for the second stage of interviewing the 12 candidates selected. The paper sift 
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meeting was attended by the agent and regional director, although only in an advisory 
capacity. Officers were only permitted access to the curriculum vitae to make their 
choices; photographs and other details were retained by the agent until afterwards. 
Moreover, there were amendments to the selection committee: 'it was considered 
important that the selection committee should be representative of the electorate and the 
process called for wider community involvement in this and at the executive ... there 
were various imperatives in the instructions from Central Office about representation of 
those people on the selection committee, with the agent being very specific that the 
criteria were being adhered to ... it included officers, but with the aim that around 50% of 
the committee should be women ... the final decision as to the membership of the 
selection committee would be left with the chairman' 7° Previously, it was an executive 
council decision. It was reported that most members were happy with the process, though 
the open primary caused concern. 7 1 However, "the old and the bold" observed that the 
executive council was largely sidelined in the selection process through a central board 
directive that the association had no option but to accept. The candidate selection rules 
had been changed by diktat from London, thereby ignoring the governing body of the 
association. 72 Whilst local autonomy was preserved through the local party being allowed 
to make the final decision, it was clearly diluted by reduced involvement of local 
activists. The centre was modernising local procedures on its terms. 
4. Cheltenham 
In the Cheltenham process, activists revealed another departure from previous practice, 
notably the local application procedure. For an advertised seat, candidates now applied to 
CCIIQ, who forwarded the curriculum vitae to the regional director. He brought them to 
the initial paper sift. CCHQ was hence provided with an opportunity to perform its own 
sift and ensure certain candidates were given preference. Officials closely associated with 
candidates vehemently denied this occurred, maintaining that all applications were 
forwarded 73 Nevertheless suspicions were aroused locally: 'we had about 20 candidates 
whose papers were passed through ... I signed the stand letter for somebody who 
had to 
apply not to the association, but to Central Office, who vetted them and only sent to us, 
the association, those CVs that met their own criteria ... was that the right thing to 
do ... 
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I don't know who was excluded by that ... but if they didn't come up to set criteria, they 
probably wouldn't write ... they did have that 
influence'. 74 In addition: 'applications are 
sent to CCHQ and it sends them down here ... the idea of local candidates, there was 
some objection from the centre about that, they much preferred their own candidates to 
be chosen ... I've no proof that (they sifted them), 
but yes ... there should be a list vetted 
by Central Office, but whether they are all notified ... they notify, or allegedly, 
everybody on the list that Cheltenham is now looking for a candidate, that's how they 
control it' 7s That Somerton and Frome received very few applications from men, 
substantiated this concern; indeed they were largely the local candidates encouraged to 
apply by the association. 76 Local candidates were also believed to lack central support: 'it 
was evident that local candidates had a fairly blinkered look, didn't have a good 
knowledge of national events, had not had access to some of the advisers at Central 
Office ... whether they had the ability to ask for it, I don't know' 
77 It was thought that the 
centre was coaching its preferred candidates. 
Cheltenham demonstrated that the centre allowed some leeway in local procedures. A 
ballot was used to choose eight members to join the three principal officers on the 
selection committee and a further ballot was used to choose four members of the 
community panel. 78 In addition, the constituency showed a capacity for innovation by 
canvass testing the survivors of the initial sift: 'to see how they would perform on the 
doorstep ... we made this decision locally, we were allowed to do so within the rules ... 
we found enough people to do one per candidate ... we were allowed about two hours'. 
79 
Such modifications though, were not strategic. Along with the other constituencies, most 
Cheltenham members judged the process a success, but mirroring concern in Somerton 
and Frome: 'some people felt disenfranchised in the selection process, those who might 
have been on the executive or management committee ... we structured 
it according to 
Cameron's diktats, but there were people who thought they would be involved earlier 
on' 8° The centre could impose strict control over local procedures. 
5. Political Tactics 
0 
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In addition to the local operational changes, the centre employed some covert ruses in 
order to achieve its political aims. There were reports of CCHQ telephoning local 
associations to encourage the selection of women, backed up by promises of regular visits 
from members of the shadow cabinet. 81 Illustratively: 'the final decision must never go to 
Central Office ... this is what we get annoyed about ... someone rang and said 
they 
wanted a woman on the shortlist ... I said I'm not interested, I'm 
interested in the best 
person to win the seat and put the phone down ... I wouldn't tolerate 
it'. 82 There were also 
subtler mechanisms. Through its control of the selection timetable, the centre could 
manipulate applications. Candidates were given just two or three weeks to apply for 
advertised constituencies. Consequently, local candidates did not always find out about 
target seats, as those on the priority list only were informed officially. Local candidates 
were a constituency responsibility: 'people on the other list are not circulated, you've got 
to contact them individually and say "are you interested", or they find out and say "can 
we apply" ... you can't have class A and class B, they're either 
fit to 'be parliamentary 
candidates or they are not, if you don't want them, don't have them on the list'. 83 Potential 
local candidates for the safe seat of Cambridgeshire North East reportedly discovered the 
vacancy through ConservativeHome, even though the full approved list was in 
operation. 84 This strategy was apparently premeditated: at the 2006 candidate conference, 
a question on this issue brought widespread applause. Both party deputy chairman 
(candidates) John Maples and chairman of the candidates committee Shireen Ritchie 
were also supposedly unaware of a practice whereby local candidates were being 
effectively vetoed by CCHQ after being invited to apply by local chairmen. 85 That local 
candidates were sometimes encumbered by unpublicised CCHQ deadlines just for 
them, 86 added to its scheming. 
6. The Local Primary 
The introduction of the open primary, whilst largely enjoyed, caused the most local angst. 
Professionals were euphoric to the point that it would likely be employed universally in 
future general elections. An agent commented: 'no-one can argue about the primary ... 
the opposition haven't a leg to stand on, it's a wonderful idea, we've opened it up so much 
that Liberal Democrats come in and vote at our count ... we were open to 
it and we had 
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excellent candidates'. 87 Some local officers were equally content: 'the vast majority of 
people when Annunziata was selected ... I've never experienced anything 
like it ... the 
room was electric ... it was overflowing'. 
88 Furthermore: 'we had two Liberal Democrats 
attend ... you have to register, you can't 
just turn up ... it was taken in good spirit ... 
it 
went well ... Mark Coote got over 50% of the vote and 
it gave him a good launch pad' 89 
However, in Cheltenham there was evidence that Cameron's message was not fully 
embraced. Local people had not grasped his strategic priority: 'on the final night, Tariq 
was fantastic but should have been in London, Jesse fluffed it and Mark stole the floor ... 
it was a fantastic way of doing it ... open, transparent, none of this 
backroom stuff. 90 
Moreover: 'each would have been a very good candidate ... Tariq was the most 
intelligent and the best, but we have to have one which is electable in Cheltenham ... 
Jesse performed less well and Mark, the sort of man who on the doorstep comes across 
well because he doesn't immediately put people off, a man of the people who has the 
tremendously important cache of having been to the local primary and grammar school, 
and then went off into education, a teacher, a director of Cancer Research ... it was 
important to have a local dimension'. 91 The spectacle surrounding the black candidate, 
John Taylor, in 1992 had not been fully exorcised. 
Most antagonism was directed towards the introduction of outside people: 'I'm not happy 
that you do not have to be a Conservative member to vote at your prospective candidacy 
... I recognise he's trying to say we're an open party, but if you really want 50 Liberal 
Democrats registered, they could vote a dummy in and you lose a good candidate ... how 
would we know that non-members had the interests of the party at heart'. 92 A more 
positive view was: 'South Derbyshire, about 70-80% of people were members ... you 
only put four forward, you are perfectly happy with any of them, so it's not as if the 
Labour Party could come in and vote in a most unsuitable candidate, you've got fairly 
good control over it ... but perhaps it should have been explained 
better in the party'. 93 
Furthermore: 'we were anticipating that the Liberal Democrats would flood the meeting, 
but there was a small envelope of time ... only two who were 
identifiable applied and 
neither turned up ... some said that the candidate we selected 
had flooded the meeting ... 
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there were three members of her family and friends who were not members present ... 
people said the most outrageous things and it's just not based on facts'. 
94 However an area 
officer related that at Bolton North East: 'there were about 150, more than anticipated ... 
an A-list lady from nearby won ... generally, when 
I've been to a selection meeting the 
winning candidate had got a standing ovation, but a few stood up, which isn't a good 
omen ... 
it was clear that some didn't like what had happened'. 9s Overall, an official 
concluded: 'they are quite keen on primaries ... 
it's been good for associations ... they are 
not always keen on being told that they have to include women candidates ... until they'd 
worked out that they could say yes or no to the candidate that the open primary had 
selected, they were against it because they were worried that it would invite opposition 
supporters to swell the ranks ... there 
is a Special General Meeting immediately 
afterwards where the membership vote on whether to adopt that candidate'. 
6 It would 
though, be difficult politically for any association to overturn the result of a primary 
attended by local voters; the media fallout would be significant. 97 However, many 
officers were alarmed about the membership impact. The point of being a member was 
questioned; members might not leave, but new ones would be more difficult to attract. 
7. Resistance to the Cameron Reforms 
Despite annoyance over the introduction of primaries, overt resistance was confined to 
the rhetoric of relatively few activists. Most either accepted the modernising agenda 
and/or recognised the practical reality. For example: 'there was some resistance, but on 
the whole people accepted that we couldn't carry on in exactly the same vein and the 
changes just had to be made'. 98 Moreover: 'there has been resistance, but that's just 
something to do with being Conservative with a small c ... it was always very minor 
amongst a certain hard core of activists, who feel they are more important than they really 
are ... people will spout on about local autonomy, but equally spout on about the need to 
have a Conservative government'. 99 Practical politics underpinned acquiescence: 'our 
members know they have to move with the time's ... people now recognise that we are 
in 
a different world ... I'm not sure the job's been completed yet ... 
if he delivers success, he 
will be forgiven ... it was exactly the same with Margaret Thatcher'. 
1°° In Cheltenham 
particularly: 'what was the point of fighting against the changes ... politically 
damaging 
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... it would be very difficult to do that and pointless at a time when we are up 
in the polls 
... which association puts its head above the parapet and starts shouting about what the 
leadership is doing, when actually what we want is to get a good candidate, get working 
and get an MP ... what we don't want is headlines about "local association riots against" 
... you have to understand the sensitivities in Cheltenham around the selection of 
John 
Taylor in 1992 ... one of the main reasons why we lost that election is that the Liberals 
were putting out reasonably torrid bits of paper across the town in working class CDE 
areas and it turned people ... so, the sensitivity of being high profile'. 
101 An alternative 
explanation was: 'I wouldn't have said for political reasons ... more out of trust 
because 
Cameron was elected with a fairly large percentage of the membership ... in his 
honeymoon period, that would be a powerful influence with people, effectively saying 
they trust the guy'. 102 Poor communication reflecting a patronising approach, was 
however apparent: 'it wasn't the best handled announcement, it did cause some 
resentment ... all too often, we have found a knee-jerk reaction because of a lack, of 
clarity and understanding as to what it's about and that's a barrier we've got to break down 
... when Cameron first became leader, he had huge aspirations, but he's surrounded by an 
enthusiastic team who didn't always understand the structure and the need for clarity 
within the party'. '°3 Disenchantment was present locally, but most activists recognised 
they would have to accept change. The communication problem was a continuation of 
previous practice. 
Practical acquiescence with change did not necessarily translate into a change of the 
collective local mindset. Opinions were equivocal, age of members being a key factor: 
'with candidate selection, most people I know thought there was no reason to change 
it'. 104 Moreover: 'it's so ingrained, that's going to be tough, politics is not vibrant enough 
... I cannot see leopards changing their spots and the problem is the demographics of the 
membership haven't changed significantly'. 105 A wider political explanation was offered 
for Somerton and Frome: 'there are older members who have an affinity with UKIP ... 
Cameron's a much younger man than they are used to, with new ideas, and they don't 
hear in their view a strong enough message for them as core Conservative voters ... some 
will be concemcd that we have selected a woman instead of a male ... there were a lot of 
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executive members where the mindset was stuck in the past'. 
106 Equally though: 'most of 
us decided one of the ways we could get rid of this Liberal Democrat was having a young 
woman candidate and we're jolly lucky one came along ... David Cameron's made a step 
change ... it's a bit prescriptive what 
he wanted, but they liked Annunziata, she's young 
and got energy ... only very few resisted, but that's passed, people 
have moved on ... 
people love being anti sent candidates from Central Office ... we had to choose a local 
person here because that's what the Liberal Democrats go for'. 107 Other officers were also 
positive: 'he's definitely changing the mindset ... he's got a long way to go, but certainly 
he's done more in 12 months than anybody ever thought he could do, so we're getting 
there'. 108 Similarly, to a professional: 'where they have made a good choice it has ... it 
has opened things up ... in a safe seat, the association were absolutely willing and open 
to consider all sorts of new ideas ... you have a danger, particularly in non-majority seats 
and some Labour heartlands where our associations are not necessarily as representative 
of the whole constituency as they used to be, of making decisions that are out-of-date, but 
by and large they are becoming more open-minded on selection'. 109 This was reinforced 
by: 'the better quality members, the ones who do the campaigning, work, listen out more 
and understand more ... whereas there's still a lot of them saying well what's 
he doing, 
why is he saying this, I don't like that'. "° 
Supply side improvement provided the crucial face saving factor for neutralising local 
resistance. Agents concurred that: 'even though they were suspicious of positive 
discrimination, they've been impressed with the choice of candidates ... it's a sensible 
move for the party and locally it's been well received'. ' 11 Moreover: 'the fact we selected 
a candidate who had overwhelming support helped hugely ... if we'd had a strong body 
of the association unhappy with the candidate finally selected, then there might have been 
more trouble over the selection procedures ... the end 
justified the means'. ' 12 Candidate 
quality reflected elitism in terms of occupational 'high-flyers', but this met with both local 
and professional approval. For a professional: 'the nature of women candidates has 
massively changed ... 15 years ago, it was "twin set and pearls" and 
"now the children 
have left school, I thought I would do politics" ... now, when we selected 
Annunziata 
Rees-Mogg, at the executive council stage four out of the five were women purely on 
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merit and they had a choice between a leader writer for the Daily Telegraph, a managing 
director of her own communications company, a general practitioner and the wife of a 
consultant surgeon, but who had been the managing director of a merchant bank herself, 
so serious career people ... if you had sat at the 
back of the Somerton and Frome 
selection process and spoken to some of the 'crustees', retired colonels, they would have 
quietly said they were a pretty impressive bunch of women ... the calibre and the nature 
of the candidates made their acceptance of a controversial process that much more 
simpler and much more straightforward'. ' 13 This enabled another to conclude: 'they 
moaned about it and then did exactly what he wanted ... they were forced to consider 
more widely and in many cases they have chosen candidates who we need more of ... 
some really good candidates ... people have accepted the need to change ... when 
I first 
came into the party, a woman candidate arriving at a selection could be shot down in 
flames about whether her husband was going to join her, and what was she going to do 
about the children ... now that couldn't happen'. 
114 
This section revealed a number of local nuances designed to enable the centre to achieve 
its strategic aims. They resulted in a chipping away at local autonomy in candidate 
selection to the point where it became very questionable whether it remains. The long 
term impact upon member motivation was not a central consideration. The evidence 
though, did point to some local acquiescence. An interesting further observation was 
complicity with elitism. This was embraced locally both in the composition of the 
candidate shortlist and the selection of community representatives; it was not just a local 
face saver. However, the failure to select the perceived 'best' ethnic minority candidate in 
Cheltenham indicated that local interests were not fully aligned with national ones. 
Contemporary Local and Central Candidate Selection Positions 
The changes to local procedures were significant and questioned the continuance of local 
autonomy. A number of further issues warrant consideration in this regard. This section 
will first examine the perceived competitive position of activists. It will then assess the 
growing role of higher officials and the prospects for central intervention and candidate 
imposition. 
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1. The Position of Activists 
The developments discussed thus far indicated a weakening of activists' power over 
candidate selection. However, they were quick to discount this: 'it's still local ... we've 
got absolute say about who we select and who we don't select ... there's no 
interference 
nationally'. 15 Moreover: 'it's got to be local ... I can see areas where that will 
differ like 
South Wales where there's only a few members ... but where there's an association that's 
raising money and has district councillors, that area should select its own, whether it's 
male, female, it's up to them'. 116 The common view was that people would walk away if 
they did not retain the right of final selection. This was recognised professionally: 'people 
think isn't it bizarre that we start off with quite a rigorous and finely honed selection 
procedure and then right at the end throw it open to the membership in almost a lottery, 
but if the membership aren't allowed to be involved, then they may not choose to be 
involved when you need them, it's a really fine balancing act'. 117 A local officer thus 
concluded: 'it has to be the final decision rests with local members ... it still 
left us with 
the autonomy to make our own decision ... we had a slightly restricted 
list of candidates, 
but we were happy to accept that they had filtered out what they thought were the best 
and we did have a reasonable cross section of men and women ... I didn't feel that we 
were having people foisted upon us unnecessarily ... we all knew that there was a 
bit of 
re-engineering going on, but we accept that ... we need a few more women and 
if we can 
get a few ethnic minorities, great ... we had a pretty strong group of people that applied, 
so we thought we hadn't been short changed in any way, but we were conscious that we 
could have been'. 118 Finally, an agent played down the significance: 'some people have 
seen parliamentary candidate selection being partly interfered with from the centre, but it 
hasn't been ... very few are really bothered about it ... there's a 
lot of fuss about 
Cameron's change to the list, but the grassroots didn't make a lot of fuss because the 
association still had the final say'. ' 19 Nevertheless, the evidence detailed earlier pointed at 
a dilution of this 'final say'; many activists resignedly accepted the political reality. 
Activist acquiescence was a test of Strom's (1990) exchange concept, and indeed 
Whiteley and Seyd's (2002: 27) assertion, that candidate selection was a reward for the 
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hard work of campaigning and fundraising. This was vociferously discounted: 'it's a right, 
it isn't any reward ... if you are running the show, you've got to 
be able to select your 
candidate and don't forget that candidates have to present themselves to the members'. 
120 
Moreover: 'I wouldn't see it as a reward, I would see it as something that is fundamental 
to being part of a local party, otherwise what is the point? "21 Another stressed the right, 
but in essence was closer to Strom: 'not a reward, very much a right ... the party 
is the 
members and going to conference and voting for your local parliamentary candidate, your 
county council candidate is what you pay your subscription for and what you pound the 
streets for ... you have earned that, so it's certainly not seen as a reward 
from the centre 
... the times where these concerns are raised 
is when the centre seems to forget that'. 122 
An alternative view was: 'I wouldn't regard it as either ... people want to do their 
best and 
get the best possible person ... it's not that I pay my £15 and I've got a right to this, it's 
subtler than that ... it's more the voluntary element ... a willingness to 
help out'. 123 
Nevertheless, others extended the notion of right into local ownership: 'of course, we 
listen to Central Office, we're aware of what's happening in the wider world, we take all 
that into account, but we select because he's going to be our member of parliament'. '24 
This could extend into local politics: 'once she was selected as PPC, the councillors were 
all over her with offers of help ... it felt like "remember me when you are an MP" ... 
people viewing the candidate selection process from the point of their own vested 
interests ... how much more influence they can have to bring about their own agenda ... 
it seemingly snowballs'. 125 The link to the MP was commonly stressed; it was a 
fundamental component of activism. Ultimately, the notion of candidate selection as a 
basic right was linked to the broader activist view of localism and a sense of ownership of 
the MP, who was there to look after local interests. This may therefore be in conflict with 
national interests. 
The basic right of candidate selection evoked strong local feeling. Pointedly, recent 
developments meant that: 'we've got to fight for it, but that's a good thing, you can prove 
that you are right rather than just having the powers ... you've got to provide a good 
case'. 126 Similarly: 'it is fightable, particularly if you've got the candidate with the 
qualities that you wanted ... it's the people in charge who've got the 
"umph" to say 1'm 
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not accepting that, look at it again ... the strength of people, and then they 
back off. '27 
This was reinforced by: 'I would have been very unhappy if they had said "we impose a 
candidate" because when you do that you have the danger that you completely alienate 
local people, and if you are the candidate the first thing you need to do is to enlist the 
help of all your volunteers to support you ... 
if you arrive having been imposed from on 
high like a sort of dictator type of figure, you're not going to get very far ... you're also 
up against a sitting MP'. 128 Hence, an agent stressed: 'not quite as strong as a basic right, 
but they would see it as important ... some people would spend 
20 years as an active 
member of the party and never have an opportunity to select a candidate because they 
have a long serving MP, but if it was taken away from them, then there would be some 
resistance ... 
it's the one big thing that party members see they have to decide on ... I 
don't think it would involve huge resignations'. 129 
2. The Role of Higher Officials 
The right of membership potentially conflicted with the growing responsibility of 
regional professionals. There was a consensus that their role was to enforce the centrally 
conceived rules, and for advice. However, their remit has become more strategic, 
incorporating information provision. Close involvement began at the executive council 
meeting to agree the selection system. The regional director outlined the new procedures 
and delineated the aim of achieving greater diversity and correcting the gender 
imbalance; following discussion, the method of selection was agreed. 130 A professional 
stated: 'more than before, we conducted significant research in each constituency to brief 
the selection committee ... for example, the Tory party continues to have a major hang- 
up over Europe, but if you stopped 100 people and asked which criteria will most 
influence how they will vote at the next election, wherever you go the answer's pretty 
much the same, the health service, schools, law and order ... we also touched on 
localism 
and the extent to which it mattered, and the answer almost without exception across the 
country, people told us they didn't care where the person was born or went to school, but 
they did care whether or not they will live here, use local services, shop locally ... there 
lies the difference'. 131 The opinion of professionals and the centre that localism meant 
their trained candidate was thus reinforced; this was again in contrast to the broader 
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stance taken by activists. Area officers performed a similar role to the professionals, but 
in a sailer manner: 'to counsel, to advise and to ensure the procedures are followed ... I 
know more about the rules than they do and when things go wrong, I might say 
"chairman, I really think it might be a good idea if' ... 
it very rarely happens ... a 
chairman who misunderstood her briefing from the regional director, I put her right very 
gently ... you can make a big difference by making the 
job run smoothly ... I have been 
at selection processes where there was blood on the carpet ... you don't get good 
decisions out of those'. 132 
Activists had mixed feelings over the professional role. Positively: 'the regional director 
said "which of these candidates do you believe is going to be a winner" ... that struck a 
note with most of us and we looked at the candidates in a very different way after that ... 
he was very much involved in that he was there at each stage of the selection process, but 
purely for advice'. 133 In addition: 'with Mid-Derbyshire, the regional director and 
campaign director were involved ... they were the professional paid people representing 
the party board ... it's the rules and regulations, if they know something 
is happening that 
is not right, they can step in ... there has to be that'. 
134 Critically: 'there is a separate 
document which tells people what to look for when selecting a parliamentary candidate, 
which is more to do with common sense ... the centre also provided a set of rules for the 
process, how you did things ... we were obliged to adhere to them because Central Office 
sent the regional director to be present at the meetings and the agent, who is a servant of 
the party first and foremost as opposed to the local party who employs him'. 135 Other 
officers were more dispassionate: 'they're always there to give advice ... they're proactive 
at the election when we want to select a candidate and then they are too proactive ... 
that's the problem'. 136 
Activists vehemently discounted professional influence over the final selection: 'I 
detected no influence whatever by Central Office ... I am willing to accept that the local 
association did have the opportunity from the 20 to make their own free selection ... as a 
member of the panel, I would have had some knowledge if I was being manoeuvred ... 
they co-ordinate the process and rules, that's all ... I would hope not to see more central 
250 
involvement in future, but I can't judge on that'. 137 Moreover, professionals were viewed 
by some officers as a resource: 'who might know something about the candidates from 
networking with other constituencies'. 138 In Derby North: 'we asked him what he thought 
of those candidates he knew and he gave his opinion, but he didn't try and force anyone 
on us or tell us we must consider so and so, there's no element of direction or of us being 
told who to favour or not favour'. 139 Nevertheless, the professionals were strengthening 
their position: 'in the past, it was just making sure it was fair ... now, I'm much more 
likely to be asked advice about candidates because we tend to know them ... for example, 
some lack commitment because they may do the interview and then fly off somewhere ... 
I would tell the association about that, whereas in the past we weren't allowed to ... if 
someone tells an outright lie, I will make that known'. 140 For a regional official: it was 'a 
multi-faceted role ... from a technical point of view to represent the board which 
determines the process in conjunction with its candidates' committee ... to ensure fair 
play, to ensure the guidelines are abided by ... I always tell them I have neither a vote nor 
an opinion, but if someone sidles up to you over coffee and says what do you think of 
that one ... I try to provide leadership, clarity, explain the process ... on this controversial 
last round with the priority list and the desire to increase the number of women, I made 
the case on David Cameron's behalf ... it was before the commencement of each stage ... 
those who oppose tend to forget that he never sought to conceal it during his leadership 
campaign ... so, to advise selection committees and very genuinely we sought to work 
with them to tow them in the right direction as we perceived it ... some of that comes 
down to my judgement'. 141 Officially therefore, professional involvement related to the 
formal process, but in practice it was much broader. It stopped short of influencing the 
final decision, but professionals were very proactive in setting out Cameron's strategic 
priorities and hence trying to align local interests to national ones. For progressive 
officers, this development was not of great concern, but for others it caused alarm. 
3. Central Intervention 
The professional role in rule enforcement implied a right of intervention, but it was 
contentious how far this could be applied. There was local support for intervention over 
legal issues and extremism, but not generally: 'if the basic procedures weren't being 
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applied properly, if there was evidence that the local party was acting unfairly in terms of 
equal opportunities or it was discriminating against candidates, then certainly it's got to 
intervene'. 142 Regarding extremism: 'if you had a totally perverse selection ... you find 
out afterwards he is a member of the BNP, or he holds extreme views, it is perfectly right, 
just as Labour did when they had to control Militant, for the centre to come down and say 
no, this is not allowable'. 143 This was qualified by: 'except if the local association was 
trying to choose some thoroughly undesirable character, they shouldn't in principle 
intervene to remove a candidate or MP ... it should be by persuasion ... they shouldn't 
have a veto over it'. '44 Hence, extremism was interpreted in terms of the far right; there 
was no suggestion of it applying to positions on Europe, for example. 
Activists equated the centre's role with accumulating a bank of suitable candidates. 
However, it did now possess a veto, which overrode local decisions: 'local autonomy is 
emphasised by virtue of we selected the candidate ... we had a brace of good quality 
candidates ... if we hadn't, we had the option to say we aren't selecting, we want some 
more candidates ... as long as they find the quality, because we can't find the candidates 
ourselves ... if we could, the centre 
has a right of veto ... the centre 
is better to do this 
because it has an overview of what the party needs'. 145 Moreover: 'subject to the right of 
veto by Central Office, we are the people doing all the work, we know the area best, 
we're raising most of the funds ... that gives us the right to conduct our own affairs 
relatively independently of Central Office ... that doesn't mean 
it doesn't give them the 
right to oversee what we do or check up on us ... certainly they 
have a right to object to a 
candidate we select'. '46 In principle however, intervention during the candidate process 
was dismissed: 'if they tried to intervene, I would resent it ... have a conversation with 
the chairman or the officers, but you get the candidate or MP you deserve and as long as 
it's not something illegal that the candidate has done, then why should CCHQ try ... it 
might be an essential seat, but sometimes it works against the centre ... there is past 
evidence where the party has split because externally someone's intervened or the 
association itself has split over the candidate for whatever reason ... it never 
helps to get 
interference from CCHQ, advice yes, but if you interfere then you immediately get two 
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sides ... we have the collective strength, "the old and the bold" include three ex-chairmen 
who are very anti-CCI-IQ and would come to my support if I considered it appropriate'. 147 
There was however, some local support for central intervention in performance terms: 'I 
do a three monthly report for Lord Ashcroft on the candidate in North West 
Leicestershire ... a regional chairman should be given that duty to report on candidates 
and evaluate their performance on for example, work rate, press coverage'. 148 Moreover. 
'I'm very keen on, as I'm instituting locally, if a candidate is selected and trust is placed in 
them, they'd better work ... if they don't, I want the power to deselect them ... this 
is 
where the performance figures and the links with the Area Campaign Director come in 
much more tightly ... how well are you doing, if you're not doing well you get a 
"kick up 
the arse" and if you're still not doing well, pull them out'. 149 Ultimately for the centre: 
'they have to have some control, they've got to agree that this person has the calibre and 
everything they require ... but, it should be exceptional (political) circumstances when 
centre intervenes'. 150 That some activists are in accord with the centre's approach 
suggested that professionalism is pervading at least the apex of some localities. The basis 
for intervention was that now accountability was invested in the candidate, rather than the 
association (see chapter four). A professional noted: 'if the candidate is under-performing, 
he can get called into the candidates' department, the party chairman will talk to his local 
association ... ultimately, the party could say you can't be a candidate because these 
days, 
the nomination paper, you have to have another paper signed saying that the party gives 
permission for so and so to be a parliamentary candidate ... that's what Michael Howard 
used against Howard Flight ... there is local autonomy, but if they want to stand, they 
have to have a signature which says you can'. 151 Deselection is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but the centre's advocacy of local performance warrants emphasis, as it is 
clearly the direction in which it is moving. 
4. Candidate Imposition 
Regarding performance, 'exceptional circumstances' highlighted above, could be 
construed in terms of the selection of women, black and ethnic minority candidates. 
Contemplating the August 2006 changes, Cameron did not rule out imposing all-women 
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shortlists. 152 However, this would have caused severe problems. In Somerton and Frome: 
'the officers would have resigned en masse ... that is the only thing you could 
do, but I 
would hope desperately that it would not come to that ... they would be upset 
if we did, 
as we are one of the key marginals they've got to win ... people do feel strongly ... we 
have a lot of elderly, ex-service people with very strong views ... I am not sure they 
would be daft enough to do it ... I don't think they 
dare do it ... I would be astonished 
if 
they tried to drive that through because they know there would be blood on the carpet and 
that's not in anybody's best interests ... they pushed it almost as far as they reasonably 
could this time around by the whole A-list process and the more recent 50% women ... if 
they had tried to impose all-women shortlists, there would have been absolute 
mayhem'. 153 Moreover: 'Somerton and Frome would be strong enough to say no to all- 
women shortlists... we would not select and he's got to realise that ... you select the 
person on how good they are, regardless of sex'. 154 A similar outlook was echoed 
elsewhere. Most were relieved that all-women shortlists could be avoided: 'there would 
have been a revolt if there was no alternative as the Labour Party did for a while ... we 
weren't told you could only have that but if you did it the traditional way it had to be one 
... if you wanted complete 
freedom, it had to be an open primary system where anybody 
can come in'. ' 55 Politically, an official conceded: 'that would have caused huge problems, 
which it did for the Labour Party ... it seriously damaged its campaigns in the Forest of 
Dean, by doing that and doing it twice, it could have been a critical factor in the loss of 
the seat'. 156 By imposing all-women shortlists, the leadership would have been courting 
local disaster through a further weakening of the campaign base, but if the party were to 
lose the next general election, activists feared corrective action. 
Although, all-women shortlists were eschewed, there was creeping candidate imposition 
through the 'City Seats Initiative', which was expected to be extended. This was aimed at 
reviving the party's fortunes in large cities. Teams of candidates were chosen who 
campaigned under the direction of regional offices and were then placed in individual 
seats. In future, members might be allowed a say, but this was not guaranteed: 'we're 
training up candidates to be potential winners ... two of the Manchester team 
from the 
last election are now candidates in target seats ... hopefully this time 
for the five seats we 
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might have 10 candidates as a team and then nearer the time have a mini-selection of 
those associations, so some involvement of the members'. 
'" However, an area officer 
added that in 2005, candidates were: 'chosen by me and the area campaign director, but it 
didn't work as planned because not many wanted it ... because of the team, members 
had 
no say in the selection at all ... I was surprised 
how quietly that went down, but there was 
nothing they could have done about it because Central Office had put it to us and we'd 
decided ... the same thing happened 
in Liverpool ... they'll widen it out'. 
158 The initiative 
has been confined to seats where there was a weak association. However, the definition 
of'weak' could be extended. 
Local autonomy in candidate selection was strongly emphasised as a right of 
membership, and not a reward for effort. This was linked to perceptions of ownership of 
the candidate in terms of looking after local interests, which contradicted the centre's 
narrower view of localism as its trained candidate. This dichotomy illustrated the 
problem of trying to align national and local candidate interests. Hence, the centre has 
been proactively strengthening its position. The role of the regional professionals has 
become more strategic, through the provision of information and the enforcement of local 
procedures. Moreover, the centre now possesses a veto over local choice. It has so far 
resisted the temptation to impose all-women's shortlists, but the City Seats Initiative 
suggested creeping change, which might be quickened if the party lost again. 
Conclusion 
Electoral reversals drove candidate selection reform. Change though, was equally a 
fundamental component of Cameron's leadership style, reflecting a belief of needing to 
be seen to be in control of his party in presidential terms. The priority list of candidates 
and the radical changes to local procedures were underpinned by his enthusiastic 
acceptance of the demand thesis regarding candidate inclusiveness; it was easy to portray 
activists as a reactionary force blocking change. In his quest to modify the composition of 
the parliamentary party, the evidence revealed some progress statistically, though still 
short of that desired. Importantly, the introduction of local primaries was judged a 
success both politically and organisationally; these were likely to become a compulsory 
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feature of future selections. The engagement of external community representatives and 
supporters was viewed positively. Cameron stated publicly that they make 'this a more, 
not a less, democratic process than the one it replaces', thereby conceiving local 
democracy in voter terms. 159 Primaries were a significant component of the centre's aim 
of professionalising the electorally visible local procedures. This included restricting the 
initial paper sift to the three senior officers and hence reducing the role of the executive. 
However, the failure to implement all-women shortlists and moreover, the rolling back of 
local change to an equality shortlist, chosen from the full approved list, showed the limit 
of progress, at least in this electoral cycle; essentially, the centre still needed local 
activists. Face saving, which was implied could also be extended to the quality of 
candidates, which was enhanced, and to the outward retention of the 'final say' by the 
localities. Nevertheless, the Cheltenham incident, in which the perceived 'best' ethnic 
minority candidate was not successful, indicated the cost to the leadership of this middle 
position. It showed that local parties had not fully grasped the leadership's strategic 
priorities or recognised national competitive differentiation. The different interpretations 
of localism were apposite. To the centre, it was its trained candidate; to the localities, it 
was much broader, reflecting local origin, an empathetic understanding of local issues 
and looking after local interests. Full alignment of national and local candidate interests 
was not therefore achieved by the Cameron reforms. 
Local autonomy, a core traditional principle of Conservatism, was crucial to this. The 
leadership deemed it an impediment to improved competitiveness, and hence it required 
dismantling. The constitution provided the authority to facilitate reform and as a result, 
the evidence pointed to the localities being undermined on several fronts. In addition to 
the priority list, the officer sift, the downgrading of the executive council and the 
introduction of primaries, the centre has control of the selection timetable, and 
opportunities to perform its own sift and manipulate applicants. It can also impose 
candidates at by-elections and retains a final veto. The localities were ultimately required 
to follow selection rules imposed by the centre, without consultation. Their deteriorating 
position can be interpreted in the twin processes of de-skilling and de-politicisation 
highlighted in chapter four. Many activists now have reduced candidate responsibilities; 
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only the three senior officers have a full role. The introduction of community expertise 
added to this. It is the engagement of outsiders generally that has contributed to the de- 
politicisation, though few supporters have thus far attended primaries. Nevertheless, it 
would be politically explosive if the local membership overturned the decision of a 
primary. All-women shortlists are now the only method where local activists have the 
exclusive rights over selection, but in such circumstances their strategic role is implicitly 
lost. Moreover, activists were having to fight to retain their basic right of candidate 
selection as they saw it. The notion of local ownership of the MP, in the sense of looking 
after local interests, remained a core value. Candidate reform thus caused much upset and 
resentment, even if much of it was not audible. Importantly, it questioned the future of 
the concept of membership party. Solidary incentives were further weakened through the 
reduced role. That individuals no longer had to be members of the party to vote at the 
selection also undermined purposive incentives. However, this was consistent with the 
leadership position of trying to retain a core activist membership and enhance supporter 
networks. Overall, to keep activists motivated, the centre was trying to maintain the 
perception of local autonomy to meet their expectations. It was no longer autonomy 
under the strict definition, but a revised central conception. 
The candidate changes thus pointed to a strengthening of oligarchy. Cameron's approach 
to resolving the inclusiveness problem was a re-affirmation of McKenzie's (1963) 
conclusion concerning the elite model of democracy, where the chain of responsibility 
was to the electorate. Moreover, it was the leadership that drove change through the 
constitution, and the various ruses employed were illustrative of Michels's characteristics 
of skills in the art of politics and control over the internal means of communication. 
However, as demonstrated, the leadership did not have full control of the candidate 
process, so that local parties retained a significant input into the composition of the 
parliamentary party. 
The evidence was further consistent with the models of both Kirchhcimer (1966) and 
Panebianco (1988), who pointed to a strengthening of the leadership and a downgrading 
of members. However, electoral-professional and the associated political marketing 
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interpretation implied the need to control all aspects of the product. To improve the 
Conservative Party's image, greater inclusiveness was necessary. The leadership though, 
was not able to impose candidates on the localities and hence could not achieve full 
control of product strategy. In terms of Panebianco's zone of uncertainty, it had enhanced 
its position regarding both the formal rules and candidate recruitment and advancement, 
but the local parties still retained a meaningful role. In a similar manner, Carty's (2004) 
stratarchical bargain, which underpinned his franchise model, was tipped further in 
favour of the leadership who were able to meticulously determine revised local 
procedures and personnel involvement. However, the model was undermined structurally 
by the enforced introduction of outside expertise and supporters. Moreover, his assertion 
that the franchise contract would strongly incentivise members to build an effective local 
organisation was refuted by the candidate selection evidence. Nevertheless in this 
activity, local power remained a constraint on leadership freedom of action, albeit a 
diluted one. 
With regard to the party organisation, the concept of separation, as with the campaign 
initiatives discussed in chapter four, was apposite. For candidate selection, there was also. 
a separation of formulation and implementation of strategy, with the localities responsible 
for the latter. Moreover, the centre was separating out the different local stages, so that it 
could clearly define who should be involved at each one. Hence, like the campaign team, 
it was able to embrace outside expertise in the form of the community representatives and 
the primary moderator. Similarly, consonant with building up supporter networks for 
leafleting and fundraising, so it was engaging them for a greater candidate role. Hence, 
the party was retrenching into its cadre position locally, but in a different form to 
previously. The local chairman particularly had an enhanced role, including responsibility 
for the selection committee, the primary moderator and importantly, for diffusing tension 
caused by reform. The Somerton and Frome selection revealed the necessary diplomatic, 
empathetic and motivational skills required for a local leader; a regional professional 
would not have been able to facilitate local change so successfully. Structurally, the 
party, again in a similar manner to the campaign teams, is loosening the boundaries of the 
local organisation and contracting out specific parts of the process, but not strictly in 
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terms of the models of Heidar and Saglie (2003), and IHopkin and Paolucci (1999). 
Overall, through reform the centre has diminished Drucker's (1979) exposition of 
'accepted practice' and replaced it with a more formalised and institutionalised approach. 
Local autonomy has been replaced by a looser concept in which outside supporters 
perform an increasing role. This will be developed further in chapter six. 
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